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Small farmers in both developed and developing countries share 
certain basic goals. For the most part, they wish to increase the 
security and income of their families while retaining their independ- 
ence as owners and operators of a farm enterprise. It has become 
increasingly difficult to pursue these goals simultaneously. Farmers 
have been pulled by the increasing demands of the market and the 
state into a nexus of relationships that extend beyond the farm to the 
national and international level. 
The interaction between smallholders and more powerful economic 
and political agents is not new. What characterizes the contemporary 
situation is the variety of forces with which small farmers must deal. 
To the traditional relationships with individuals (landlords, money- 
lenders, traders) and with the agents of the state (tax collectors, law 
enforcers) has been added an array of powerful organizations. The 
most significant of these are public enterprises with monopolies over 
input and output marketing, authorities of integrated rural develop- 
ment projects, and large domestic or foreign corporations. The size, 
complexity and impersonality of these organizations has resulted in a 
qualitative change in the nature of the smallholder's relationships to 
the outside world. 
One of the relationships which has been least explored is that 
between agribusiness and the small farmer. The term `agribusiness' 
has been used to cover such a variety of phenomena that definition is 
difficult, but it generally refers to the activities of a private firm, alone 
or in joint ventures with public agencies, in the production, proces- 
sing or marketing of agricultural or agriculture-related goods and 
services. This very broad definition includes international commodity 
trade (Cargill), farm machinery manufacturers (Massey-Ferguson), 
agro-chemical suppliers (CIBA-Geigy), produce canners and packers 
(Heinz, Del Monte) and plantation owners (United Brands). Many 
firms, including some mentioned above, are highly diversified and 
operate in several of these fields; Unilever is perhaps the best-known 
example. 
Among this array of agribusiness activities, the one which entails 
the most direct and the most complex relationships between large 
corporations and small farmers is contract farming (CF). In this system, 
the firm replaces or supplements company production of agricultural 
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commodities with purchases from local farmers through contracts. 
The contracts specify several conditions of sale and obligate the firm 
to provide technical assistance, agro-chemicals and other services. 
The system has long been practised in developed countries, where it 
accounts for about 15% of agricultural output (Mighell, 1972); its use 
in developing countries is also significant and increasing. The system 
is used by both domestic firms and transnational corporations 
(TNCs). 
The logic of contract farming is discussed in detail in a subsequent 
section of this chapter. At this point, it is sufficient to note three 
general considerations. First, these contracts provide advantages to 
both the firm and its growers, particularly with respect to risk and 
uncertainty. Prices, quantities and quality standards are often preset, 
allowing growers an assured market for their produce and firms an 
assured volume of material of consistent quality. The relationship is 
one of close interdependence between the firm and its suppliers. 
Second, since the operations often include the introduction of new 
crops and techniques and generally involve processing or packing in 
factory-style operations, the social impact of these schemes can be 
wide ranging and often extends beyond the contract farmers to hired 
labour, other household members and rural communities in general. 
Third, these operations involve companies of substantial size, 
sometimes operating in concert with government institutions and 
lending agencies. The coalition of interests within such an agri- 
business venture can be complex and, from the farmer's point of 
view, formidable. Within the broad interdependence mentioned 
previously, there is considerable room for conflicts of interest, 
exploitation and bargaining, with internal dynamics changing signi- 
ficantly over time. 
This book attempts a comprehensive assessment of one particular 
form of agribusiness - contract farming - and its social impact in 
developed and developing countries. It draws on case studies from 
Canada, Latin America and Africa, most of them based on the 
authors' fieldwork. It covers private schemes and public-private joint 
ventures, domestic and transnational firms and traditional and non- 
traditional commodities. Each case study focuses on the economic 
logic of the agribusiness-grower relationship, its social impact on 
the rural community and the ways in which farmers have responded. 
The aim is to identify those elements which have produced viable 
schemes beneficial to local communities and to provide policy advice 
for firms, farmers' organizations, and governments. 
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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONTRACT FARMING 
In contract farming, a central processing or exporting unit purchases 
the harvests of independent farmers. These purchases can supple- 
ment or substitute for company production. The terms of the 
purchase are arranged in advance through contracts, the exact nature 
of which varies considerably from case to case. Contracts are 
generally signed at planting time and specify how much produce the 
company will buy and what price it will pay for it. Often the firm 
provides credit, inputs, farm-machinery rentals and technical advice 
and it always retains the right to reject substandard produce. 
Contracting is most commonly practised by food processing firms. 
Since their processing plants have high fixed costs, these firms have 
an interest in keeping raw material inflows at a steady level close to 
plant capacity. Relying on open market purchases is unlikely to achieve 
this. Contracts, on the other hand, can specify planting dates (and thus, 
indirectly, delivery dates) as well as total quantities to be delivered. 
The contract reduces much of the uncertainty that would exist if the 
company simply bought crops on the open market, and gives it some 
control over the production process (for example, over the variety 
grown). There is no reason, of course, why the firm cannot use more 
than one method of obtaining supplies, and some firms use company 
farms, contract growers and open market purchases as well. 
Contracting is fundamentally a way of allocating the distribution of 
risk between the firm and its growers. The latter assume most of the 
risks associated with production while the former assumes the risks of 
marketing the final product. In practical terms, however, consider- 
able interdependence exists between the two parties. A supply cut- 
off will affect the company's final product sales just as a downturn in 
sales will result in a decline in the firm's demand for raw materials. 
How risks are allocated is specified in the contract and there is a great 
deal of variation between contracts. In some, the grower and firm 
agree to trade a certain volume of production; in such cases, the 
grower bears the risk of variations in yield. In others, the firm bears 
this risk by accepting all production from a specified acreage. The 
price is usually set in advance, but in some cases the firm pays the 
market price at the time of delivery. A wide range of pricing formulae 
are also found, some of which are mentioned by Kirsch (1976, p. 19): 
prices calculated according to the state of the market (in between 
the market price and a basic price; average prices over a period of 
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time, pooling prices); prices taken from current market prices 
(fixed difference to market prices; market prices limited to a fixed 
latitude between maximum and minimum fixed prices; average 
prices taken from several quotations). 
Contracts can be thought of as varying in `intensity'. In some cases, 
the company pays the market price at delivery time and exercises 
little or no control over the production process. (This is most likely to 
occur when the crop is a non-perishable commodity destined for 
processing and when market prices do not fluctuate greatly during the 
buying season.) At the other extreme are cases where prices are fixed 
at planting time and the company exercises constant supervision over 
the production process. In some cases, it provides all of the inputs 
used and either provides planting and harvesting equipment or 
actually carries out these operations itself. These very `intense' 
contracts are common in feedlots and chicken-raising operations, 
where the firm provides an operator with young animals and feed and 
purchases the mature animals. 
Arriving at a meaningful definition of contract farming is rather 
difficult, then. Roy, the leading authority on this system as it is 
practised in the United States, defined it as follows (Roy, 1972, p. 3): 
those contractual arrangements between farmers and other firms, 
whether oral or written, specifying one or more conditions of 
production and/or marketing of an agricultural product. 
For the purposes of this study, Roy's definition is too broad, since it 
would include forward contracts, in which only price and volume are 
set. This book deals with contracting arrangements in which the firm 
and its suppliers are known to each other and in which the firm's 
behaviour has some influence over the grower's farming practices. 
Simple forward contracts, which may be bought and sold many times 
on an arm's length basis are not of interest here. To exclude forward 
contracts and others of `low intensity', let us add two conditions to 
Roy's definition: first, that the contract be non-transferable and 
second, that the `and/or' be changed to `and'; i.e. that one or more 
conditions of marketing and production be specified. 
This relatively simple definition of contract farming is confused in 
practice, since a great many terms have been used to describe 
variations of the system. There exists no standard usage; the terms 
are often used without intending to draw specific distinctions; and 
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there is considerable overlap among them. The following terms and 
their connotations are found in the literature and from time to time in 
this book. 
Contract farming: generally connotes a private sector scheme. 
Outgrower scheme: generally connotes a government scheme, with 
a public enterprise purchasing crops from farmers, either on its 
own or as part of a joint venture with a private firm. The term is 
most frequently used in Africa and Asia. 
Nucleus-outgrower scheme: a variation of the outgrower scheme, 
in which the project authority also administers a plantation adjacent 
to the processing plants. Contract purchases supplement plantation 
production, the proportion varying from case to case. 
Satellite farming: a broader term, referring to any of the variations 
mentioned above. 
Multipartite arrangements: similar to outgrower/nucleus-outgrower 
schemes. The term is usually used to emphasize the participation of 
several actors, most frequently private firms, government agencies 
(often more than one in a scheme) and foreign aid agencies. 
Since multipartite arrangements are the most complex and appear to 
be of growing importance, some additional detail on this variation is 
warranted. 
The most common participants in such multipartite arrangements 
are private firms (usually foreign, occasionally local), the host- 
country government and/or international aid or lending agencies such 
as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
World Bank, or the Commonwealth Development Corporation 
(CDC). The CDC has been particularly active in this type of scheme. 
In one common variation, a national development bank provides 
growers with credit for the purchase of fertilizer, seeds, and the like. 
At harvest time, the firm pays growers the contract price, but takes 
off the top a sum that goes to the bank to repay its loan to the grower. 
In this system, TNCs avoid the problems of assessing creditworthiness 
and prosecuting defaulters. In some cases, government agencies 
provide inputs or technical assistance. At the extreme, the TNC has 
little or no equity in the operation and receives fees through a 
management contract. In other cases, joint ventures have been 
established with the TNC, the government, and the growers all 
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holding shares. Multipartite schemes are common in sugar in East 
and Southern Africa, in fruits and vegetables in Central America, 
and in cotton in Francophone Africa (involving the Compagnie 
Frangaise de Developpement de Textiles). 
The industry in which contracting is quantitatively most important 
is bananas, where the three firms which dominate international trade 
purchase about one-third of their supplies from associate producers. 
The latter are generally local plantation owners who employ large 
labour forces. United Brands and Castle & Cooke have bought 
bananas from associate producers for nearly a hundred years, and the 
proportion of exports provided by these producers has increased - 
accelerating since the mid-1950s in response to economic national- 
ism. (There appears to be little likelihood, however, that the TNCs 
will withdraw from production altogether.) 
The banana multinationals have generally steered away from 
multipartite arrangements and followed the classic contract farming 
model. They provide growers with an integrated package of services 
and inputs (some produced by the TNC's affiliates) and deduct the 
costs from payments to the farmer at harvest time. Financing is 
usually the only function delegated to government. The sugar 
multinationals have gone farthest away from equity ventures and 
toward management contracts and consultancies. Each of the three 
major TNCs (Booker McConnell, Tate and Lyle, and Lonrho) 
currently has management contracts in multipartite arrangements 
with governments in Africa. 
Contract farming is also heavily used in fruit and vegetable produc- 
tion, particularly in Central America. Most frequently, this entails 
the export of high-value items such as asparagus, cucumbers, melons, 
or strawberries, with the firm providing quality control, brand names, 
and marketing channels. Business-oriented growers, cooperatives, and 
individual small farmers have all been involved. Total LDC employ- 
ment in CF in these `non-traditional crops' is much less than that in 
the traditional crops such as bananas and sugar. However, there is 
some evidence that it is expanding at a faster rate and that these 
labour-intensive products are more promising outlets for small farmers. 
They therefore receive disproportionate attention in this book. 
MOTIVES FOR SUBCONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURE 
Modern agribusiness involves a coalition of partners, both foreign 
and domestic, each with different motives and interests. The firm and 
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its contract growers are always key actors but local government and 
foreign aid agencies frequently play important roles as well. The 
possible motives of each actor for participating in contract farming 
schemes are described below. 
For firms, delegating production to local agents has a number of 
benefits beyond the technical advantages described earlier. Contracts 
allow the company a degree of control over the production process 
that is often comparable to that obtained on company plantations. 
On the other hand, the company does not have to invest in land, hire 
labour or manage large-scale farming operations which may tax the 
managerial capacity and technical expertise of a primarily industrial 
firm. Of the broader motives for contracting, avoiding conflicts over 
landownership and labour issues is probably more significant. Cost 
advantages may also be possible. For crops requiring much labour and 
careful attention, smallholder production may be more efficient than 
plantations; in cases where it is not (e.g. bananas),,local plantation 
owners may be able to achieve lower costs than TNCs by paying 
lower wages. Local firms are less conspicuous than foreign ones and 
can often pay workers less and deal more harshly with unions. 
Another possible advantage of contract farming is that local 
growers may find it easier than TNCs to get the local government (or 
indirectly, international aid agencies) to provide credit for operating 
capital or for the rehabilitation of plantations. If these sources provide 
loans at sufficiently low interest rates, the cost of operating or restoring 
the farms can be kept down, allowing the firm to avoid financial risks. 
Local purchasing also lessens the risk of expropriation by locating 
fewer assets within the host country. Contract farming may promote 
good public relations and present a progressive image by involving 
local producers. It can also make the companies' wages and social 
benefits look good in comparison with those paid by local growers. 
Finally, contract farming may contribute to the formation of 
alliances with local businessmen who may defend the TNC's interests 
on certain issues. The chairman of United Fruit actually went on 
record in 1962 as saying that this was an important consideration 
(Jonas and Tobis, 1974, p. 26). How effective the strategy has been in 
this respect is an empirical question, the answer to which depends on 
two things. First, where do the interests of contract growers lie? Are 
they similar to those of the TNC or divergent? Second, how effective 
have the growers been in articulating those interests? Neither of these 
questions has been systematically researched. 
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It should be noted that agribusiness TNCs are not the only firms to 
engage in subcontracting. Industrial firms, both domestic and foreign, 
who have also done so, enjoy several advantages. First, it allows the 
firm to draw on the specialized expertise of a subcontractor (Bauer, 
1954, p. 112; Casson, 1979). Second, it permits the achievement of a 
minimum efficient scale of production at each stage in a process more 
readily than full vertical integration would allow. (If production at 
Stage 1 is most efficient at 100,000 units per year and Stage 2 at 
150,000, an obvious difficulty arises for a single firm.) Third, manage- 
rial efficiency may be enhanced, since vertical integration may make 
it difficult to isolate inefficiency at one particular stage. Finally, 
subcontracting can allow greater flexibility in meeting market fluctua- 
tions, since it is simpler to cut back on contractual obligations than to 
reduce the output of a single vertically integrated firm. (It should be 
noted that some of these advantages are theoretical and have not 
been verified empirically.) 
These considerations have led many firms to engage in production 
subcontracting, or other contractual relationships which allow the 
firm to maintain a measure of control without ownership. Such 
relationships can operate within national boundaries or across them. 
Subcontracting in Japanese industry has received considerable atten- 
tion (Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Paine, 1971). The `new forms' of 
international investment in mining, manufacturing and services have 
been exhaustively studied (Oman, 1984). Oman's study shows that 
non-equity forms of investment, including subcontracting, are widely 
and perhaps increasingly used in a wide variety of sectors. Electronic 
firms rely heavily on locally-owned workshops in Mexico and the Far 
East to produce components which are later assembled and sold 
under company trademarks. Many copper companies produce ore 
from nationalized mines, transport it on chartered boats, and sell it to 
independent smelters. Even financing is increasingly provided by 
local sources. 
In many industries, TNCs retain control over only the most crucial 
stages in the marketing chain and delegate responsibility for other 
stages. If the firm retains control of that activity in which barriers to 
entry are highest, expropriation of production facilities by an LDC 
government may accomplish little. It is possible that host countries 
may actually be worse off if, after nationalization, they are forced to 
bear the brunt of production risks and demand fluctuations, while 
TNCs reap stable profits from marketing and management contracts. 
The behaviour of agricultural TNCs in withdrawing from production 
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is not anomalous, then - it is quite consistent with the recent 
behaviour of international firms in general. 
Small farmers may see contract farming as a way to overcome some of 
their traditional problems. These problems are numerous and only 
those to which CF is most relevant are discussed here. First, they face 
competition from producers who have adopted new technologies but 
they are often reluctant to adopt these technologies themselves 
because of the. risks and costs involved. (For example, new crop 
varieties often have higher variances and are more input-intensive 
than traditional varieties.) 
Second, and related to the first, input supply is often weak in 
LDCs. Whether in response to lack of initiative from the private 
sector or as a matter of preference, governments have often taken 
over the supply of fertilizer and other agro-chemicals. Frequently, 
however, they are unable to supply them in sufficient quantities or in 
a timely fashion. 
Third, agricultural extention is frequently weak, since neither the 
private nor the public sector is well positioned to provide it. The `free 
rider' problem makes it hard for private firms to earn profits from 
extension while the difficulty of designing appropriate incentive 
systems for staff weakens public extension agencies. 
Fourth, access to credit is difficult. Public credit is generally sub- 
sidized and must therefore be rationed; larger and more influential 
farmers tend to get more than their share. Private credit appears to 
be more effective in reaching smallholders (von Pischke et al., 1983) 
but only partially so. 
Fifth, local markets for high value perishable goods tend to be very 
thin and thus highly volatile. While products like fruit and vegetables 
may be suitable for smallholder production, prices are unpredictable 
and can drop suddenly and drastically if a few farmers market a day's 
harvest simultaneously. 
Sixth, international markets, which are deeper than local ones, are 
inaccessible to peasant farmers unless specific channels have been 
established. 
Contract farming has the potential to overcome these problems. 
The risk reducing aspect of the contract may facilitate technology 
adoption. Input supply and extension may be superior to government 
services not necessarily because of private sector expertise, but 
because the firm has a direct interest in seeing that these are carried 
out efficiently: the results will be directly reflected in growers' yields 
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and quality and thus in the firm's profits. Credit provision is facili- 
tated because the firm can deduct loan repayment from crop pay- 
ments and can use the crop as collateral. The existence of collateral in 
the form of a crop contract can also make it easier for a grower to get 
loans from a private or public bank. Since most agribusiness firms 
process perishable goods or export them to large markets abroad, 
they do not face thin markets. They can therefore offer growers fixed- 
priced contracts. Finally, transnational agribusinesses based on 
developed countries can often provide access to lucrative northern 
markets, through their expertise, brand names or oligopolistic 
marketing channels. 
Local governments have a variety of motives for supporting contract 
farming schemes. These schemes avoid foreign ownership of large 
tracts of land, something nationalist governments in developed as 
well as developing countries often object to. They may also create 
expectations that other objectionable features of vertically integrated 
plantations will be avoided (for example, transfer pricing abuse and 
enclave effects). Whether those expectations are actually met is an 
empirical question. Given the complexity of many multipartite 
arrangements and the quasi-monopoly position which some firms 
hold in international marketing, it is far from certain that transfer 
pricing would be more transparent or less subject to abuse. Nor is it 
clear a priori that the delegation of production in itself will create 
greater value added or employment effects. 
Outgrower schemes may also appeal to those governments which 
have a fundamental distrust of markets and of the spontaneous 
behaviour of small farmers. In outgrower schemes, growers are 
organized and often tightly controlled by a central authority. The 
schemes are often linked with and facilitate resettlement schemes; in 
some cases, the primary objective is resettlement and the outgrower 
scheme is simply a way to organize the relocated population. Finally, 
contracting often creates lucrative opportunities for local business- 
men, such as absentee landlords. Those schemes in which the firm 
provides most services and the grower essentially rents his land are 
ideally suited to absentee landlords. Such landlords frequently have 
close ties with government or are politicians themselves. 
Foreign aid agencies also find outgrower schemes attractive. These 
schemes allow the agencies to channel funds in fairly large doses 
to the priority area of agricultural development, often in least 
Introduction 11 
developed countries in Africa (another donor priority of the 1980s). 
Donor preferences for private sector involvement can often be 
satisfied and the frequent involvement of TNCs provides some 
reassurance about the technical and managerial soundness of the 
project. Centralized control of the scheme satisfies the misgivings 
that donors often share with governments about unorganized small 
farmers. Given the interlocking of TNC, government and donor 
interests, it is not surprising that multipartite arrangements have 
become so popular. This interlocking also makes a careful examina- 
tion of the effects on growers and communities, usually the least 
powerful members of the coalition, all the more important. 
ISSUES FROM THE LITERATURE 
Interest in agribusiness increased noticeably during the 1970s and 
80s, for a number of reasons. The African famines of 1974 and 1985 
focused attention on that continent's continuing crisis in food produc- 
tion. While most development practitioners placed their faith in 
policy reform and technological research, some observers identified 
agribusiness as either a cause of or a solution to the food problem. As 
noted above, aid agencies began to see contract farming as a way to 
meet production and equity goals simultaneously; this led them to 
commission a number of evaluative and prescriptive reports. Finally, 
public corporations came under intense scrutiny as governments tried 
to reform or justify these institutions to external agencies like the 
IMF and World Bank; multipartite arrangements were examined in 
this context as case studies of success or failure. 
These concerns have prompted relatively few academic studies 
of agribusiness. Most studies to date could be grouped in three 
categories. The first is project evaluations done by development 
practitioners. Lamb and Muller's (1982) study of the Kenya Tea 
Development Authority is an example which examines the organiza- 
tional efficiency of a multipartite arrangement and draws lessons 
from it for the design of similar institutions. This analysis, while very 
useful, is relatively restricted in the range of questions it addresses. 
A second group of studies might be termed the `Food First' 
approach. Examples are Lapp6 and Collins (1977), George (1976) 
and Dinham and Hines (1983). This school is highly critical of 
agribusiness for diverting resources from staple food to cash crop 
production, for exerting monopoly power over peasant producers, 
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for promoting inappropriate tastes and technologies, and so forth. 
The range of issues covered is broader than in the other approaches 
but a rigorous methodology to address them is frequently lacking. 
Isolated facts are juxtaposed, then presented as cause and effect and 
unicausal explanations are offered for diverse and complex phenom- 
ena. This weakness stems in large part from heavy reliance on 
secondary, often journalistic sources of information. 
The third school of thought might be termed the business school 
approach. Examples are Goldberg (1974), Austin (1974) and Williams 
and Karen (1985). Most of these studies tend to look at agribusiness 
in terms of the problems it presents to the firm and to neglect the 
questions of grower welfare and sociological and political questions. 
Some, particularly Williams and Karen, imply that beneficial out- 
comes for host countries and peasant farmers are largely the result of 
goodwill and good management on the part of the firm. Careful 
analysis of price policies or the technical characteristics of production 
and processing are usually lacking. As a result, it is difficult to 
identify the specific factors which lead to disparate outcomes. 
While none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory on its own, 
the agribusiness literature as a whole does suggest some important 
issues for more systematic investigation. Some of these issues are 
related to the behaviour or welfare of growers or other groups; others 
to rural development more generally. Each of these issues is responded 
to in the Conclusion following the case studies. 
(a) What problems do firms and growers most frequently face in 
contract farming? 
While the advantages of CF to firms and growers are clear in theory, 
in practice problems may arise for both. These may arise from lack of 
experience with formal contracts or with a new type of contracting 
partner; from difficulties in implementing the contract as intended; or 
from attempts by one party to manipulate the other. One would 
expect many problems to be case-specific and related to the nature of 
the crop and its production or processing technology. Beyond these, 
are there problems which are typical of contract farming relationships? 
(b) What role do credit and debt play in contract farming? 
CF provides growers with a package of inputs and services. The 
contents of the package and the weight given to each element by 
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growers will likely vary from case to case. How important is credit as 
an inducement to enter a contracting relationship? How serious is the 
resulting indebtedness? 
(c) How does contract farming affect risk-bearing by growers? 
As noted above, contracting is fundamentally a way of allocating 
risks between the firm and its growers. What variations can be 
observed in this respect among cases of CF? What does it imply about 
the type of grower most likely to enter a contracting relationship? 
(d) What changes in income does contract farming produce? 
Evaluations of agricultural projects typically emphasize changes in 
the income of participants. Many of the existing studies provide 
`snapshots' of grower income at one point in time. More extended 
studies would be useful in assessing changes over time, and the 
secondary effects resulting from reinvestment of the original income. 
(e) Does contract farming in LDCs exclude small farmers? 
Some critics have alleged that private outgrower schemes are of little 
value as instruments of development because they rely on large 
rather than small farmers. A number of studies contradict this 
generalization, however. Although large growers do seem to be over- 
represented in the population of contract farmers, they are by no 
means the only ones to participate in outgrower schemes. This is one 
question to which virtually all research on contract farming has been 
very attentive (NACLA, 1976; Laramee, 1975; Morrissy, 1974; 
Lipton, 1977). 
Disagreement over the importance of small farmers may stem in 
part from definition and measurement problems. What one writer 
considers a small-scale farmer may not fit another's conception of the 
term. Area cultivated can be a misleading indicator, particularly if 
comparisons are made between different crops or different levels of 
investment: twenty acres of rain-fed barley is relatively small but 
twenty acres of irrigated tomatoes is a major undertaking. Caution 
must also be used in interpreting company producer lists. From the 
company's point of view, it is the area under contract that is 
significant, not the grower's total acreage. It is not uncommon for the 
first to be a small fraction of the second so that a small tomato 
grower, for example, may actually be a large landowner. In this 
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book, a smallholder is considered to be a grower who relies princi- 
pally on his family's labour to grow the contract crop. 
In general, agribusiness firms do seem to prefer large farmers, but 
most will deal with whoever is available and some have even sought 
out small farmers. The main reason for the former preference seems 
to be the inconvenience of finding many small farmers and furnishing 
them with contracts, inputs, technical assistance, etc. The firms 
interviewed by Meissner (1969) also expected more uniform quality 
and fewer production problems from big farmers. (It may be that the 
number of problems varies mainly with the number of producers, not 
with total acreage or volume. A multitude of smallholders probably 
involves a greater variety of cultivation practices, soils, topography, 
and so on.) 
In cases where firms do deal with small growers (Nestle, 1975; 
Laramee, 1975), three factors are usually present, either singly or in 
combination. First, the area most suitable for production may be 
characterized by small farmer predominance, and the firm simply 
works with whatever suppliers are available. Second, the local 
government may encourage the firm to make use of small growers. 
Third, smallholders may have lower costs of production than large 
growers or be willing to accept lower prices or greater shares of 
risk. 
M What is the social status of contract farmers? 
It would also be useful to know, not just how large the contract 
growers are, but really who they are. While Meissner (1969) inter- 
viewed firms as to their reasons for contracting and their preferences 
regarding contract growers, we know less about the social or political 
status of those growers. Why do some farmers decide to enter a 
contracting relationship and others not? Are large contract farmers 
traditional landowners who seize the opportunity to modernize, or 
are they members of a new class of progressive farmers? Do small 
growers have previous social relations which encourage or impede 
their participation? It would also be worthwhile to investigate in 
more detail the phenomenon of prestanombres or 'name-lenders', 
described by Feder (1977). These people put their names on legal 
documents but are, in fact, `front men' for large, sometimes foreign 
companies. By using prestanombres, the companies are able to evade 
prohibitions on land ownership. 
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(g) What are the effects on women? 
In many Third World societies, households embody complex divi- 
sions of labour and responsibility. Signing the contract with an 
agribusiness firm, making farming decisions, supplying agricultural 
labour, receiving payment, making expenditures - each of these 
functions might be performed by different family members. A 
contracting relationship which benefits the `grower', legally defined, 
may not provide benefits to those who provide the labour and 
decision making. In many cases, household members have responsi- 
bility for different expenditure items and their expenditures must be 
financed from their own income. The effects of increased household 
income on investment in physical capital or school fees, on food 
consumption or family obligations will vary as much with intra- 
household division of expenditure responsibilities as with the mar- 
ginal increase in income. 
Furthermore, the establishment of an agribusiness may have 
dynamic effects, changing previously accepted gender and age roles. 
Women are often employed in packing houses or factories; seasonal 
work at harvest time may provide income and status for children 
during school vacations, and so on. In general, the changes in farming 
practices and income patterns (amount, timing and distribution) 
which result from agribusiness can be expected to interact with pre- 
existing household roles in ways that will vary from case to case with 
the specific characteristics of firms and households. 
(h) What are the effects on labour? 
Not all outgrowers are owner-operators. Some manage large farms 
with hired workers and even farmers with small plots of land may hire 
some labour. In the Latin American banana industry and in the 
`nucleus-outgrower' schemes, it should be possible to compare the 
conditions of workers on the nucleus estate or the parent firm's 
plantation with those of workers on outgrowers' farms. 
(i) Does contract farming promote socio-economic differentiation? 
One of the major debates of the 1970s concerned `peasant differentia- 
tion' - the breakdown of a relatively homogeneous subsistence 
peasantry into a series of strata with different incomes, values and 
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relationships to the land as the cash economy expanded. The debate 
continues in discussions of the effects of agribusiness. Given that 
potential contract farmers differ in ownership of assets, farming 
skills, degree of risk aversion, and so on, it is reasonable to expect 
growers to respond differently to agribusiness opportunities (and for 
agribusinesses to actively seek out particular types of growers, as 
noted above). In time, the result could be increased differences 
among contract growers or between those who contract with the firm 
and those who do not. Alternatively, the centralized control and 
uniformity of the contracts might tend to produce homogeneity 
among contract growers. Again, much will depend on the degree of 
prior homogeneity and the nature of the contracting relationship in 
each case. 
(j) What are the effects of contract farming on farming and 
management skills? 
Morrissy's business school study (1974) treats contract farming as a 
way of effecting the transfer of agricultural technology from firms to 
growers. Since the company has a direct interest in increasing the 
quality of its growers' produce, it may provide technical assistance 
more conscientiously than would a government agricultural extension 
service. The resulting learning effects could be of considerable value, 
especially in cases where farmers have no previous experience in 
growing the crop in question. Unfortunately, Morrissy does not 
demonstrate but only assumes that learning is a part of the contract- 
ing relationship; one is left unsure as to how often this potential 
benefit is realized. 
Alternatively, a company which deals with a multitude of small 
growers may not have the managerial capacity to give them all 
individual attention. If, in addition, it is not confident of growers' 
skills, it may simply prescribe detailed but standardized procedures 
and the small farmer's initiative and intimate knowledge of his farm's 
soil, topography and climate will be wasted. If independent farmers 
are replaced by contract growers who simply carry out a corporation's 
orders, valuable skills may be lost. 
Finally, it would be worthwhile investigating the degree to which 
technological invention occurs in agribusiness schemes. There is 
evidence that some schemes have been successful in extending 
existing technologies to farmers who were unfamiliar with them 
before; there is less evidence of schemes which have developed 
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genuinely new technologies. There may be unrealized potential in 
these schemes for invention and experimentation, since the controlled 
environment of an outgrower scheme offers a good framework for 
interaction between experiment station and technology users. 
(k) What are the effects on the process of grower organization? 
The degree to which contracting is beneficial to the welfare of 
outgrowers depends not only on economic variables, but also on 
related political ones. In particular, it depends on the ability of 
farmers to organize and bargain collectively. One wonders whether 
or not outgrower schemes have a common and predictable effect on 
this process. Does having a single adversary with whom to negotiate 
promote solidarity among growers or do patron-client relationships 
arise between growers and the firm to inhibit solidarity? 
(1) How does contract farming affect elite-small farmer 
relationships? 
The formal contractual relationships typical of agribusiness, and their 
frequent emphasis on world markets, are significantly different from 
the style of interplay between growers and elites in traditional rural 
societies. Credit, inputs, information and obligations are allocated 
through different mechanisms. How does the establishment of an 
agribusiness affect prevailing agrarian relationships? 
(m) What are the effects on food production and nutrition? 
This is perhaps the most controversial issue in the literature. Most 
agribusiness schemes involve production of cash crops, often for 
export. This has attracted criticism that scarce resources are diverted 
to meet the needs of affluent consumers in cities or developed 
countries, leaving unsatisfied demands for basic food crops. In this 
view, not only is the total amount of food available to the nation 
reduced, but even the food consumption and nutrition of contract 
growers will suffer as they increasingly specialize in the cash crop. 
The opposing view is that specialization according to comparative 
advantage can increase total food supplies, since an efficient producer 
of a cash crop should be able to trade his production for a greater 
amount of food than he could produce with the same resources. 
Both arguments rest on thin empirical evidence. The critics 
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have little data to relate changes in total food production to agri- 
business activity and much less about nutrition levels. Advocates of 
export agriculture have little to say about the intra-country distri- 
bution and utilization of export earnings or about the imperfections 
in world commodity markets which cause actual trade flows to 
diverge from those indicated by comparative advantage. 
(n) What changes in firm-grower relations typically occur over 
time? 
It is likely that significant changes will occur and that a `snapshot' 
taken at one moment in time will not convey an accurate picture of 
the relationship. While many changes will undoubtedly be highly 
case-specific, others may be more widely observable. 
(o) What are the broader rural development effects of contract 
farming? 
Traditional plantation agribusiness has long been criticized for its 
`enclave' nature i.e. its failure to provide linkage effects such as 
demand for local inputs or services which would promote develop- 
ment of the local economy. To what extent is this a problem with 
the modern varieties of agribusiness based on contract farming? 
Evidence on the Latin American banana industry indicates that the 
linkage effects of plantation and contract production are equally 
slight (Ellis, 1977). Additional research could indicate the extent to 
which this is true in other crops, countries or variations of agri- 
business. Research might also indicate variations in local capacity 
to respond to opportunities for linkages: a scheme which stimulates 
local entrepreneurship in one environment might remain an enclave 
in another. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Fieldwork for this book was carried out between 1977 and 1981 in 
Latin America and Canada. Ken Kusterer's research evaluated a 
series of agribusiness projects financed through intermediary credit 
institutions by USAID. The research itself was also financed by the 
Agency, sometimes as part of project evaluations, sometimes as 
follow up investigations of longer term social and developmental 
impacts. Some evaluations were done entirely by the author while 
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others involved contributions by local research assistants. David 
Glover's research was undertaken for a Ph.D. granted by the 
Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto and in- 
volved no research assistants. For each author, the time spent on 
each case varied, according to the complexity of the case and the level 
of research funding and time available, between two days (for some 
of the `mini cases' described in one of the chapters) and up to six 
months (for the major cases described in other chapters). Chapters 2 
and 3 are based on data collected by Ken Kusterer; Chapters 4 and 5 
on data collected or compiled by David Glover. Both authors provide 
data for Chapter 6. 
The methodology employed has been termed `data triangulation', 
which involves the collection and cross checking of data from a 
variety of sources. Findings from any single source are accepted as 
valid only if they are consistent with data from other sources. The 
sources and techniques used in these case studies included: 
survey interviews of contract farmers, farm women, processing 
plant employees and farm workers 
in-depth interviews with farmers, company executives and 
technicians, government officials, agro-input merchants, 
bankers, journalists and academics 
examination of company records 
examination of government documents and press clippings 
direct observation of key events. 
The chapter on Africa draws on existing studies rather than 
primary research, updated by interviews with key informants. This 
provides the book with a broader geographical coverage and a wider 
range of organizational forms than the authors' fieldwork in the 
Western Hemisphere would permit. 
The book consists essentially of a series of case studies, which use 
empirical material from Canada, Latin America and Africa to 
address the issues raised in the Introduction. The first two chapters 
analyse the experience of small farmers in Guatemala and Peru in 
growing non-traditional vegetables (new products in the Peruvian 
case, old products for new markets in Guatemala). In both cases, the 
impact of agribusiness on both farmers and plant workers was far 
reaching but varied substantially with the socioeconomic characteris- 
tics of the communities. The next case examines the experience of 
potato farmers in New Brunswick, Canada as they adapt to the 
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changes stimulated by the establishment and the expansion of a 
processing industry over a twenty-five year period. A study of two 
widely-acclaimed projects in Kenya follows, attempting to identify 
the degree of success achieved in these large, state-directed schemes 
and the factors that have influenced the outcomes. The last empirical 
chapter assembles a series of short commodity studies based on the 
authors' practical experience in Latin America. The concluding 
chapters return to the research agenda outlined in the Introduction 
and assess the implications for policy. 
2 Frozen Vegetables in 
Guatemala: Tapping the 
Small Farmer's Potential 
BACKGROUND 
Alimentos Congelados, S.A. (ALCOSA) began operations in Guate- 
mala in 1971. Hardly more than a household business at that time, 
ALCOSA specialized in freezing fruits and vegetables for the small 
local market and small quantities of specialized products, such as 
guacamole dip, for export. In 1975, the company was purchased by' 
Hanover Brands, Inc. an American processor and distributor of 
frozen canned fruits and vegetables. With investments from Hanover 
and with increased financial support from the Latin American Agri- 
business Development Corporation (LAAD), ALCOSA's plant was 
greatly expanded and its business reoriented toward the processing of 
large quantities of a few labour-intensive vegetables for the North 
American market. 
Although it has frozen other products in small batches, the great 
bulk of ALCOSA's production consists of okra, broccoli, cauliflower 
and brussels sprouts. Okra is a warm weather crop grown in the 
Department of Zacapa; it is not covered in this chapter. The other 
three products, however, are cold weather crops best grown in the 
central highland regions where most of Guatemala's small and 
indigenous farmers are concentrated. ALCOSA's processing of these 
products has expanded continually since the company first began 
production in 1976. 
ALCOSA freezes all of these products in its plant at San Jose 
Pinula, located in the Department of Guatemala some thirteen miles 
to the southwest of the capital, just off the Pan American Highway to 
El Salvador. The plant is organized in a classic food processing 
assembly line format. In one large room women cut and trim the new 
materials as pieces of broccoli or cauliflower pass before them on an 
assembly line, sort it according to quality, and return it to smaller 
assembly lines. In the freezing room, a more automated assembly line 
blanches and chills the product before sending it into a flow-through 
freezing unit. 
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The plant employs between 125 and 300 people, depending on the 
season. A subcontractor's okra processing shed, during the six 
months of the year that it is in operation, employs an additional 
twenty-five to sixty people. At one time, ALCOSA leased extensive 
land in the area and planted most of its own broccoli, brussels sprouts 
and hybrid cauliflower. These farms employed up to 400 people at 
their peak but were gradually phased out as small farmer production 
increased. The last of ALCOSA's farms were closed out just before 
the fieldwork for this case study began. 
During its first years of operation, ALCOSA had three types of 
farming operations supplying its raw materials: its own farms, middle 
size farms operated by agricultural entrepreneurs, and small farms in 
the highlands. The first to be developed were its own farms, and 
ALCOSA at one time intended to depend primarily on these. Soon, 
however, it began to rely more on outgrowers. The first ALCOSA 
outgrowers were nontraditional commercial farming entrepreneurs, 
many of whom had other businesses. At first, this group of sophisti- 
cated farmers was the easiest for ALCOSA to persuade to start new 
crops and techniques, but in the slightly longer run, they did not 
prove to be the best source of supply. Most of them had no previous 
experience with vegetable production and none of them had experi- 
ence with ALCOSA's crops. Yields or quality were often too low to 
return a profit to the farmer and disputes with ALCOSA over prices 
and quality standards were commonplace. 
Meanwhile, experience with small farmers in the highlands was 
proving more satisfactory and highland purchasing programmes have 
been continually expanded. By 1980, 95% of all cold weather crops 
were purchased from small farmers in the highlands. 
FIRM-GROWER INTERACTION 
During the 1980 growing season, ALCOSA purchased its cauliflower, 
broccoli and Brussels sprouts primarily from 2,000 small highland 
farmers. To receive this produce, ALCOSA operated seventeen 
buying stations in the Departments of Chimaltenango, Sacatapequez 
and Solola. Three of these were in the villages of Chimachoy, Patzicia 
and Santiago, where the fieldwork for this case was carried out. 
About half the buying stations primarily purchased cauliflower and 
had been open since 1977 or 1978. The others specialized in broccoli 
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and were opened in 1979 and 1980, as the company stopped buying 
from larger growers and closed down its own farms. 
These simple buying stations provided a sheltered place for 
classifying and weighing each farmer's deliveries during the rainy 
season. One corner of each open-sided shed is usually walled off to 
form a lockable room where equipment is stored. During harvest 
periods, ALCOSA employees operate each shed two to four days a 
week. On buying days trucks bring empty baskets from the factory; 
farmers then classify and pack their products into these baskets, and 
the product is weighed. After weighing, the farmer gets a receipt for 
the delivery: the product has then been formally transferred to 
ALCOSA. 
Although some elements are standard - the baskets, the weigh-in, 
the receipted purchase - buying stations and buying procedures vary 
throughout the region. Where a cooperative or some other agency 
already own a suitable building such as a warehouse, ALCOSA uses 
the facility that is available. Thus, in Santiago, the buying station is a 
much larger and more elaborate building erected by the cooperative 
on land donated by the municipality. Likewise, classification of the 
product is sometimes carried out by the farmers themselves, as in 
Chimachoy and Santiago, and sometimes by subcontracted em- 
ployees, as in Patzicia. To operate these buying stations and to 
coordinate the plantings and purchases, ALCOSA employed a field 
staff that in 1980 reached a peak of eighteen persons. It cost 
ALCOSA approximately three cents per pound of raw material to 
pay the wages and travel expenses of this field staff, to maintain the 
buying stations, and to transport the product from the buying stations 
to the plant. (To help judge the magnitude of these costs, ALCOSA 
paid farmers five to sixteen cents per pound for these products.) 
Production begins with a series of visits by the agronomists and 
their staff a month or two before the highland dry season comes to an 
end in late May. In these meetings, agronomists try to recruit farmers 
to produce broccoli and cauliflower for ALCOSA. Up until 1980, 
ALCOSA never had enough product to operate at full capacity, so 
agronomists had to actively recruit more outgrowers and to convince 
continuing farmers to expand. An important aspect of this recruit- 
ment has been ALCOSA's willingness to provide seeds, transplant- 
able seedlings, fertilizer and insecticides as interest free loans against 
the harvest deliveries. Farmers recruited by ALCOSA are signed to 
contracts, which specify how many quarter acres of each product the 
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farmer will transplant each week throughout the rainy season. The 
growing time necessary from transplant to harvest varies with each 
crop and each town's microclimate, but ranges from two to four 
months. ALCOSA tries to organize contracts so that all farmers 
around a given buying station will be in production at the same time, 
but all zones will not be in production at once. The goal is to ensure 
smooth flows of raw material to the processing plant. 
ALCOSA contracts include a description of the quality standards, 
the assurance that ALCOSA will buy the production from contracted 
acreage that meets these standards, and the price ALCOSA will pay. 
The details of ALCOSA's mechanisms for penalizing low quality are 
spelled out. The contracts also specify how ALCOSA will sample 
that delivered product and discount its contract price by a percentage 
equal to the substandard product in the samples. All contracts also 
contain a clause, most important from ALCOSA's point of view, that 
binds the farmer to deliver to the firm the whole of the harvest from 
contracted plantings. However, the contract contains no clause binding 
ALCOSA to purchase as unambiguously as the clause that binds the 
farmer to sell, though growers usually assumed that it does. 
Once a farmer has signed a contract, the agronomist calculates the 
amount of inputs necessary and offers to sell that amount as a 
production credit. Only in 1980 had ALCOSA begun to offer so 
much credit, and even so, not all inputs were offered to every farmer 
in each zone. When the agronomists do offer credit, however, most 
farmers choose to accept it. Those who do not take credit from 
ALCOSA either finance their own production or use the ALCOSA 
contracts as evidence of an assured market in their application for 
credit from the large regional coops or from BANDESA, the 
government's agricultural development bank. 
CHIMACHOY 
Fifty miles into the highlands from Guatemala City on an isolated 
hilltop live the 100 families who make up the village of Chimachoy. 
Chimachoy is connected to the rest of Guatemala by an upgraded 
track that runs two miles downhill to a dirt road that descends twelve 
more miles to the highway at Paframos. Over this bumpy route come 
trucks, rural buses, and technicians' jeeps. No other village around 
Chimachoy has such an access route and much of the town's growth 
must be attributed to this advantage. 
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Chimachoy is different from its neighbouring villages in other 
ways. Among the most important are its higher altitude (7,600 to 
8,000 feet) which keeps its fields cloud-covered and cultivable 
throughout the dry season; its loose, sandy, volcanic soil; and its 
steep, erosion-prone slopes. Because of its topography and unique 
microclimate, the farmers of Chimachoy have evolved a highly 
specialized set of farming practices, unlike those of any other in the 
area. 
Chimachoy farmers specialize in producing vegetables and produce 
little corn or beans. They concentrate on dry season production, to 
harvest as much as possible during the high priced months. This 
specialized vegetable-producing culture is what originally attracted 
ALCOSA to Chimachoy but, as we shall see, it also presented 
difficulties. 
The 790 people who lived in Chimachoy in 1980 were almost 
entirely Indians of the Cakc...quel group. They earn their living from 
independent farming almost exclusively, supplemented by the sale of 
woven goods. Chimachoy is unusually homogenous in this regard, 
unless the contemporary literature on the subject is misleading or 
now out of date. Families farm their own plots of land independently 
and most of this land is their own property, although many plots are 
rented. That is to say, Chimachoy has no `landless' agricultural 
workers. 
ALCOSA'S OPERATIONS IN CHIMACHOY 
ALCOSA arrived in Chimachoy in 1977. At that time ALCOSA's 
one agronomist would arrive in the village twice a week to spend 
most of the day with the thirty or so farmers then under contract. He 
would discuss the progress of their plantings while weighing and 
accepting all of their products. He would bring with him the cash to 
pay for the cauliflower purchased on his last visit, and happily bought 
everything not infested with worms at the high fixed price of 6.5 cents 
per pound. 
By 1980, ALCOSA still bought cauliflower in Chimachoy twice a 
week during the harvest season, but little else remained the same. 
New ALCOSA field personnel used higher quality standards and 
tighter purchasing procedures to cope with the hundreds of farmers 
from Chimachoy and elsewhere who now brought their cauliflower to 
the new and expanded buying station. From the farmers' point of 
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view, everything about their dealings with ALCOSA had deteri- 
orated. Although the price for first quality cauliflower had risen 
steadily, they thought the increase had been insufficient to offset the 
tighter quality standards and higher prices for inputs. Farmers 
complained that ALCOSA's massive purchases of native cauliflower 
seed from their own traditional suppliers had driven these prices up 
500%. Nor did they like the new payment procedures involving 
biweekly checks, often received late, instead of cash on delivery. 
More serious were the suspensions of purchases during the 1980 
harvest. In that year, a combination of good weather and ALCOSA's 
underestimations of yields from new broccoli outgrowers led to 
oversupply that exceeded plant capacity. The firm cut off cauliflower 
purchases, stating that the contract did not explicitly require it to 
accept all contracted produce. Chimachoy was one of the villages hit 
hardest by the suspension. It was one of the villages with the highest 
proportion of its growers already harvesting, and among the last 
villages allowed to resume sales. It was also the only village whose 
buying station was shut down again later in the year, ostensibly 
because there were no contracted plantings that should have been 
in harvest then. (Many farmers had written contracts that said other- 
wise.) About two-thirds of the growers suffered substantial losses. 
The most bitter resentment against ALCOSA in Chimachoy, 
however, is based on farmers' perceptions of their mistreatment at 
the hands of the field employees who have worked in the village in 
recent years. Farmers have been the victims of two separate schemes 
to defraud them. One involved skimming of a small percentage from 
farmers on every delivery, carried out by two local men hired to run 
the buying station. The second, discovered by ALCOSA manage- 
ment in 1980, involved kickbacks between the company's chief 
agronomist and merchants who supplied the inputs that ALCOSA 
distributed to farmers. The chief agronomist's responsibilities included 
recommending appropriate types and levels of fertilizer and insecti- 
cide, then supplying farmers with enough inputs to follow his 
recommendations. He used this position to recommend excessive 
inputs and took a percentage of the price. Relationships between the 
Ladino field staff and Indian farmers have in general deteriorated, 
with mistrust and poor communication increasing. 
Agricultural Impacts 
In 1980 the most obvious impact of ALCOSA on agricultural 
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practices in Chimachoy was the almost complete transformation of 
the village from a diversified vegetable producer to a cauliflower 
specialist. Even with the greatly reduced planting due to ALCOSA's 
capacity problems in 1980, the farmers sampled planted far more 
cauliflower than corn and more than ten times as much cauliflower as 
the nearest competing non-ALCOSA vegetable, squash. With con- 
tinued plantings of this much cauliflower, agronomists worried about 
the dangers of monocultivation and increased populations of more 
resistant diseases and insects. There was also the economic danger of 
dependency on one crop and one purchaser. Warnings from a local 
NGO about this dependency went more or less unheeded, because no 
farmers felt able to switch from ALCOSA cauliflower to less convenient 
and less certain markets. 
When ALCOSA suspended its purchases in Chimachoy, the lesson 
was effectively, if painfully, learned. Monocultivation would never 
again be so dangerous. When ALCOSA cut back on its purchases, 
farmers began working with a regional cooperative in Chimaltenango 
to arrange weekly transport from the village to the new CEMOMERCA 
vegetable marketing project in Patzicia. Other groups of farmers 
began to test previously unfamiliar crops such as wheat, soybeans, 
and locally exotic vegetables. 
The farmers' responses to ALCOSA's behaviour during the over- 
supply crisis indicate some of the ways in which their views on 
agriculture changed as a result of their years with ALCOSA. No one 
had any interest in returning to the tiny scale of vegetable production 
for the local market. All were searching for some alternative to 
ALCOSA that would allow them to continue growing and selling 
large quantities of high priced vegetables. Their abilities to carry out 
commercial vegetable production increased along with their desire to 
do so. Previous contacts that Chimachoy farmers had made in the 
Guatemala City terminal market have been greatly expanded. 
Community leaders used these contacts and various agricultural 
promotion programmes (World Neighbours, Uleu Foundation), 
cooperatives, government agencies and NGOs to further increase 
their sales outlets. 
Also increased in sophistication was their knowledge of a variety of 
types and brands of commercial fertilizers, insecticides and other 
chemicals. This was a large advance over their almost ritualistic 
dependence on a few familiar products in 1977. Although they 
unanimously denied that they had ever received any agronomic help 
from ALCOSA, this must be understood as a reflection of their 
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feelings toward the ALCOSA field employees, rather than an accurate 
appraisal of what they had actually learned from their ALCOSA 
experience. 
Economic Impacts 
The most impressive change since the establishment of ALCOSA was 
simple economic growth. The town had many new houses, a new 
church, a new health post, two new stores and a new tortilla mill. 
There has also been a decided movement in residential patterns, from 
generally `informal' houses, built of cane and straw and scattered 
among the fields, to `formal' houses, built of wood or block with 
metal roofs and lined up along the road through town. With corn- 
stalk fences along the roadway and barbed wire or metal gates, 
Chimachoy took on the appearance of a small Guatemalan town 
instead of a typical village of scattered houses. 
Since the town had no economic base besides agriculture, and since 
almost every farmer in town had become an ALCOSA outgrower, 
this spurt of growth must be attributed to ALCOSA, the town's only 
significant source of income. In their survey interviews, both men and 
women of every economic status denied receiving any significant 
increase in income since ALCOSA came to town. Such responses 
could not be taken seriously in the face of the visible evidence of 
accumulating wealth, the newly purchased land and the new or 
improved stores and houses. 
The increases in income, though shared by all farm households, 
were distributed unevenly. Poorer households had been able to make 
only quantitative improvements in their standard of living, because 
even with the increased income they had no real disposable income 
beyond that needed to meet basic human needs. In the lowest 
economic stratum, improved income permitted children to be better 
clothed, women to wear shoes, houses to be improved with occasional 
purchases of wood for walls or corrugated metal for the roof. Such 
homes still contain little or no furnishings; cooking and eating utensils 
are still confined to a few pieces of pottery or enamelware. 
The upper stratum of farmers in the village had sufficient dispos- 
able income as a result of ALCOSA to continue and expand the 
accumulation of family resources. Their most frequent new major 
purchases included concrete-block houses and additional land. 
Minor purchases included plastic tableware, food preparation uten- 
sils, simple wooden furniture, bedding to replace straw mats, better 
Frozen Vegetables in Guatemala 29 
clothing for children, a third or fourth set of traditional clothing for 
women, an additional jacket and pants for men, and perhaps a 
second radio for women's use at home while the original radio went 
with the men to the fields. 
Farmers at all economic levels made purchases of additional farm 
equipment. The largest such investments were pack horses: almost 
half the households had one. Chemical sprayers were almost as costly 
and these became standard farm equipment. In Chimachoy the 
containers used for the local transport of crops were round nets; each 
of them costs three dollars. Farmers who once got by with only five or 
six of these now owned fifteen or more. 
The value of a traditional complement of farm equipment (hoe, 
machete, hatchet, sharpening stone, a few nets, ropes and harnesses) 
used to be less than fifty dollars. This is less than the cost of a sprayer. 
New investments in farm equipment, therefore, although they aver- 
age slightly less than $100 per household and seldom exceed $200 
even for the largest farmers, represent 100 to 300% increases in the 
original level of investment. 
Consequently, local indebtedness has expanded greatly, with 
most households now carrying three types of loans concurrently: 
long-term loans for land purchases (and in the case of a few 
households, for the construction of stores and houses as well); credits 
for cultivation of ALCOSA crops; and very small loans from itinerant 
merchants for the installment purchase of household goods. 
None of these types of credit were available to Chimachoy residents 
until the mid-1970s. The latter two had come into existence as a result 
of ALCOSA's presence in the town. Most farmers get their farm 
credit from ALCOSA itself, but some of the larger farmers had 
obtained loans elsewhere, from a government agency (BANDESA) 
or from cooperatives. Thanks to ALCOSA, the introduction of farm 
credits has been both rapid and thorough. In 1977, no farmers used 
production credits to purchase their inputs; in 1980, all farmers did. 
The weekly visits of credit-offering itinerant merchants are also new, 
resulting from the increased spending power of Chimachoy house- 
holds. 
Household Impacts 
During the cauliflower season, most women in Chimachoy spend two 
or three days a week planting, picking, and peeling cauliflower. Prior 
to ALCOSA's arrival, the women of Chimachoy worked in the fields 
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very seldom, normally only a few times a year when there were large 
areas to be planted. (Planting was the one agricultural task that 
traditionally involved women.) This was a significant transformation 
of women's role within the community, because it broke down the 
normally rigid segregation of men's and women's activities. 
The one major women's task that disappeared almost completely 
was the marketing trip to the terminal market in Guatemala City. In 
the past, though men often carried their product to the terminal 
market, especially when there were new contacts to be made or 
inputs to be purchased, routine sales trips were often made by 
women. Frequently, they were the ones who accompanied their 
produce on the buses into town and actually made the sales to the 
merchants in the market. Both men and women in their interviews 
stressed the unpleasantness of those trips to the big city market and 
their fear of the growing crime in the terminal. 
The products that they sold in Guatemala were the household's 
main cash crops, the ones cultivated by the men, and the principal 
source of household income. The women also carried out smaller 
farm activities to raise smaller amounts of income which they usually 
used for day-to-day food purchases. Only the men's and the cash crop 
farming and the women's transportation of these crops to Guatemala 
City has been supplanted by ALCOSA. Women's smaller-scale, 
income-producing work continues as before: raising chickens and 
collecting eggs, milking the cow, collecting herbs and flowers, etc. 
The result of this work is usually a basket full of produce, which 
women sell directly to consumers in Chimaltenango or Antigua. 
Thus, women continue to sell their products in the local markets, 
but they are'no longer the marketers of the men's products. The exact 
effect of ALCOSA on women's influence within the household and 
the community is therefore difficult to determine. On the one hand, 
they are fully involved with ALCOSA production, spend their days 
with the men, and have earned a place in the community as central 
actors in the main income-producing activity. Some participated in 
the village level `public policy' discussions about ALCOSA, and this 
kind of participation in these important community affairs was not 
common in the past. On the other hand, they sometimes used to 
collect the household's income from cash crop sales. Now it was the 
men whom ALCOSA paid. 
With greater household income from independent farming, the 
role of men and children in Chimachoy's economic life changed also. 
Both groups spent much less time working as day labourers on the 
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farms of others and most school-age children were freed from farm 
employment to attend school. 
Finally, the village's involvement with agribusiness resulted 
in significant changes in attitudes and expectations. Farmers of 
Chimachoy had long since entered a culture of `rising expectations'. 
The eternal cycle of agricultural subsistence had long since been 
broken. But until the coming of ALCOSA, rising expectations mostly 
meant frustration. With an expanded market for more profitable 
crops, farmers could better themselves economically without aban- 
doning their land or farming skills. ALCOSA created the possibility 
of combining the always preferred lifestyle, independent farming, 
with economic progress and a better life for their children. Associ- 
ated with new expectations were changed aspirations for family life. 
Schooling, once distrusted and passively resisted, has become a 
valued asset. Both men and women, in informal interviews, showed 
interest in family planning, expressing the view that too large a family 
prevented the parents from providing their children with enough of a 
base for continued economic advancement. Such attitudes indicate 
the extent to which these villagers had left behind world views that 
traditionally accepted a cyclical (rather than progressive) existence, 
based on subsistence living and the eternally unchanging cycles of the 
agricultural seasons. 
GROWER ORGANIZATION 
Contract farming helped create a growing gap between the richer 
local farmers and their poorer neighbours in Chimachoy. This gap 
was readily discernible to the people of Chimachoy, who described it 
as a source of division within the community. For some time, the 
local village leadership and the staff of the Uleu Foundation tried to 
organize groups of farming men and women for self-help projects and 
there were even more widespread local efforts to try to organize a 
cooperative. A key factor that impeded those efforts, according to 
interviews with village leaders, was the passive lack of cooperation 
(but not active disagreement) of the influential older men who head 
some of the wealthier families. Satisfied with their own progress, so 
other villagers said, they were uninterested in collective efforts to 
speed the progress of others. In interviews, the larger farmers stated 
that collective efforts should be resorted to only when individual self- 
reliance is insufficient to produce economic advancement. The 
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dynamics are more subtle than this short discussion suggests because 
they reflect more than a simple rich-versus-poor division. For one 
thing, none of these `wealthier' families are anything but poor in 
terms of the larger Guatemalan economy. 
Perhaps it would be fair to describe the dynamics within the 
community this way: although the `wealth' of the larger farmers was 
incipient at best, the split within the community was not. In discus- 
sions of `what to do' about ALCOSA's slow payments and temporary 
suspensions of cauliflower purchases, larger farmers invariably pro- 
posed conciliation and negotiation, taking the view that the village's 
long term interests required ALCOSA's continued presence. Poorer 
farmers, on the other hand, urged tactics of confrontation, such as 
collective refusal to pay debts. In these discussions, poorer farmers 
repeatedly made the point that the larger farmers could afford to be 
conciliatory since they had only suffered a temporary loss of income, 
while the situation in their own families was more desperate. In the 
end, the farmers of Chimachoy never were able to decide on an 
effective course of collective action. 
A year later after the field research, guerilla activity spread into the 
hills near Chimachoy. The army came to the village and rounded up 
all able bodied men `for work on the roads.' They were never seen 
again. ALCOSA stopped working in the town in 1981 `because the 
farmers disappeared'. By 1985, the village resembled a refugee camp 
more than the prosperous town of five years before. International 
agencies have begun disaster relief work among the survivors. 
PATZICIA 
The second buying station for ALCOSA was established in the town 
of Patzicia, which differs from Chimachoy in a number of respects. It 
is located on the main highway that connects Guatemala City, 
Mexico, and El Salvador, giving farmers much better access to 
markets than those in Chimachoy. Ecological conditions are less 
extreme and do not require the specialization and special skills in 
vegetable growing that made Chimachoy distinctive. Finally, Patzicia 
is a mixed Ladino/Indian community with a history of bitter conflict. 
Patzicia is well known throughout Guatemala as the site of the last 
major Indian revolt, in 1944, when the Cakchiquel native population 
of the town rose up against the Ladino people. More than 1,000 
people were killed on both sides and the town has remained bitterly 
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divided. Since that event, the people of Patzicia have had a tendency 
to stay within their family units and `mind their own business'. Fear- 
ful or suspicious of collective organizations and political activism, and 
distrustful of each other as well as outsiders, both Indian and Ladino 
residents of Patzicia have earned a reputation among others in the 
area as `hard' people. 
Because of all the other marketing opportunities available to 
Patzicia farmers, only a small minority of the vegetable growers in the 
area contract with ALCOSA. Even in the village of El Sitan, the area 
immediately surrounding ALCOSA's buying station, the percentage 
of farmers who sell to ALCOSA probably did not exceed 20%. 
Approximately 180 farmers signed cauliflower or broccoli contracts 
with ALCOSA in 1980. These growers, less than 10% of Patzicia's 
farming households, were a thinly scattered group drawn from a wide 
radius around the buying station. Twenty of these outgrowers, in 
fact, did not live in Patzicia but in the three surrounding towns of 
Tecpan, Zaragosa and Santa Cruz Balanya. 
FIRM-GROWER INTERACTION 
Most aspects of ALCOSA's operations in the town were similar to 
those in Chimachoy, the main difference being that grading was done 
by employees of an ALCOSA subcontractor rather than by the 
farmers themselves. Patzicia was unique among ALCOSA's buying 
zones in the lack of collective identity among its farmers. Partly as a 
result of the hard individualism of its local culture, and partly because 
of the higher turnover rate among its farmers (due as much to the 
greater availability of alternative markets as to higher levels of 
dissatisfaction), most of the men who came to sell at the buying 
station did not know each other. Divided ethnically into two groups 
and geographically into more than a dozen, most of the men spent 
their days at the buying station talking quietly with the few other 
farmers with whom they were acquainted, men from the same village 
or more often the same family. As managers on the ALCOSA field 
staff were aware, it was this lack of mutual acquaintance in Patzicia 
that caused the company many problems of communication and 
organization. For instance, the agronomists believed that the reason 
farmers' self-classification did not work in Patzicia was because it was 
impossible to establish any of the collective identity and peer group 
pressure that made the system workable at the other stations. 
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Agricultural Impacts 
Most obviously, there was a huge increase in the amount of cauliflower 
grown in Patzicia. Additionally, about 20% of the farmers contracted 
by ALCOSA began to grow broccoli in 1980. The principal crop 
displaced was corn, which in 1980 accounted for about one-third of 
all planted acreage, down about 10% since ALCOSA began. Out- 
growers planted less cabbage, potatoes and wheat than previously, 
although it is unlikely that total plantings of these crops in the town 
decreased much because the 80% of local farmers who did not 
contract with ALCOSA increased their acreages in these crops. 
In 1977, profit levels available to ALCOSA cauliflower growers 
were much higher than the profit potential of any other crops. By 
1980 this was no longer the case. The prices for other vegetable crops 
rose faster than ALCOSA's price for cauliflower, and rising quality 
standards led to a decline in yields of first quality product. In 1980, if 
a Patzicia farmer met certain conditions, it was more profitable to 
grow other crops for other markets than to plant cauliflower for 
ALCOSA. The conditions necessary to participate in other more 
profitable markets were: market contacts, either in the Guatemala 
City terminal or among Salvadoran buyers; sufficient field size to 
produce a truckfull of produce in a single cutting (in potatoes, 
cabbage, and squash this was still quite small, much less than an 
acre); sufficient assets to sustain self-financed investments and the 
inherently greater risks of open market prices. 
As a result, proportionately fewer farmers participated than in 
1977. The economic and agricultural profile of those who participated 
was different from before, and the impact on the town's total 
agriculture was relatively small. Only about 20% of farmers whose 
fields lay within walking distance of ALCOSA's buying station 
signed contracts. Farther away the proportion was much smaller. 
Almost all the ALCOSA outgrowers fall into two distinct types. 
About 70% of them including most of the Cakchiquels and a few of 
the Ladinos, are from the smallest and poorest stratum of farmers in 
the area. Another 20% are larger and more sophisticated vegetable 
farmers with diversified vegetable plantings that always include some 
cauliflower for ALCOSA to counterbalance price uncertainty for 
their other vegetable crops. A slight majority of this last group are 
Ladinos. ALCOSA, therefore, has contracts with many of the 
smallest and a few of the largest farmers, but with hardly any of the 
`middle' of Patzicia farmers typical of agriculture in the area. (This 
Frozen Vegetables in Guatemala 35 
discussion of small, medium, and large farmers, it should be noted, is 
useful for local comparisons only; by Guatemalan or international 
standards, none of these farmers are anything but `small', with the 
largest of them farming less than ten acres and earning little more 
than urban minimum wages.) 
Because ALCOSA outgrowers were such a small minority among 
local farmers, the total agricultural impact of ALCOSA in Patzicia 
was correspondingly limited. The company's impact on farmers who 
did participate, however, was just as large as in Chimachoy, and 
similar in nature. These impacts included a more sophisticated use of 
a much larger variety of fertilizers and insecticides, a dramatic 
increase in the level of farm investment, and dependence on farm 
credits from ALCOSA. 
Economic Impacts 
Potential earnings for ALCOSA outgrowers were not particularly high. 
As mentioned before, vegetable farmers in Patzicia could earn more 
growing other crops for other markets. If farmers were to devote their 
acreage to corn, a year-long crop in this area that requires much less 
labour, they could earn almost as much seeking paid farm employment, 
either locally (at $2 per day) or by migrating to the coffee harvest (at 
$3.50 per day). In contrast to Chimachoy, then, the economic impact 
of ALCOSA on its outgrowers was not that it raised incomes but that 
it permitted even the smallest farmers to pursue their preferred 
occupation, independent farming, without sacrificing income. 
The transformation from self-financing to credit, as the source of 
the ever-increasing working capital required by small farmers, was 
another significant economic impact. The dependence of small 
farmers on production credits has often led to disaster, as a year or 
two of bad crops could result in the transfer of small farmers' land to 
their creditors. All of the production credit in Patzicia, however, 
came from ALCOSA itself. As a creditor, ALCOSA has a much 
different relationship to its debtors than do traditional money 
lenders. First, since the company is the source of the income as well 
as the credit, its debts are likely to be paid off if there is any 
production at all. ALCOSA does pay itself first, even if that means 
months of no income farming for the indebted outgrower. This can 
cause severe hardships, as indeed it did in 1980, but it cannot be 
compared to the permanent economic damage and dislocation suffered 
by indebted farmers in the past, who often lost their lands to local 
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moneylenders. It is not credible that ALCOSA would be interested 
in seizing small farmers' lands to collect debts, or that it could 
successfully carry out such a politically dangerous move, even if it 
wished to. 
Another significant economic impact is the result of ALCOSA 
providing enough income to smallholders so that they need not seek 
farm work elsewhere. This impact is discussed later in terms of its 
reinforcement of traditional values, attitudes, and life styles, but 
there is a narrower economic aspect to this issue as well. Wage rates 
for day labour in Patzicia, as in Chimachoy, became responsive to 
ALCOSA's rhythm of activity. Since there were no longer any 
significant number of farm labourers in Patzicia, all local farm labour 
was performed by men from smallholder households that had surplus 
labour-time available after tending their own fields. Since so many of 
the smallest farmers in Patzicia were ALCOSA outgrowers, their 
involvement in these labour-intensive crops sharply reduced the 
amount of wage labour available to larger farmers, especially in those 
months when cauliflower is transplanted or harvested. Wage rates 
rose by 60 to 100% at peak cauliflower periods. Expansion by the 
largest cauliflower growers was therefore held in check by this 
shortage of peak season wage labour. New arrangements, even more 
advantageous to the labourer than the higher daily wages, appeared. 
For instance, family work crews who prepare land for planting were 
now paid by the job, rather than by the day. The system encouraged 
rapid and intensive labour and very high earnings for efficient crews. 
The earnings possible from these jobs were so much higher than 
subsistence that some poorer families came to depend on these 
earnings as their source of working capital for the new season. 
Community Impacts 
Farming for ALCOSA remained the most profitable market available 
to the smallest farmers, who otherwise would have to pay to trans- 
port small quantities to distant buyers. As a result of its changed 
position in the produce market, ALCOSA served not as an agent of 
concentration, but as one that permitted the smallest farmers to 
participate in the newly expanded commercial markets. Through 
sales to ALCOSA, the smallest farmers were able to maintain their 
independence in the face of rising costs of agricultural inputs and 
land rents. ALCOSA prevented the concentration that might have 
occurred otherwise with the growth of larger-scale commercial 
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vegetable farming for the Guatemala City and Salvadoran markets. 
A second community impact that initially appeared likely was the 
development of a commercial centre in the village of El Sitan, the site 
of the buying station. This did not occur, in part because ALCOSA 
began paying farmers with cheques instead of cash, thus completely 
transforming the commercial potential of pay day at the buying 
station. Turning the cheque into spendable cash now required a trip 
into Chimaltenango, where merchants were already established. 
Household Impacts 
ALCOSA's effects on gender roles in Patzicia was the only area of 
household impact that differed from the other two villages studied. 
ALCOSA had contact with two distinct groups of women: a larger 
group who were members of farm households, and a smaller group 
who found employment as cauliflower sorters in the buying station. 
The employment impact is the simpler of the two: these dozen jobs 
were the first paid wage labour available to women in Patzicia, 
excepting domestic service and the occasional government job open 
to a few local women with unusually high levels of education. This 
impact was limited, however, since it involved no more than sixty 
days of seasonal employment per year. 
Patzicia was the only one of the three sites where ALCOSA's 
introduction of large scale cauliflower farming did not lead at once to 
farm households' shifting their women's labour into agricultural 
work. The cause of this phenomenon was not clear. Some informants 
suggested that Patzicia women did not work in the fields because they 
continued to weave a great deal, something that women in Santiago 
had given up. But Patzicia women in fact weave very little, purchasing 
their clothing from the women of nearby Patzun; at the same time the 
women of Chimachoy, who do work in the fields, all continue to 
weave. Male Cakchiquel informants in Patzicia suggested that their 
women stayed out of the fields because they imitate the behavior of 
higher-status Ladino women. But Ladino women were more, rather 
than less, likely to work in agriculture. Similarly, the greater urbani- 
zation of Patzicia relative to Chimachoy was offered as an explana- 
tion, but Santiago was more urbanized than either of the others, and 
its women worked in the fields. Finally, agronomists suggested that 
Patzicia women were less familiar with the traditional concept of a 
women's herb and vegetable garden near the house. But, although 
the practice was culturally familiar in all three towns, none of the 
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women practiced it, but relied instead on picking herbs and greens 
that grew naturally without any need of cultivation. 
Remembering that in the Cakchiquel culture women traditionally 
only work in the fields to plant the crop, it was the women of 
Chimachoy and Santiago who changed their traditional behavior, not 
those of Patzicia. This leaves only the hypothesis that this was part of 
Patzicia's general cultural conservatism, a long-continuing reaction to 
the events of 1944, which for years withstood very strong economic 
pressures of labour scarcity and high wages for farm labour. By 1985, 
however, ALCOSA's smaller Patzicia outgrower households had 
given in to the labour market opportunities offered by peak season 
wage rates. Women helped their husbands and fathers with cauli- 
flower production so that sons could be freed to earn high daily wages 
working for other larger- farmers. Though they took much longer to 
come around to it, in the end Patzicia women's farm work was 
not much different from the pattern begun seven years before in 
Chimachoy. 
SANTIAGO SACATAPEQUEZ 
Santiago Sacatapequez is a very different place than Chimachoy or 
Patzicia. Located only fourteen miles west of the capital on the Pan 
American highway, the town is on the edge of a suburban develop- 
ment. Although the population of the town is made up almost 
entirely of indigenous farmers, the encroaching land developments 
and the relatively easy access to urban employment have encouraged 
many to commute to urban jobs. 
Another significant difference is the presence of a massive project 
of earthquake reconstruction and rural development. This Swiss aid 
project has rebuilt the entire town's housing stock to very high 
standards and has installed a team of advisers, called the Swiss 
Group, that has undertaken a series of agricultural and social 
development efforts. 
The third big difference between Santiago and the other sites is the 
intensity of its agriculture. In other villages, the average small farmer 
had three or four acres available for cultivation; in Santiago, the 
average is less than one acre. A 1954 land reform parcelled out 
small plots that were divided up even further when handed down to 
the current generation. To survive on these tiny plots, Santiago 
farmers long ago became specialists in producing vegetables for the 
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nearby Guatemala City market. Their expertise exceeds even that of 
Chimachoy's vegetable specialists. Fortunately for the very small 
farmers of Santiago, much of their land is more fertile than Patzicia 
and flatter than the fields of Chimachoy. Most of the villagers' parcels 
are very well suited to the kind of very intensive horticulture that they 
practise. 
FIRM-GROWER INTERACTION 
The way ALCOSA operated in Santiago was fundamentally different 
from its mode of operation in Patzicia and Chimachoy. For one thing, 
the company purposely chose to work through intermediaries in 
Santiago, at first the Swiss Group and then the cooperative. This 
reduced the company's expenses considerably. It used the coopera- 
tive's warehouse for its buying station, the cooperative's truck for 
transport to the plant, and the cooperative's personnel to coordinate 
the programme. It was the cooperative that assigned and kept track 
of the plantings, kept records of who had delivered how much, and 
dispersed cash payments to the farmers. 
Most striking was the lack of involvement of the ALCOSA field 
staff. The company's agronomists and their agricultural recommen- 
dations played no part in Santiago agriculture whatsoever. Local 
cultivation practices were based on research and recommendations 
developed by the Swiss Group's agronomists working in cooperation 
with the government's agricultural research institute (ICTA). Like- 
wise, the person who weighed the delivered product and checked its 
classification was the man elected treasurer of the coop. His salary 
was paid partly by the cooperative and partly by the company. 
Because of these arrangements, the relationship between the 
weigher-classifier and the farmers was impressively different, free of 
the mutual hostility and tensions that existed elsewhere. Yet com- 
pany records showed that the product was at least as well classified in 
Santiago as in the other sites. The absence of conflict had not dis- 
advantaged the company by lowering the standards of classification. 
Agricultural Impact 
The average farmer in Santiago had lower costs of production than 
counterparts in the other two towns, yields that were more than twice 
as high, proportions of first-quality product that were 15% higher 
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than Patzicia and 20% higher than Chimachoy, and net income per 
unit of land that was many times higher than elsewhere. These 
farmers had somewhat better land to work with, but the main cause 
of these superior results was a difference of farming technique. The 
difference in agricultural technique, in turn, was probably the result 
of three factors: an original superior knowledge of vegetable produc- 
tion that carried over somewhat into ALCOSA crops; more labour- 
intensive care on the much smaller plantings of each household; and 
the very different agricultural recommendations from the agronomists 
working in Santiago. 
As a result of their research, these agronomists recommended less 
frequent applications of smaller quantities of cheaper insecticide than 
did ALCOSA. ICTA agronomists also developed systems that permit 
the interplanting of corn and cauliflower so that the same tiny piece 
of land can provide its usual quantity of corn while also delivering 
cauliflower yields higher than farmers in Patzicia were able to achieve 
with cauliflower alone. They were also able to give farmers more 
individual attention, since they had a much higher ratio of agronomists 
to farmers (1 to 160 versus 1 to 425). Whether higher yields were a 
cause or result of the programme's success was hard to say. It would 
be better to think of it as a golden circle of success: higher yields lead 
to farmer satisfaction and cooperation which makes them more 
willing to follow agronomist's recommendations, which leads to 
higher yields and incomes, and so on. 
GROWER ORGANIZATION 
The cooperative benefited the company by lowering company 
expenses, in ways listed above. But these were small savings com- 
pared with the advantages the company reaped from the improved 
organization, coordination, communication, and cooperation of 
growers that the cooperative makes possible. The cooperative pro- 
vided the company with local leadership that was both formally 
defined and fully legitimate. When the company had a problem, the 
cooperative leaders and their Swiss advisers were available to work 
out some sort of solution and implement it. The company played no 
role in attempting to disseminate new information or discipline 
growers to new procedures. To achieve a similar result in Patzicia or 
Chimachoy was impossible, since it required that an ALCOSA field 
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employee convinced each outgrower of the necessity and legitimacy 
of a new procedure. 
If the benefits to the company were impressive, the benefits to the 
individual farmers were even more so. First and most important, 
there was the potential clout of collective bargaining. The coopera- 
tive's clout was enhanced by the vegetable-growing skills of its members 
and by the considerable independent influence of its Swiss advisers, 
but these were supplementary to the basic source of its strength: the 
size of its membership and the discipline of its organization. 
The membership also benefited because their cooperative was 
smaller than ALCOSA and more efficient. The cooperative store 
from which they got their inputs on credit was conveniently located, 
and when it was time to pay, the cooperative was more flexible and 
more reliable in the way it made its deductions 
The main advantage of the cooperative to its members, of course, 
was its primary mission. The cooperative existed to serve the needs of 
its members, not the requirements of a Guatemalan corporation or its 
parent company in the United States. Concretely, this meant that the 
cooperative attempted to maximize the sales of its members. At the 
time, that goal was best served through cooperation with ALCOSA, 
but the cooperative was always on the lookout for other more 
advantageous markets. The cooperative was already in 1980 dealing 
with one other American company, an exporter of fresh snow peas, 
and was gearing up to produce dehydrated spices and vegetables for 
sale to CINDAL, Nestle's local subsidiary for dried soup mixes. By 
1986, the cooperative had developed regular marketing relationships 
with almost a dozen firms exporting to international markets. 
In practical terms, since the farmers delivered all their products to 
the cooperative's warehouse and received all their pay from the same 
place, they benefited from the coop's diversification of their markets 
without having to involve themselves in all the complexities of 
separate contracts, delivery arrangements and payment procedures. 
Similarly, the agronomists advising the coop provided a single source 
of recommendations for planning, planting and cultivating the 
various crops. In developing their recommendations, they seek to 
maximize the income of members. Agronomists with this priority are 
more likely to maximize farmer income than company employees. 
This is true even when the company agronomists are pursuing the 
legitimate priority of maximizing product quality instead of the 
illegitimate priority of maximizing kickbacks. 
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What were the benefits that ALCOSA brought to the coop? 
ALCOSA's involvement in Santiago began a year before the formal 
establishment of the coop, and leaders of the coop went out of their 
way to credit ALCOSA with partial responsibility for the coop's 
growth and success. Initially, ALCOSA was the coop's sole economic 
base. The coop financed its entire operation through a 3% commis- 
sion on its members' sales. This stable economic base in turn 
permitted it to operate with paid staff from the beginning. 
An even more important factor was the company's acceptance of 
an early decision by coop organizers to restrict local farmers' access 
to ALCOSA. To contract with ALCOSA for delivery at the coop's 
warehouse, a farmer was required to join the cooperative. According 
to coop leaders, it was neither the cooperative ideal nor their own 
energetic efforts that fueled the explosive early growth of the coop. 
They gave the credit to this simple requirement. The coop grew to 
400 members from all the towns and villages in the Santiago munici- 
pality because all those farmers wanted to sell to ALCOSA, not 
necessarily because they were enthused with cooperativism. 
Household Impacts 
Unlike Chimachoy and Patzicia, women in Santiago were almost 
equal partners with their husbands in cauliflower production. In 
Chimachoy, women worked alongside their husbands and generally 
assisted in the fields; in Santiago, women worked in agriculture more 
independently. In 1980, almost half of the farm households were 
represented at the buying station by their women, and many women 
collected the payments from the cooperative. One possible explana- 
tion for this was the similarity between the intensity and tiny scale of 
farm production in Santiago and women's traditional small plots for 
vegetables and herbs. For whatever reason, woman were in 1980 
essentially equal participants in the principal income-producing work 
of each household. 
Such a degree of gender equality was not to remain unchallenged. 
In 1983, the coop made a formal decision that its members were men, 
not households, and that henceforth produce would be received from 
members and payment would be made only to members. Women 
were declared too illiterate to understand coop accounting - though 
they were the ones used to market accounts and transactions, not the 
men - and prohibited from signing-off on produce delivery records or 
payment receipts. Women's farm status reverted to something like 
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that in Chimachoy, as hardworking `helpers' in their husbands' farm 
work. The coop has begun nutrition and sewing classes for them. 
Attendance is sparse. 
Impact on Factory Labour 
At its peak, ALCOSA directly and indirectly employed almost 800 
people, making it at that time the largest employer in the vicinity of 
the plant. Since its own farms were phased out, however, ALCOSA 
provided reasonably steady employment for about 200 people in San 
Jose Pinula and seasonal employment for an additional M. Women 
make up 80% of the permanent employees and all of the seasonal 
employees. The permanent workforce is drawn from a wide radius 
around the plant, from the town centre of San Jose Pinula and from 
villages up to ten miles away. 
A central theme of interviews with ALCOSA employees was that 
factory work brought women freedom; freedom from the constant 
fear that accompanies grinding poverty and ever-increasing debt, 
freedom from oppressive family situations, freedom from the never- 
ending servile work conditions of the live-in domestic employee, or 
freedom from the oppressive supervision, deceit, and low pay of the 
small business employer. 
Asked why they came to work at ALCOSA, some described a 
situation of desperate financial need and growing debt. ALCOSA 
wages permitted them to pay off debts and maintain a minimally 
acceptable standard of living. Some came from less desperate econo- 
mic situations; ALCOSA wages permitted them to `better them- 
selves', improve their houses, clothe themselves more respectably, 
and make installment payments on household goods. For others, 
ALCOSA wages represented freedom not so much from poverty as 
from intolerable domestic arrangements. Having an independent 
source of income has enabled them to assume a degree of control 
over family relationships that would be impossible for young women 
with no income of their own. 
Another area of freedom that ALCOSA employment brought to 
some of these women was freedom at work, at least compared to 
previous employment. In small towns like San Jose Pinula, the only 
widely available alternative to factories is domestic work. Women 
who had previously worked as live-in-domestic help contrasted their 
ALCOSA jobs with the 'slave-like' conditions of their former 
employment. In the bureaucratized atmosphere of ALCOSA, as in 
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any other large plant, work tasks and responsibilities were relatively 
fixed and defined. Women who used to work as maids appreciated 
the more limited work conditions of factories such as ALCOSA. 
They liked the idea of the time clock, the clear separation of working 
time owed to the employer and personal time of their own. From 
morning to night, domestic helpers have no legitimate personal time 
when the employer does not expect them to be working. Likewise, 
some women appreciated the division of labour, the apparent source 
of the monotony and tedium of assembly line work. Such a clearly 
defined job description was preferred to the infinitely expandable 
work tasks of the domestic employee for whom `women's work is 
never done'. 
A smaller number of women had previously worked in small 
business settings, stores and restaurants. They preferred ALCOSA's 
size and bureaucratic impersonality to the close supervision of the 
small business owner and his tendency to sexually harass his young 
female employees. They also contrasted ALCOSA's fair and routine 
handling of wages and benefits with small employers who rarely met 
the legal minimum wage and often tried to reduce it further through 
deceit. 
To sum up what these women said, the very conditions of large 
corporate employment which critics have so often indicated as 
sources of alienation - the timeclock punctuality, the unvaried 
routine, the impersonality, the narrow division of labour - all of these 
were perceived by many women as conditions of relative freedom on 
the job. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ALCOSA case has several lessons. Small farmers can produce 
export quality produce, even with newly introduced crops. In this 
case, they produced so well that no other source could compete, so 
well in fact that the company could not always absorb their output. 
Although farmers would not admit it, the contract farming system 
was extremely effective at disseminating new knowledge and new 
inputs to small farmers. Even so, use of an intermediary institution 
like the coop in Santiago made the system work even better, for both 
growers and firm. This was especially important in a country where 
legitimate means of resolving disputes are few and conflicts tend to 
become political and often violent. 




In the late 1970s, the third of a series of military governments that 
since 1968 had promoted socialist agricultural reform in Peru was 
running out of steam. Export earnings from fish and minerals, 
principal supports to the Peruvian economy, were down and the 
government could no longer afford to subsidize the agricultural 
production cooperatives which were attempting to continue large 
scale farming on the expropriated estates of their former employers. 
Harvests had declined and, as a result, years of unpaid loans 
overhung the farm collectives, demoralizing their members and 
decreasing the willingness of even governmental credit institutions to 
continue providing new loans. 
In this environment, the government was for the first time receptive to 
a proposal from the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(AID) to initiate an agribusiness development fund to encourage 
private sector initiatives in agricultural credit and marketing. Among 
the earliest and largest loans under this programme was made in 
January, 1979 to Agroindustrias del Santa (AGSA) for $750,000. 
This firm was a new member of the Bertelo group of companies, 
based in Lima. It was formed to process and export canned white 
asparagus. The AID loan was to help finance construction of a new 
canning plant in the town of Santa, on the north coast of Peru near 
Chimbote, and to supply working capital to lend to small outgrowers. 
Such credit was necessary to start asparagus cultivation, since the 
crop was a permanent installation (ten years in Peru) which does not 
earn income until the second year, or pay back its start-up until the 
third. 
THE ASPARAGUS GROWERS OF SANTA VALLEY 
Historically and ecologically, the Santa Valley is among the most 
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important of Peru's coastal farming valleys. The Rio Santa drains a 
large proportion of Peru's highland intermountain plateau, making 
this valley unique among the northern coastal valleys for its year- 
round irrigation source. 
The valley's broad coastal plain is divided into two distinct types of 
farming areas: those alongside the river with silt deposits, well- 
formed soils, and a history of irrigated cultivation stretching back into 
the pre-Hispanic era; and a series of newer farming zones carved out 
of the desert by recent irrigation projects. The first of these was 
finished in the late 1950s and the most recent in the mid-1970s. Soil in 
these latter areas is only now in the process of formation, as farm 
cultivation slowly adds organic materials to form a fragile arable cap 
over the original `dead sands'. 
All of the individual contracted farmers were located in these 
newer farm areas, as was the cooperative `Amauta', one of the four 
agrarian reform collectives that grows asparagus for the company. 
Farmers with better soils in the more established areas could obtain 
much higher yields of good asparagus, according to company agro- 
nomists; but the company was only able to sign up farmers in the 
more recently colonized zones, whose poorer quality soils did not 
permit them to grow more profitable crops. 
Family Farmers and Farm Entrepreneurs 
Asparagus farmers in the Santa Valley used one of two distinct types 
of farming operations. A little less than half were true family farmers, 
relying principally on family labour and hiring workers only when 
necessary,: the other half will be referred to in this chapter as `farm 
entrepreneurs', businessmen who actively manage small farms work- 
ed with hired labour. 
Family farmers live on the land and work it together with all the 
other members of the family. They have low levels of education, are 
likely to have spent little time working in non-farm occupations, and 
aspire to provide a prosperous farm as a legacy for their children. 
Most were born in the poorest regions of the Sierra and migrated 
as youths to the coast. Though they prefer to use family labour, 
asparagus is such a labour intensive crop that all but the largest 
families have been forced to hire their neighbours as farm labour on a 
regular basis. 
Farm entrepreneurs, a slight majority of the asparagus contractors 
in the Santa Valley, are often referred to in the development 
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literature as 'medium-sized farmers.' In this case, however, the size 
of the farms involved is in the same general range as that of the family 
farmers. The key difference between these two groups is not the size 
of their farm operations, but their socioeconomic and educational 
levels. Farm entrepreneurs include all farmers with more than a 
primary education; they have spent more time in non-farm employ- 
ment (although most were originally raised in farming families); they 
are more likely to have been born on the coast rather than in the 
highlands; and they aspire to provide their children with technical or 
university education to provide them with an occupational status 
higher than their own. Eecause of their backgrounds in coastal 
agriculture, their more urbanized life styles, and their aspirations for 
their children, farm entrepreneurs view their farming role as that of a 
manager or overseer. Most of this group maintain residences in 
Chimbote, but the farm entrepreneur himself spends his days on the 
farm, joining his family in its urban residence either nightly or on 
weekends. 
Both types of farmers are migrants to the region, most coming 
from the highlands. The ecologies of the two regions are so different 
that much farm experience does not transfer and many basic skills 
must be relearned. However, not all the farmers came from the 
highlands. Almost half were born in various coastal valleys from 
Trujillo in the north to Arequipa in the south. The modal life history 
of this group is that they were born and raised among farm workers in 
large coastal haciendas, then spent a period of time in a non-farm 
occupations before acquiring their present parcel. Although experi- 
enced from birth in coastal farming, whatever advantage in farm 
knowledge they might possess is outweighed by their lack of experi- 
ence as independent farm operators. Even the most naive highland 
farmer takes an overview of farming that a wage-earning farm 
labourer does not, and thinks in terms of an annual cycle of 
investment and harvest, of permissible present consumption and 
mandatory savings. 
The two types of farmers, though they differ in many ways, tend to 
have certain personal characteristics in common: aggressiveness, 
tenacity, and determination. The Santa Valley asparagus growers are 
all people who have endured ten or fifteen years of hardship and 
deprivation in order to obtain their desert farm sites. In the process, 
they have had to battle government bureaucracies to regularize their 
farm titles and to get and keep their all-important water rights. At the 
same time they have struggled with no capital of their own and 
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without the agrarian reform agency's expected assistance to `make 
their farms', to turn alkaline sandhills into graded, irrigable, arable 
land. The original settlers in these colonization districts had to arrive 
well in advance of the water and defend their claims against later 
arrivals. At the same time, they had to legitimize their claims to the 
agrarian reform agency, hang on through years of delays until the 
water arrived, survive without technical and financial assistance, and 
endure a devastating earthquake. Most of the original settlers did not 
survive these tests and abandoned their properties in despair. Their 
places were taken by later waves of hopeful migrants, many of whom 
had to seek off-farm jobs as vendors or labourers in order to survive. 
Their skills as independent farmers had not been finely honed, but 
their years of struggle with the bureaucracies had given them an 
organizational and political sophistication that more traditional inde- 
pendent farmers seldom acquire. 
The Asparagus Outgrower Programme 
The first activity of the asparagus venture, preceding even plant 
construction, was the establishment of a separate subsidiary, Asesor- 
amientos Agroindustriales (ASAGRO), to enrol growers and to 
introduce and promote the planting of asparagus in the Santa Valley. 
Despite twenty years of agronomic feasibility studies indicating the 
Valley's suitability for asparagus, ASAGRO had difficulty in getting 
farmers to agree to grow the crop. The farmers' reluctance is 
understandable: the crop is unfamiliar and the plant's characteristics 
(ten-year life cycle, three-year payback period) make it riskier than 
the more familiar crops. As a result, even the company's promotional 
offer of 100% financing induced only a scattering of farmers to sign 
contracts. Since 1978, the company has been able to sign contracts in 
the valley with a total of 106 individual farmers and one production 
cooperative, for a total of about 1,250 acres of asparagus. These 
producers are thinly scattered in the more recently developed zones 
of a valley that contains thousands of farmers and tens of thousands 
of irrigated hectares. 
In its constant attempts to solve its supply problems, ASAGRO 
changed direction to target a new group of potential producers. It 
added a programme of relatively large-scale contracts with collectively- 
farmed cooperatives in the Santa and Casma Valleys, and turned to 
more experienced asparagus producers in the Viru Valley to the 
north, who needed much less financing and technical assistance. This 
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chapter, while concentrating on the Santa valley growers, will make 
comparisons where appropriate with the Viru and collective-farm 
operations. 
FIRM-GROWER INTERACTION 
To promote the planting of asparagus, the company financed all 
outgrowers' inputs, equipment rental and labour costs to prepare the 
land, plant the asparagus and tend the fields. Even attributable family 
or cooperative labour was paid at the same rate as hired labour with 
company advances against anticipated production. The interest rate 
that ASAGRO charged for these credits varied with those set by the 
government regulatory agency. The company is not legally required 
to follow these rates but finds that the public relations benefits 
outweigh the implied losses. When the project began, the nominal 
interest rates were in the 20-25% range; by 1981 the rate had climbed 
to 50%. This doubling of the interest rate has greatly affected the 
nominal size of farmers' loans and the loans' psychological burden on 
the growers, although the interest rates are in fact lower than the rate 
of Peruvian inflation. 
Although it has largely abandoned the practice, ASAGRO origin- 
ally provided not only financing but also the actual work crews. 
Under the direction of its own manager-agronomists, these crews 
prepared the land and transplanted asparagus from the company's 
seed beds. In many cases, the farmers' only initial involvement was to 
provide the land and agree to pay back the costs plus interest once the 
asparagus was in production. Once planted, the farmer became 
responsible for the care and cultivation of the fields, still under the 
direction of company agronomists, but he was `paid' for this work 
every two weeks according to the labour expended. 
Financial record keeping during this start-up phase was too loose, 
with a central office in Lima posting growers' accounts based on the 
often ambiguous and fragmentary documentation of ASAGRO's 
local management. Since these accounts were often late and were 
posted so remotely from the farmers, it was difficult for a grower to 
find out the status of his debt. Farmers consequently had little idea of 
the extent of their indebtedness and the bi-weekly labour cheques 
had the appearance of an earned wage rather than the interest- 
bearing loans that they actually were. 
Farmers recall this early period as a time when the company was 
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friendly, generous, open-handed and eager to help. Cost-cutting was 
not a high priority for either the company or the farmers because 
their asparagus farms were expected to be such a high-yield, high- 
profit business that the mounting debts would quickly melt away. 
The company's processing plant in Santa opened its doors in 
November 1979 and daily purchases of asparagus began shortly after. 
In this phase, the company needed a dependable, efficient adminis- 
tration. It was soon apparent that this was lacking. Raw material 
deliveries were undependable and farm production was consistently 
far below agronomists' estimates. 
After a few months of continued administrative difficulties, the 
management in Lima brought in an outside consultant. His report 
criticized agronomic practices, accounting and administrative defici- 
encies, and gaps between claimed and actual investment levels. For 
example, the report found that some of the acres claimed were not 
actually planted, that planted fields contained fewer plants than 
planned (too few to be economically viable in some cases), and that 
costs of extensive grading and land preparation were too high to be 
repaid with the low yields attainable on such poor soils. The emphasis 
of the report was on the lack of any budgeting or cost monitoring. 
With such generous loans and rising interest rates, farmers' debts 
could well become permanent obligations, putting the company in 
legal violation of the provisions of Peru's land reform statutes that 
prohibit debt peonage. 
Subsequent investigation by the company revealed that approxi- 
mately 20% of the claimed acreage was never planted, and that loans 
were made to associates and farm entities that neither signed 
asparagus contracts nor possessed suitable lands. In addition, many 
of the genuine outgrowers were found to have fewer plants on less 
acreage than company records indicated. It is highly probable that 
farmers with `phantom' asparagus plantings were paying interest on 
inflated credit accounts. 
As a result of these investigations, the company's outgrower 
programme has been drastically transformed. By 1981, ASAGRO 
had become a tightly administered operation conducting business in 
an efficient and highly bureaucratized fashion. Multiple records were 
kept of each transaction, a system of checks and balances was 
applied, all fields were checked regularly, and the processing plant 
was provided with accurate, honest predictions. This required an 
expanded and reorganized field staff of twenty agronomists and 
technicians. 
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In addition, an expanded administrative staff provided farmers 
with prompt bi-weekly loan cheques. Every month, reports were 
prepared for the central office in Lima, financial statements were 
made available to growers, and employees' wages were paid. As a 
result, a very large staff administered relatively few acres (approxi- 
mately 1,750) and a small number of farm units (110). According to 
the administration, such a large staff was necessary due to unusual 
characteristics of the programme: (a) farm units were so small and 
widely dispersed that technicians' travel time is high; (b) the com- 
pany's policy of quality maximization required a complicated collec- 
tion and transportation system of thrice-daily pick-ups at every farm; 
(c) none of the farmers were experienced asparagus growers and 
many were novices in coastal desert farming; and (d) the project was 
both agronomically and organizationally a pioneer. 
In the field, the daily work schedule was dominated by the need to 
keep up with the harvest. Asparagus shoots are the tips of new plants 
sent up by root crowns buried a foot or so underground. White 
asparagus, the kind that ASAGRO produces, must be harvested the 
instant the tip emerges from the soil. If left exposed to the sun for as 
little as three hours, the tip of the asparagus opens up; the shoot turns 
green, and the product deteriorates rapidly from first quality (white 
and unopened) to third quality (green with opened tips). 
ASAGRO therefore advises its growers to harvest twice a day. 
This practice, which is followed by most of the new growers who have 
harvested once a day for years, maximizes product quality. It also 
increases grower income, since there is a sharp price differential 
between the three quality levels: first quality at eighteen cents (U.S.) 
per pound; second quality at thirteen cents; and third quality at ten 
cents. To harvest the asparagus, harvesters walk up and down the 
apparently empty furrows, backs bent and heads bowed, searching 
out the small white tips. When they spot one, they insert an asparagus 
knife, a piece of metal sharpened on the end like a long thin chisel, 
and cut the tip 8 or 9 inches below the surface. At the side of the field, 
another worker classifies the asparagus into the three different 
quality categories. 
Once harvested, the asparagus begins at once to deteriorate. 
ASAGRO has therefore devised a transport system in which small 
pick-up trucks, owned and operated by local subcontractors, pass by 
each harvesting field three times a day, receive the harvest from the 
farmers and transport it promptly to the company's collection point. 
The truck drivers carry portable scales to weigh the product at the 
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farm site and to issue the delivery receipts to farmers. The drivers are 
also responsible for a quality check to ensure that the farmers are 
following the company's classification standards. From farm to factory, 
the asparagus is transported in specially-designed company-owned 
plastic crates. Careful inventory of these is maintained at all times; 
both the farmers and the truckers must sign receipts noting each 
empty crate they receive and full crate they deliver. 
The collection centre is home base for the agronomist in charge of 
harvesting as well as for two or three farm technicians. Here the 
asparagus is transferred from the pick-ups to the large truck that 
makes twice-daily deliveries from the collection centre to the plant. 
Technicians verify the weight and classification of each crate as it 
comes off the pick-up truck. If any discrepancies or problems arise, 
or if a route driver reports that a farmer has something he wants to 
discuss, either the agronomist or a farm technician can set out for the 
farm at once. 
When not specifically overseeing the day's harvest, one agronomist 
and some farm technicians are normally busy visiting the fields of 
farmers who are not then harvesting. Farm visits are made to check 
on the progress of the crops (to verify and if necessary adjust the 
expected dates and quantities of the field's harvest, part of the 
constant updating of overall production forecasts); to evaluate and 
diagnose any problems resulting from poor cultivation practices or 
pest infestations; to verify that the necessary farm work has been 
done, or that tasks for which the farmer has requested a bi-weekly 
loan are both necessary and timely; or to lend technical assistance to 
the grower. Only the last type of farm visit requires an actual meeting 
of field staff and farmer. This is the rarest kind of farm visit, so most 
of the field staff's work is not visible to the growers, who do not 
understand the extent or importance of the field staff's duties. 
At the same time, other agronomists and farm technicians are 
involved in experimental work. The company has for some time been 
involved in a major research effort with industrial tomatoes to check 
the feasibility of the processing plant's planned expansion into that 
line. The mealy bug infestation, discussed elsewhere, has also re- 
quired a large crash research programme. In addition, the company 
carries out continual asparagus research, principally directed towards 
lowering the costs of recommended inputs and improving the com- 
pany's nursery stock. Other farm technicians are assigned perman- 
nently as resource persons to the various collectives. Finally, there 
remains one field employee who works as a `straw boss', directly 
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managing the employed labour force on several adjacent farms 
owned by a family of farm entrepreneurs that has been unable or 
unwilling to work without direct company involvement. 
Passing their days like this, the field staff put in long hard hours and 
feel overworked, despite such low ratios of seventeen farms per 
agronomist (seven per field employee) and 260 acres per agronomist 
(115 per field employee). All of ASAGRO's field employees work 
longer and harder for less pay than their equivalently qualified 
counterparts in the public sector. Yet the need for such a large staff, 
constantly called into question by the farmers in their arguments for 
higher prices, remains open to doubt. Although stretched thin under 
present circumstances, some of these circumstances are the result of 
managerial decisions which could in the future be modified. The field 
staff is as large as it is because of: the widely dispersed farm units; the 
unfamiliarity of all Santa farmers with the new crop; the company's 
overriding emphasis on high quality based on its overall pricing and 
marketing strategies; the elaborate and costly control systems intro- 
duced by the new management as a reaction to the fraud and waste 
that resulted from the previous lack of accountability. 
IMPACT ON SANTA VALLEY FARMERS 
The basic impact of ASAGRO on its contracted farmers has been to 
perpetuate and consolidate their position as independent farmers. 
Both the farm entrepreneurs and the family farmers were born and 
raised on farms, but worked many years as urban labourers or 
farm workers. They have dedicated the last ten or fifteen years of 
their lives to a single goal: to become independent land-owning 
farmers. 
Despite years of effort, many farm entrepreneurs and almost all of 
the family farmers were still in a precarious position when ASAGRO 
began its asparagus operations. They lacked the capital or credit 
necessary to turn desert into arable land and begin farming. 
For the 106 farmers desperate or adventurous enough to take a risk 
with an unknown crop and a new company, ASAGRO accomplished 
in a year what other farmers needed a generation to achieve: the 
transformation of sand lots into farms. Overnight, land that could not 
grow anything became a cash crop farm. From that point on, since 
the farm entrepreneurs could not pay their labourers nor the family 
farmers give up their outside jobs, ASAGRO made bi-weekly loans 
54 Small Farmers, Big Business 
so that those who cultivated the crop could survive over the three 
years until asparagus would become a paying proposition. 
POSITIVE IMPACTS 
A New Colonizing Crop 
Asparagus's potential as a colonizing plant may be its most important 
value to the agriculture of the area. Other crops such as potatoes may 
be more profitable on already formed soils. The greatest advantage of 
asparagus is as a colonizer, since it will survive, if not thrive, on pure 
sand, and its plant cycle allows twice-yearly applications of organic 
material to fertilize the soil and gradually build up its structure. 
This use of asparagus as a colonizer, however, is only feasible if 
the growers have their own source of organic material, such as 
livestock. The new ASAGRO management has determined that 
outside purchases of manure are uneconomic, even if yields were to 
increase substantially, and has therefore discontinued the earlier 
practice of financing such purchases. Although the technology exists 
which could permit small farmers to generate their own organic ferti- 
lizer, for example by composting or by grinding the asparagus bushes, 
company agronomists did not assign a high priority to experiment- 
ation or dissemination of these techniques. This is partly because 
other yield-depressing problems were more severe and promised 
more immediate results if solved, and partly because they did not be- 
lieve many of their growers would be successful with these techniques. 
Greater. Labour Intensity and Employment Generation 
Asparagus is a more labour-intensive cultivant than any other of the 
crops common to the area - corn, beans, sweet potatoes, alfalfa and 
potatoes. Compared with other vegetables grown by a few farmers 
in the area (lettuce, carrots, or tomatoes) or to other crop rotations, 
asparagus is unsurpassed in its labour-per-acre requirements. More- 
over, because of its emphasis on quality and the need for year-round 
production, ASAGRO advocates techniques that are much more 
labour-intensive than those previously in use. Chief among these are 
the twice-daily harvest and the division of each farm into three 
successively blooming lots, so that one lot is always in production. 
This ASAGRO system, which is not used by other processors or 
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growers, offers advantages to everybody involved. The company 
benefits because its purchases are more easily spread throughout the 
year and because the constant-harvest system requires growers who 
live in town to attend their asparagus production daily throughout the 
year. Farmers benefit because both their income and their costs 
fluctuate less through the year and because the more stable labour 
force is easier for farm entrepreneurs to administer and for family 
farmers to supply. Farm labourers benefit because the employment 
demand is spread throughout the year. 
Asparagus is such a labour-intensive crop that two-thirds of the 
family farmers must hire outside labour to supplement family workers, 
despite the small size of family farmers' plots (averaging ten acres per 
family). Those who do hire outside labour employ an average of two 
workers each during the harvest season (at least eight months a year). 
Most family farmers who hire outside labour do so because their 
households lack internal labour resources. Usually such households 
are nuclear families whose children have yet to reach adolescence. 
But there are some family farm employers with average size plantings 
and three or four adult family members also working in the fields. 
ASAGRO calculated that a full-time farm worker is needed for each 
4.25 acres. Using this ratio, it is possible to calculate that all but the 
smallest family farms or the largest families will have a more or less 
permanent need to hire outside labour. This further transforms the 
nature of the farm enterprise. As a result of the asparagus project, 
farmers who could not live off their own land and had to seek 
employment to survive, have become not only independent farmers 
but farm employers. 
Farm labourers probably benefit most from the increased labour 
requirements of asparagus. The group that receives the next greatest 
benefit is probably family farmers planting asparagus. All of the 
families are using their full family labour capacity in productive 
income-producing work. Among family farmers, 68% must hire 
additional labour since their own labour resources are insufficient. 
This situation contrasts sharply with the same family's labour utiliza- 
tion before planting asparagus, when most had only a few acres under 
cultivation, and the crops cultivated were primarily corn and alfalfa, 
the least labour-intensive of the area's crops. Farms that previously 
got along with the daily farm chores of children and the part-time 
labour of their parents now require two or three adult males to work 
six and a half days per week, farm women to spend half their days 
with the asparagus, and children to work after (and often before) 
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school. Family farms previously could not support the family, but 
exported men's labour and underemployed everyone else's; they now 
supported the family, fully-employed all family members, and pro- 
vided jobs for an average of two additional outside labourers. 
ASAGRO has brought a fuller and more productive use, not only of 
land and water resources, but also of labour resources. 
Greatly Increased Technical Assistance 
Another obvious benefit for these growers is the massive technical 
assistance provided by ASAGRO. Before occupying their present 
land, 79% of the Santa Valley sample had never operated their own 
farm. Although many had been raised on small farms and were 
therefore familiar with a farm lifestyle, it is nevertheless clear that, as 
a group, ASAGRO's farmers were unusually inexperienced. 
Comparing the Santa Valley neophytes with the more experienced 
asparagus growers in Viru, for instance, company agronomists noted, 
on the one hand, that Santa farmers are easier to work with since they 
are more compliant and open to suggestions; and, on the other hand, 
that they consume much more of the agronomists' time since they 
lack basic skills in irrigation and fertilizing. 
Any processing company which tries to introduce an entirely new 
crop to small outgrowers, faces a massive teaching job. ASAGRO's 
task was even harder, since in many cases it had to teach not only the 
particularities of asparagus cultivation but also the generalities of 
either small-farm management or farm techniques appropriate to the 
desert colonizing environment. The original management of the 
company resolved this problem through highly centralized manage- 
ment and the use of hired labour crews. Perhaps this was necessary in 
the beginning, but the original approach had the added effect of 
making possible a degree of financial chicanery that would not have 
continued unnoticed for so long if farmers had been given the 
responsibility to manage their own asparagus. With the new manage- 
ment, the emphasis has been much more on teaching, on explaining 
the `why' as well as the `what', and on lessening the farmers' direct 
dependence on ASAGRO. 
The new ASAGRO management changed not only its general 
mode of operation but also most of the specific recommendations 
regarding asparagus cultivation (e.g. different transplanting seasons, 
seedling sizes, and plant distances; different types of chemical 
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fertilizer in different applications; harvesting based on the maturity of 
the plantings rather than time since last harvest; and so on). All of 
these changes are based either on greater attention to the economics 
of asparagus production or on results of the company's experiments. 
The changes seem sound, but changing so many recommendations in 
such a short time, combined with other more basic problems, 
contributed to a growing estrangement between the company and its 
growers. 
It is important to emphasize the omnipresence of the company's 
technical assistance programme. Agronomists in their pick-up trucks 
and farm technicians on their motocycles circulate constantly among 
the widely scattered asparagus fields. ASAGRO-connected vehicles 
constitute most of the traffic on these rutted farm roads which were 
often first opened by ASAGRO traffic. 
No more than two weeks pass without a consultation between each 
farmer and an agronomist; most keep in contact more often, and 
sometimes when there is a problem, the two work together almost 
daily until the crisis has passed. Except for missionary-sponsored 
extension personnel, no other technical assistance agents were en- 
countered in the area. Nor could farmers recall ever having come into 
contact with any. Yet this area and these farmers have been, over the 
years, the `target population' of a variety of government sponsored 
technical assistance programmes, all designed to increase both the 
productive utility and the small farmer benefits from the irrigation 
infrastructure. Evaluations of agricultural extension programmes 
often hinge on an assessment of whether or not contact was actually 
made with farmers and, if so, with what kinds of farmers and how 
many. The agribusiness-based technical assistance that ASAGRO 
has provided is on another level, as is this evaluation of its intended 
and unintended social impacts. With ASAGRO it can be taken for 
granted that agricultural assistance has been extended and received; 
the evidence is in the high quality harvest delivered daily to the 
ASAGRO collection centre. The peasants, however, do not perceive 
this. A majority claim that they are not receiving any technical 
assistance from the company; some even claim that they have never 
received such assistance. This perception is inaccurate, but it is very 
strong. The explanation for this anomaly lies in the farmers' associa- 
tion of technical assistance with a number of negative impacts during 
the project, as described below. 
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NEGATIVE IMPACTS 
Negative Perceptions of ASAGRO Staff 
The highly visible presence of such a large ASAGRO field staff was 
described by several farmers as a hindrance, not a help. Among 
themselves, and in the monthly meetings of their Asparagus Growers' 
Association, they describe ASAGRO's technicians as an army of 
parasites living off the farmers' asparagus production. When these 
farmers are asked about the company's technical assistance, they 
answer, not in terms of their recollection of advice received, but in 
terms of their general attitudes toward the company, whether it is 
helping them or harming them, and their general level of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with the project. 
There is a lesson to be learned here about evaluation methodology: 
survey items designed to elict from the respondent a simple reporting 
of past behaviour elicit instead responses that serve better as 
indicators of present attitudes. Most attitudes were conditioned by 
one basic problem for the growers: the lack of farm profits. But other 
factors also contributed and farm unprofitability itself has several 
causes. These include low yields, rising debts, overpromotion, com- 
pany evasiveness, and `agribusiness normalization'. 
Low Yields 
The original contracts between ASAGRO and the farmers, con- 
tained, in writing, the company's expectation that farmers would 
harvest 4,500 pounds of asparagus per acre in each harvest after the 
first two. But the average yield achieved is only 1,700 pounds per 
acre, the very best yields barely top 3,500 and the poorest farmers on 
the sandiest soils achieve less than 1,000 pounds per acre. This is by 
far the company's most serious problem, the source of both its own 
economic woes and its farmers' discontent. At present yields and 
prices, the crop is simply not competitive with available alternatives. 
Most of the farmers themselves believe that asparagus is not a 
profitable enterprise, and would not be unless yields surpass 2,500 or 
even 3,500 pounds per acre. In the Santa Valley sample, two farmers 
said their asparagus business was profitable, four said that they could 
not yet answer the question, and twenty-eight stated that they were 
losing money on the crop. 
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What are the causes of these low yields? The biggest problem is an 
infestation of `mealy bug', a pest which attacks the roots of the plant. 
The Santa Valley infestation is the first recorded instance of this 
insect either attacking asparagus or living underground. Weakened 
by the mealy bug, the plant becomes susceptible to fusarium wilt, 
leading to a 40% drop in the plant's yield. 
In a sense, the important role of this infestation in reducing yields 
is a promising sign, since it is the only factor for which a quick cure is 
likely. Yields are also reduced by a number of poor cultivation 
practices: fertilizing the plants excessively, or too seldom or at 
inappropriate times; bedding the plants too deep (which produces 
fewer but longer shoots); the depletion of phosphate in the soil. 
These problems can be resolved, although it will take longer to get 
good results, since farmers are still following these mistaken practices 
as a result of the bad recommendations made by the original 
ASAGRO agronomists. 
Farmers have been slow to accept the new recommendations for 
several reasons. Firstly, it is not intuitively obvious that using lesser 
quantities of cheaper fertilizer earlier in the plant cycle will produce 
better yields at harvest time. The present agronomists are not as good 
salesmen as the original promoters. Secondly, and most important, 
there has not been any demonstration effect so far of the new 
fertilization programme, as the increasingly serious mealy bug infes- 
tation has counteracted any improvements in productivity that might 
have otherwise occurred. Yields were also reduced by early errors 
that are less easily corrected. Many fields simply contain too few 
plants set too far apart and there is little that can be done about this. 
Likewise, yields will always remain low on plantings that were made 
in extremely sandy soil, now that tests have shown that large 
purchases of manure cannot be economically justified at present 
prices. 
Although asparagus productivity will undoubtedly rise once the 
mealy bug infestation is treated and other agricultural practices are 
improved, it is highly unlikely that even the best of present plantings 
will ever reach the 4,500 pound level promised in the original 
contracts. The average is unlikely to exceed 2,750 pounds. Still, this 
will almost double productivity, sufficient to make the asparagus 
profitable and to keep the farmers from plowing their asparagus 
under, even if not enough to attract many farmers away from more 
flexible and more profitable crops. 
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Rising Debts 
ASAGRO introduced not only a new crop to the Santa Valley, but 
also a new system of agricultural credit. In a sense, the company was 
taking the pattern of agricultural credit previously used by Peruvian 
government agencies to finance production on the land-reformed, 
collectively-farmed cooperatives and applying it to individual farmers 
in the private sector. In this system, farmers are paid as they work, as 
if they were wage earners instead of self-employed independents. 
The farmers receive and spend money which they believe they have 
earned by their labour. But the already-spent money is merely a loan 
not a payment; it will not actually be earned unless and until the crop 
has been successfully harvested. Should any unforeseen problem 
arise, such as the mealy bug infestation, then the farmer-borrower 
finds himself confronted with an impossible debt which he has only 
half-deliberately assumed. The lender, in turn, finds itself confronted 
with a massive bad debt and a class of angry clients. This type of farm 
credit system has not worked in Peru's collective farming sector; most 
cooperatives are buried in debt and demoralized by the apparent 
impossibility of ever getting free. It has not worked much better in 
the private sector. 
Like small farmers everywhere, farm debt makes the asparagus 
growers nervous; their apparent inability to reduce the size of that 
debt makes them fear for their farms. Their debts were originally 
projected to be paid off after the third harvest, two years from the 
planting date. Now, with interest rates up and projected yields down, 
it is expected that farmers will only begin to reduce their debts at 
that point, not eliminating them until three or four harvests later. 
These debts represent dependency to the farmers. Most have no 
other source of income, and until the profits of asparagus increase, 
they must keep borrowing more. They resent the whole process 
but most keep on borrowing. Farmers feel that their debts are 
static and their harvest deliveries merely pay for cumulative interest 
and recent borrowings, leaving the basic debt at the same level as 
before. 
Company agronomists advise the farmers not to be overly con- 
cerned about their debts. The rate of inflation is so much higher than 
the interest rate that nominally static debt levels actually represent 
40% annual reductions in the real value of the debts. But these 
inexperienced farmers do not understand this point and are not 
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reassured when the agronomists explain it. Debt peonage is a recent 
historical reality in Peru and farmers refer to it constantly in fear and 
with anger. 
The company has terminated the experiment, continuing with its 
present contract farmers but refusing to extend this kind of credit to 
new growers. Like the members of the bankrupt cooperatives, the 
company's farmers are alternately angered and demoralized by their 
increasing indebtedness. Privately, the ASAGRO administrator pre- 
dicted that half of the original farmers would ultimately prove unable 
to repay their debts, not because the debts were so high but because 
the yields were so low. Eventually, he said, the company would have 
to write off these debts as lessons learned. The causes and con- 
sequences of indebtedness must be a major part of the analysis of the 
social impact of ASAGRO in the Santa Valley. 
The Asparagus Growers' Association has demanded that the 
company forgive the principal and interest incurred before the first 
harvest, and that debts be reduced for those farmers who were 
producing asparagus before the plant was finished and ready to 
receive it. Local ASAGRO management recommended that some of 
this debt be written off as a cost of promotion but top management in 
Lima did not concur. The debt issue continued to be a principal 
source of grower dissatisfaction. 
Overpromotion 
Since the Santa Valley growers are new both to asparagus production 
and contract farming in general, they have no reference point on 
which to base their expectations of the company. Thus, although 
yields and profits are low, they look much lower when compared with 
the inflated promises made by the salesmen agronomists who signed 
them up. Present company behaviour suffers in comparison not only 
with previous promises but also past practices. The present rigorous 
cost control contrasts unfavourably with the open-handed generosity 
with which loans were once made. Nothing represents better the 
farmers' ambivalent attitude toward their debts than this: they dislike 
limitations on current borrowing almost as much as they dislike the 
very high debts that result from the lack of such limitations in the 
past. In part, the farmers' dissatisfaction with the programme is 
simply the result of the inevitable discrepancy between aroused 
expectations and reality. 
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Company Evasiveness 
In their dealings with growers, ASAGRO agronomists have felt 
constrained by the need to conceal from farmers certain important 
facts about the company operation. Most important of these is the 
suspected fraud of the former administration. Farmers know nothing 
of this. Agronomists have tried to serve the interests of justice while 
not revealing to the farmers the nature of the problem. They have 
requested each farmer to come in and review the status of his 
debt account, a request which few farmers acted on since they 
are not aware of the nature of the potential problem. They have 
suggested to the central administration in Lima that the company 
should write off part of this debt for promotional reasons. Meanwhile 
farmers, who are terribly concerned about the large size of their 
debts, do not suspect that the `generous and friendly' former 
administration might have defrauded them, or that part of their debt 
probably resulted from interest piled on top of artificially inflated 
expenses. 
Similarly, both of the agronomists in administrative positions 
stated in interviews their belief that half of the Santa Valley farmers 
will never achieve profits sufficient to fully repay their debts. The 
least experienced small farmers on the poorest plots, they think, 
should never have been recruited into the programme in the first 
place; eventually much of their debt will have to be written off when 
these farmers finally give up on asparagus and turn to more promising 
crops. It is vital to the company to recover as much of this debt 
as possible, of course, so forecasts such as these cannot even be 
hinted at in talks with farmers. Farmers continue to fear the loss of 
their farms to repay debts that the company privately expects to write 
off. 
Even if these farmers should manage to repay their debts, some- 
thing which is increasingly possible as their real value declines due to 
inflation, the company has already decided not to continue working 
with distant and isolated growers. Even if productivity dramatically 
increases and the farmers wish to plant more asparagus in the future, 
they will not be allowed to do so unless a significant number of their 
neighbours also sign up. And not just any neighbours. ASAGRO has 
determined in the future to accept only those new asparagus growers 
who are experienced and have the wherewithal to plant twenty-five 
acres of crop. In the most distant and newly colonized parts of the 
valley, few asparagus growers have neighbours who qualify. 
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Agribusiness Normalization 
Part of the grower dissatisfaction reflects an apparently universal 
characteristic of new agribusiness projects, `agribusiness normaliza- 
tion'. To start up operations and sign up farmers in a new area, 
processing plants must pursue promotional policies that are more 
advantageous than the company expects to maintain over the long 
run. At ASAGRO this transition was more abrupt than usual. The 
move out of the start-up phase was marked by a total change in 
administration from a group of promoters unconcerned with costs to 
a team of administrators who were told to get runaway costs under 
control. The abruptness of the transition increased the grower 
discontent that was already present. 
GROWER ORGANIZATION 
Almost as soon as ASAGRO started purchasing asparagus in 
November 1979, the Santa Valley growers began discussing the 
formation of an Asparagus Growers' Association to represent their 
interests to the company. This movement gained ground rapidly over 
the next few months, spearheaded by sharp farmer disagreement 
over rising interest rates, the initial asparagus price (which, when the 
plant opened, had not been adjusted upwards for inflation since the 
original contracts were signed in 1978), and the daily problems of 
administrative disorganization. 
According to the administration which took over in March 1980, 
the idea of the Growers' Association was actively fought by the 
earlier administration. The new administrator says that he changed 
company policy on this issue. Perhaps he was bowing to the inevit- 
able, but he also recognized the possible benefits to the company in 
terms of improved communication, coordination and discipline of the 
growers. At any rate, almost immediately after the new administra- 
tion began operating, the Association of Asparagus Growers was 
formally organized and legally constituted. It immediately began 
collective bargaining with the company, resulting in a rapid succes- 
sion of price increases, in return for which the Association agreed to 
reduce the length of the asparagus sold to the company from ten to 
eight inches. 
This illustrates how a collective bargaining unit can, as the new 
ASAGRO administration hoped, help the company. Without the 
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existence of the Association, the company could never have reduced 
the size of its asparagus purchases without a prolonged campaign and 
considerable conflict between each farmer and the company field 
representatives. When the Association agreed to the change as part 
of an overall agreement that included a price increase, the growers' 
own Association was coopted to take on the role of communicating, 
legitimizing and disciplining individual farmer's acceptance of the 
decisions. In return for this substantial advantage, the company gave 
up very little, since the original asparagus prices were so low and the 
rate of inflation so high that price concessions could have had only the 
most temporary impact on overall profitability. 
By organizing their Association so quickly and entering into the 
process of collective bargaining, the Santa Valley farmers demon- 
strated their organizational and political sophistication, the result of 
years of negotiating with government and agrarian reform bureau- 
cracies. It may be said of the group as a whole and the farm 
entrepreneurs in particular that they have had much more experience 
extracting benefits from bureaucracies than they have crops from 
the soil. With a couple of exceptions, it has been the more highly 
educated and articulate farm entrepreneurs that have provided the 
leadership for the Association. 
The Association served reasonably well its dual function of repre- 
senting farmers' interests and facilitating communications between 
the company and growers. It served equally well the latent unintended 
function of lessening farm isolation and integrating its members for 
the first time into a larger social and communication network. 
Because they live in a newly colonized area peopled by a diverse 
group of immigrants from all over Peru, family farmers who reside on 
their parcels have been unusually isolated from any social participa- 
tion outside their own family unit. There are as yet no important 
community or commercial centers in these areas, no community 
traditions or established organizations. For its 106 growers, ASAGRO 
has to some extent filled this gap. Farmers first got acquainted with 
each other as they congregated together every second Friday waiting 
for their cheques. Recently the company held its first annual field day 
for Santa Valley growers, a day-long fiesta for farmers and their 
families at the Cambio Puente collection centre. But the Association, 
organized into four sub-districts which meet together monthly, serves 
this social function even better. For those family farmers who do not 
belong to one of the church groups, the Association of Asparagus 
Growers is the only organization to which they belong, the only 
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group identity that is based on their new occupation and in their new 
area of residence. However, the Association has only one female 
member, a farm entrepreneur whose husband is too ill to manage 
their farm. Apart from her, the Association is a male organization, 
serving the social integration needs only of the adult men in the 
family. Women become, as we shall see, even more isolated than 
they were before asparagus arrived. 
CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF FARM WOMEN 
Most of the wives of farm entrepreneurs do not live at the farm site 
and have almost no contact with its operation. With one or two 
exceptions, even those who live on the farm seem to have no 
involvement, at least with cash crops such as asparagus. Family farm 
women, on the other hand, are as much a part of the asparagus 
operation as the men. For this group, the switch to asparagus farming 
has had as great an impact on their lives as it has on their husbands, 
sons and brothers. 
The cultivation of asparagus on previously barren land has exacer- 
bated the `double shift', the dual burden of house and farm work 
borne by these women. Like the men, adult women usually work 
about 35 hours a week in the asparagus fields. This additional 
workload is compensated only slightly by a corresponding reduction 
in household work responsibility. At best, the wife can afford to 
worry less about scraping together small quantities of fruits, eggs or 
other produce to sell in Chimbote as an income supplement. But 
none of the women ever spent significant proportions of their energy 
in such pursuits anyway. If men of the family formerly supplemented 
their income by fishing, then she has also been spared a time-consuming 
task: preparing the fish and peddling it in town. The only activity that 
most farm women have given up are the trips to the town market. 
Many women now go into town only once or twice a week, and for 
shorter trips, since they go only to purchase, not to sell. 
Picking and classifying asparagus, literally `stoop labour', is univer- 
sally considered by those who do it in Peru to be easier, lighter and 
more pleasant than other farm tasks. Men who now do this kind of 
work instead of other farm labour, either on their own farms or as 
labourers elsewhere, undoubtedly work longer and more productively, 
but not necessarily harder. For them, the impact of asparagus on 
their work has been nearly ideal: an end to under-employment, 
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greater productivity and greater income, without a corresponding 
increase in the intensity of the labour. The impact on women's work 
is mixed: less under-employment, greater productivity, but more 
time spent in field work, and intensified household work (since the 
same amount of work must be done in less time). 
The net effect on women's income appears to be positive. The 
changes brought about by contract farming reduced or eliminated 
some sources of independent female income, e.g. sales of fish or 
peripheral farm products. However, total household income in- 
creased considerably; the great bulk of this was controlled by men but 
some did trickle down to women. Women came to control a smaller 
percentage of household income but a larger absolute amount. 
Expenditures on food and other basic needs (the purview of women 
here) increased. So did female dependence on men within the 
household. 
For both men and women, this required adjustments in the money- 
related aspects of their family roles. In the past, a man could spend 
his income irresponsibly, at least occasionally, without putting his 
family into an unusually difficult position, since women had some 
separate sources of income. Now he has to be much more of a money 
manager. Every other Friday he must put in a loan request for money 
he will receive two weeks later to cover expenses during the two- 
week period after that. Although he receives considerable assistance 
from the ASAGRO agronomists, this kind of detailed financial 
planning was a new experience. At the same time as he asked for this 
new loan, he received a cheque based on his last request. This cheque 
must support not only him and his family for the next fourteen days, 
but in most cases, the families of his paid labourers as well. Since this 
increased financial responsibility has been a new burden for him, it 
has probably taken some time to adjust to. 
THE ASPARAGUS GROWERS OF VIRU VALLEY 
Viru, the nearest important farm valley to the north of Santa, is 
eighty uninhabited miles from the Santa Valley plant. Like all the 
other northern valleys except for Santa, its irrigation source, the Viru 
River, is only seasonal. It was thus affected, as Santa was not, by the 
terrible five-year drought that devastated northern Peru in recent 
years. The long-established systems of collective irrigation broke 
down under the water shortage; farming is now dependent upon 
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expensive water brought to the surface by petrol powered pumps. 
Most family farmers of Viru, therefore, own land which they cannot 
cultivate because they do not own a pump and because they cannot 
afford to buy much water from their wealthier pump-owning neigh- 
bours. Whereas small farmers in Santa are in the process of coloniz- 
ing land never before cultivated, in Viru they are giving up on parcels 
that have been cultivated for centuries. 
In the 1950s and 60s, Viru agriculture was dominated by a small 
number of innovative large landowners who pioneered the produc- 
tion of asparagus in Peru. Eventually, ten or twelve of these land- 
owners were each farming 150 or so acres of asparagus, and either 
operating small canning plants on their own estates or selling to 
processors in Trujillo. These estates averaged 5,250 pounds per acre, 
more than double the present rate. This export-oriented production 
system was dealt a severe blow by socialist reforms introduced in 
1968. Land reform broke up the estates, some of which remained 
collective farms and some of which were split up into small individual 
parcels. The Liber processing plant was turned over to its workers as 
a `social enterprise'. Government farm policy emphasized production 
of basic necessities for local consumption; the small, luxury export 
asparagus business was not well regarded. 
By 1980, the asparagus industry in Viru was on the verge of 
extinction. The only two buyers, Liber and San Fernando, were 
respectively disorganized and decapitalized, unable to provide even 
short-term farm credit and incapable of paying for the dwindling 
production of the asparagus acreage for which they still had con- 
tracts. In 1981, Liber ceased to purchase asparagus altogether and 
San Fernando, despite an additional line of credit from AID, was 
unable to expand its purchases or offer harvest financing. 
ASAGRO's Operations in Viru 
This was the situation which faced the Viru asparagus industry when 
ASAGRO appeared on the scene in late 1980. In the short time it has 
been operating, the company must be credited with a complete 
rejuvenation of the industry. This turnaround is its principal social 
and economic achievement. With ASAGRO the leader, the price of 
asparagus rose more than 100% (for first-quality product). In the 
process, the price structure has been reshaped to offer more incen- 
tives for quality. The company has made available short-term credits 
for existing asparagus farmers. In addition, its purchase guarantees 
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have enabled two farmers to successfully apply for the first asparagus 
production credits from the Banco Agrario, the Government's 
agricultural development bank. Though the evidence is sketchy, it 
appears that total Viru asparagus plantings increased in 1981, the first 
time this had happened since 1968. 
Aside from this economic impact, the company's operations in Viru 
have already begun to have direct socioeconomic consequences for 
asparagus farmers and farm employees. Some of these effects are dif- 
ferent from those observed in the Santa Valley, for three reasons: differ- 
ences in historical and ecological context; different expectations of the 
company among these experienced asparagus growers; and early 
implementation of the new policies favoured by ASAGRO's present 
management. Still, the central source of these differences is Viru's 
status, unique in Peru, as an established asparagus producing centre. 
The main promotional tool that has brought ASAGRO success in 
Viru has been its willingness to make short-term loans. These loans 
are interest-free advances against the next harvest, which in the 
asparagus production cycle is never more than four months away. 
The practice is traditional in the Viru asparagus industry, but com- 
peting buyers are too financially extended to continue with this kind 
of credit. The practice, always beneficial for the farmer, is even more 
so to ASAGRO, since it obliges the farmer to sell his product to them 
first. ASAGRO also gives the highest price, but only by a small 
margin. As a result of its more favourable credit terms and prices, 
ASAGRO is close to a monopsony position in the Viru asparagus 
market. Liber has for all practical purposes given up the asparagus 
business and San Fernando continues primarily because of a few 
remaining contractual obligations. 
ASAGRO's rapid domination of the market would be potentially 
dangerous for the farmers, but competition arrived soon after the 
fieldwork was completed. Partially financed by AID, the original pre- 
socialist owners of Liber formed a new company and completed 
construction of an asparagus canning plant in Viru itself. AID also 
financed feasibility studies for other potential asparagus processors, 
two of which have begun operations. 
Viru farmers differ from those of Santa principally because they 
are, in all aspects of their farming life, more established. They have 
worked their own land longer, many of them all their lives. They are 
older, they have been growing asparagus longer, and their asparagus 
plantations are longer established. The farm entrepreneurs are 
somewhat larger, much more experienced at farm management, and 
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generally more successful. Family farmers, though they have smaller 
lands than their Santa counterparts and more expensive water, also 
reap the benefits of older farm investments, fruit trees, animals and 
asparagus plantations. As a group, their farms are more profitable, 
their incomes higher and their standard of living visibly better. From 
their longer experience as independent farmers, Viru agriculturalists 
not only have greater farming knowledge about asparagus but also 
about other crops. Most of the smaller farmers concentrate on 
asparagus, but on their spare land, they tend to grow higher value 
crops than Santa's corn and alfalfa. 
Just as its farmers are more established, so, of course, is the Viru 
community. As it is not a colonization zone, it has a much lower 
proportion of recent immigrants than Santa. Most people that live 
there were born there and they remain embedded in the kinship 
networks that first nurtured them, provided them with their farms, 
and which still will provide help in emergencies. 
These `roots' carry with them customs and traditions which both 
help and hinder the worker-farmers. Viru farmers have ideas about 
how to propagate their own asparagus seed beds, how to transplant 
the seedlings, and how little water and fertilizer they can get away 
with. As a result, they spend less money and get significantly greater 
production than do the farmers of Santa. But if they buried their 
asparagus crowns less deep in the soil, their yields would be even 
greater. It they harvested twice a day, the higher price and quality 
would more than compensate for the additional labour. For this last 
reason alone, the quality of Viru asparagus is so much lower than that 
of Santa, that even with its greater production, Viru's income per 
hectare is only about the same as Santa's. The same asparagus 
traditions that provide a firm base for a secure income also limit the 
further development of farming skills and farming incomes. 
ASAGRO did little to insist that its farmers follow company advice 
rather than asparagus tradition. ASAGRO was still new to Viru, still 
in the promotional phase of the agribusiness normalization process. 
The ASAGRO agronomist in Viru frequently referred to the benefits 
of shallower beds or twice-daily harvests. But these ideas were simply 
mentioned in general conversation, and explained only if the farmer 
picked up on them and started to ask questions. This approach 
reflects the initial stage of company-grower relations. With these new 
growers, the company is still playing the role of the grateful recipient; 
not until later will it settle into the role of the powerful buyer with 
exacting requirements. 
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A second reason why ASAGRO spends less on technical assistance 
to Viru farmers is economy. Since such technical assistance is not 
absolutely necessary to obtain adequate quantities of acceptable 
asparagus, the company can cut back its expensive efforts in this area. 
The company's whole Viru operation is handled by only one un- 
assisted agronomist. The grower-to-employee ratio of the field staff 
in Viru is therefore almost eighty to one, compared to the seven to 
one ratio in Santa. In this way, the Viru operation reflects ASAGRO's 
present policies of working only with experienced farmers who need 
less technical assistance. 
IMPACTS 
Higher Quality Standards, Lower Prices 
ASAGRO not only provides its Viru growers with much less 
financing and technical assistance, it also applies stricter classification 
standards, resulting in a lower effective product price. In Viru, 
ASAGRO follows the practice, already established by its competi- 
tors, of classifying the product at its own collection centre before 
weighing and formally receiving the product. The classification is 
done by a subcontractor, who earns the same small percentage that in 
Santa is paid to the farmers themselves for this work. The subcon- 
tractor provides employment to an overseer, two male porters and 
twelve to twenty female classifiers at the Viru collection centre. 
This system results in much stricter classification norms than those 
followed by the farmers of Santa. Also, all asparagus is routinely 
trimmed to precisely eight inches, which further reduces the purchase 
weight by as much as 10%, compared to the slightly over-length 
asparagus which the Santa farmers manage to deliver. The Viru 
system also results in the farmer (rather than the company) absorbing 
the product weight loss due to the dehydration of the product during 
transport and classification. Not only does the Viru system result in 
the farmer being paid less, but he must trust the company more, since 
he plays no part in the classification or weighing of his product. 
Greater Grower Satisfaction 
By any objective measure, ASAGRO's outgrower system in Viru is 
less favourable to the farmers than its original system in Santa. Viru 
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farmers are offered less credit, given less technical assistance and 
paid less for their product. Yet Viru farmers are unanimous in the 
opinion they express in interviews: they are not just satisfied but 
enthusiastically pleased. The farmers of Santa, on the other hand, are 
nearly unanimous in their very different opinion: they are angrily 
disillusioned. What accounts for the difference? 
First, Viru farmers are making a profit (at least they believe they 
are) and the Santa farmers are not. Although gross incomes per acre 
are about the same, costs are somewhat lower in Viru and only the 
Santa farmers have access to long-term credit and the resulting 47.5% 
nominal interest charges. Asked if they thought their asparagus 
cultivation was profitable, only two farmers in Santa said `Yes', while 
all of the farmers in Viru answered `Yes, of course.' However, Santa 
farmers had a fairly precise picture of their costs, incomes and levels 
of profit and debt, because they routinely received this information 
from ASAGRO agronomists. Viru farmers, in contrast, had only 
vague notions of these concepts, since few keep detailed accounts. 
Second, the two groups had different reference points, which result 
in different levels of expectations. Viru farmers are satisfied because 
they compare ASAGRO with the lower prices, less available credit 
and greater disorganization of Peru's other asparagus producers. 
Santa farmers are dissatisfied because they compare ASAGRO with 
the oral and written promises of the agribusiness promoter who 
originated the project and first convinced them to participate. 
Third, ASAGRO's operations in the Santa Valley were three years 
older than its recently developed Viru programme. The relationships 
between the two groups of farmers and the company were therefore 
in different stages of the agribusiness normalization process. Santa 
farmers were experiencing the normal conflicts of the later phase of 
the process; Viru farmers were still in the `honeymoon' phase. 
In summary, the social and economic impact of ASAGRO on the 
farmers of Viru appears to be somewhat less positive than its original 
impact on the farms of Santa (discounting the early cases of fraud in 
the latter area). But the sources of the most dramatically positive of 
the Santa impacts, the original `making' of smallholders' farms and 
the provision of 100% financing, have not proved economically 
feasible. Such policies could not be sustained and the expansion of 
such impacts to other groups of small farmers, either by ASAGRO 
itself or by other companies following its example, cannot be expected. 
Furthermore, the very aspects of the original Santa project that 
provided the most positive socioeconomic impact were also responsible 
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for the unintended side effects of dependency and dissatisfaction. 
The Viru model appears to be more workable for future agribusiness 
planners. Though it strives for less positive impact, its levels of risk 
and investment are lower and its potential negative impact is corres- 
pondingly reduced. 
4 McCain Foods, Canada: 
The Political Economy of 
Monopoly 
Politics and business don't mix. New Brunswick's too small for 
politics. 
K. C. Irving, New Brunswick entrepreneur 
This chapter deals with McCain Foods Ltd., a potato processor in 
New Brunswick, Canada. The case is of interest for a variety of 
reasons. First, agribusiness in the St. John valley of New Brunswick is 
a very complete `system' which affects virtually every aspect of life in 
the area. McCain has been here for some twenty-five years, time 
enough to produce long-term effects on farming practices and com- 
munity life. Furthermore, McCain has used this time to consolidate 
and diversify its activities in the area to the extent that it now forms 
a classic case of monopoly. Most contract farming situations involve 
some degree of monopoly, with a multitude of growers facing at most 
a couple of firms. The McCain case is a `textbook example' which 
shows what happens when such concentration is carried to the 
extreme. 
Second, the case is highly politicized. Some farmers have been 
angered by the company's policies and have attempted to form 
growers' organizations to publicize their views and to negotiate with 
the company. Two quite distinct organizations have been formed; 
their histories provide insights into the organizational problems faced 
not only by contract farmers, but to some extent, by farmers in 
general. 
McCain Foods Ltd. is a Canadian-based transnational corporation 
with headquarters in Florenceville, New Brunswick. It is currently the 
world's second largest french fry producer, with a total of fourteen 
plants in seven countries. Its potato requirements are met largely by 
contracting, although spot market purchases and internal production 
are also important. The firm is quite diversified, producing a variety 
of frozen foods, and its subsidiaries are involved in trucking, storage, 
sales of farm equipment and fertilizer, and other fields. 
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McCain Foods was incorporated in 1956 in Florenceville, New 
Brunswick and its first french fry plant went into operation there the 
following year. Since 1969, it has operated a second plant in New 
Brunswick at Grand Falls, 100 km. northwest of Florenceville. Both 
are located in the St. John river valley. This study, carried out in 
1980, deals only with the firm's New Brunswick operations, and 
focuses on the relationship between the firm and the farmers under 
contract to supply it with potatoes. 
The chapter begins with a brief outline of the recent historical 
development of the St. John valley potato industry. The growth of 
McCain Foods and its current role in the valley are also described. In 
the next sections, the relationship between the firm and its contracted 
suppliers will be examined. The topics to be discussed here include 
the farmers' motives for contracting; the alternatives available to 
them; the means available to the firm for obtaining supplies at the 
lowest possible price; and the purpose and effect of the firm's internal 
production. The final section discusses the political activity of farmers 
vis-a-vis McCain, describing, inter alia, the organizational problems 
specific to contract farmers, the types of organizations established, 
and the role of the provincial government in influencing the process 
of organization. 
BACKGROUND 
THE NEW BRUNSWICK POTATO INDUSTRY: 1950 to 1980 
Over the last thirty years, the New Brunswick potato industry has 
changed dramatically. Perhaps the simplest way to describe this 
process is first to list some of the most visible changes and then to 
offer an historical account which ties some of these developments 
together. (Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Canadian 
census.) 
Some of the most important changes are: 
1 A decline in the number of farms. The number of farms in the St. 
John valley in 1976 was 47% of that in 1961; for all of Canada, this 
figure was 62%. 
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2 An increase in farm size, the average for the St. John valley farm 
increasing to 366 acres, from 202 acres in 1961. 
3 Increased mechanization, specifically a switch to harvesters from 
less elaborate `diggers' and a marked decline in the use of hired 
labour. 
4 An increase in the percentage of potatoes being processed into 
french fries from 15.7% in 1957 to 64% in 1978 (Senopi, 1980). 
Total acreage in production has remained roughly constant. 
5 An absolute decline in the number of potatoes sold on the fresh 
(`table') market. 
6 Increased geographical concentration of potato growing. In the 
early 1950s, about 60% of the province's potato acreage was 
located in the St. John valley (i.e. Victoria, Carleton, and Mada- 
waska counties). By 1976, this figure was 96%. 
7 Increased specialization in potato production within the valley 
and within farms. The number of farmers growing crops other 
than potatoes has declined and individual farms are less diver- 
sified than before. Potato acreage has also become increasingly 
concentrated in the larger farms. Farms in the largest category 
(over 1,600 acres) now grow over 500 acres of potatoes, a very 
large acreage for this crop. 
8 Increases in the cost of land, farm equipment and inputs. The 
average value of land, buildings and machinery per farm in real 
dollars increased more than three times over the fifteen-year 
period. This increase is comparable to that occurring nation-wide. 
The single most important factor in initiating these changes has 
been the establishment of a potato processing industry in the valley 
(Smith, 1980). Prior to this development, most potatoes were grown 
on fairly small farms and harvested by crews of workers who followed 
behind a digging machine; up to 60 acres or so could be harvested in 
this way. The potatoes would be stored and graded on the farm over 
the winter, and sold as table potatoes in Ontario and Quebec, as well 
as in New Brunswick. Once a processing plant was established, in 
Florenceville, different techniques were encouraged. Grading was 
done at the plant, so the labour and equipment for on-farm grading 
was no longer needed. The capital saved in this way was put into 
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mechanical harvesters. In order to spread the cost of this expensive 
machinery over a larger volume of production, farmers began to 
cultivate larger acreages. The initial cost of the harvester and 
additional land was greater than the first year's saving from the 
elimination of grading, however, and loans were necessary to finance 
this expansion. 
The switch to mechanized harvesting allowed a greater volume of 
production per farmer but at the expense of quality. Harvesters, 
particularly the early models, were rough on the potatoes, and 
produce harvested in this fashion was not suitable for the fresh 
market. The decline in New Brunswick's reputation as a source of 
high-quality table potatoes can probably be traced to this period. 
The decline in the fresh market for New Brunswick potatoes has a 
number of additional causes as well. The percentage of potatoes 
consumed in processed form has increased greatly, partly because of 
the spread of fast food restaurants. The Ontario and Quebec fresh 
market is being supplied increasingly from within those provinces; 
to some extent, provincial government policies, encouraging self- 
sufficiency, have been influential. The remainder of the fresh market 
has been taken over by produce from Prince Edward Island. Harves- 
ters are less common there and those in use do less damage to the 
crop than they do in New Brunswick's rocky soil. Prince Edward 
Island also has a transportation advantage; many growers are able to 
transport potatoes directly to port, while New Brunswick growers 
must transport their harvest longer distances. 
Many of these changes are not unique to the New Brunswick 
potato industry but are common to farming in the province and in 
Canada generally. For example, the total number of farmers in New 
Brunswick declined from 11,786 to 3,244 between 1961 and 1976, 
although this decline (to 28% of the previous level) is not as severe as 
the drop in potato farms (to 11%). Furthermore, this reduction was 
under way before the establishment of the processing industry. The 
shift to mechanization also appears to have been influenced by the 
increasing scarcity of labour at harvest time, a phenomenon observ- 
able in Canadian agriculture generally. 
To summarize, it is difficult to isolate the factors that have 
influenced change in the New Brunswick potato industry. While 
many of these changes have occurred in other areas of Canadian 
agriculture, it is probable that they would not have occurred as 
rapidly in New Brunswick if not for the establishment of a processing 
industry. For the purposes of this study, the most significant charac- 
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teristics of the St. John valley potato industry are a marked decline in 
the number of farms; the steadily increasing disposition of potatoes to 
the processing sector; and the decline of the market for New Brunswick 
table potatoes, the farmer's principal alternative to the process 
market. 
THE McCAIN GROUP 
The `process market' just referred to is, in fact, a single firm, McCain 
Foods. McCain Foods was established in 1956 by four brothers, 
Andrew, Robert, Harrison and Wallace McCain. The firm remains a 
family business to this day, selling no shares and publishing no annual 
report. While it is often said that the brothers built their empire up 
from nothing, in fact they were in quite an advantageous position to 
enter potato processing. The McCains' father and grandfather had 
both owned large potato shipping firms; Hugh Henderson McCain 
had been active in the New Brunswick potato industry since the 
1880s. More important, the brothers inherited a large `land bank' 
with which to finance their business ventures. An examination of 
Carleton county records shows a process of land acquisition by 
Andrew David McCain (the current generation's father); after 1956, 
the McCain brothers sold off much of the land they had inherited to 
finance their industrial expansion before entering their current phase 
of reacquisition of land. 
In 1961, Valley Farms Ltd. was incorporated as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of McCain Foods Ltd. producing potatoes to supply the 
Florenceville french fry plant. During the 1960s, McCain set up or 
acquired other companies in New Brunswick, while the 1970s wit- 
nessed the bulk of McCain's international expansion. The role these 
subsidiaries play in the St. John valley has been illustrated well in a 
report prepared by Senopi consultants: 
Potatoes are grown on McCain land (Valley Farms Ltd.) enriched 
by McCain fertilizer (McCain Fertilizers Ltd.) using McCain seed 
(Foreston Seed Co. Ltd.). Harvesting is done with McCain 
machinery (Thomas Equipment Ltd.) and the harvested potatoes 
are either stored in McCain facilities (Carleton Cold Storage Co. 
Ltd.), sent to McCain's plant for processing (McCain Food Ltd.), 
or sold fresh. In the latter case, the potatoes are handled by 
McCain shippers (McCain Produce Co. Ltd.) which use McCain 
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trucks (Day and Ross Ltd.) to move them to McCain storage 
facilities (Bayside Potatoport Ltd.) at the point of shipping. The 
processed potatoes can similarly be moved in McCain trucks (M & 
D Transfer Ltd.) for shipment abroad, wherein one of McCain's 
sales distribution systems (McCain International Ltd.) handles the 
marketing (Senopi, 1980, p. 33-4). 
The McCain group of firms obviously displays a high degree of 
vertical integration. The scale of operation at each stage is not strictly 
geared to meeting the firm's supply requirements, however. For 
instance, the firm grows less than 5% of the potatoes it needs for 
processing; conversely, it sells more fertilizer, farm equipment, and 
trucking services than it uses itself. 
The supply of fertilizers to New Brunswick is provided by three 
firms; in order of importance they are: McCain, Genstar and CIL. 
One source sets McCain's market share at 34% (Senopi, 1980, p. 20). 
There are two principal suppliers of equipment needed for potato 
farming: Thomas (i.e. McCain) and Lockwood (a U.S. firm). McCain's 
market share here is roughly two-thirds. McCain's share in trucking is 
probably over half; its competitors are numerous and small. In seed 
potato exports, McCain is the dominant firm of three. In other areas, 
McCain is relatively inactive. Storage is done on the farm; seed is 
generally purchased from government seed farms, the operating costs 
of which are subsidized; the table market is handled by a new firm, 
Gemvak, and a multiplicity of small shippers and brokers, many 
hiring Day and Ross (McCain) trucks. In most cases, McCain is the 
dominant firm in a very small oligopoly. 
FIRM-GROWER INTERACTION 
McCain Foods purchases its potatoes for processing in three ways: 
contracting, spot market (`memo') purchases and internal produc- 
tion. For both firm and farmer, contracting acts principally to reduce 
the risk of price fluctuation. The contract requires the grower to 
deliver and the company to accept a fixed volume of production at a 
pre-set price. Potatoes are stored on the grower's property at his 
expense and `called up' when the company requests delivery. The 
price increases at a fixed rate during each month of storage. 
Inspection is done by the company but either party may request 
arbitration by a federal inspector. Technical assistance is not a 
McCain Foods, Canada 79 
significant aspect of the contracting relationship. The proportion of 
McCain's supplies purchased under contract varies between a half 
and three-quarters, the variation occuring because neither prices, 
yields nor final demand can be predicted exactly. (That is, if spot 
market prices or yields on contract growers' land are low or if the 
demand for french fries is very high, spot market purchases will be 
increased.) 
In years when the market price is expected to be high in the 
autumn, the firm will contract heavily in the spring at a price it 
believes to be lower than the market price will be; when a low market 
price is expected, fewer supplies are contracted. In every year since 
its inception, except 1980, McCain has guessed correctly by contract- 
ing for low volumes in low market price years, indicating either 
extraordinarily good luck or very good market information. In 
response to criticism that its contract price is too low, the firm has 
stated: `In thirteen of the last twenty years, our contract price has 
been higher than the average price received from all sales of all 
potatoes in New Brunswick' (McCain, 1980a). Since McCain made 
small contract purchases in those years, however, the benefits to the 
farmer of those high prices were correspondingly reduced. 
No farmer is required to contract 100% of his potatoes to McCain. 
The firm, in fact, recommends that farmers contract around two- 
thirds of their potato acreage and sell the remainder on `memo'. The 
risk that there will be no demand for uncontracted potatoes does not 
seem to be a serious one, since McCain has always had trouble 
obtaining Netted Gems - the preferred variety for processing - and 
says that it will buy any Gems available. 
Risk-hedging is not the only motive for a farmer to contract; in 
many cases, access to credit is more important. Prosperous or well- 
established farmers can generally obtain loans from private banks 
without difficulty. For a less prosperous individual or a young person 
who wants to enter farming, the situation is somewhat different. Here 
the applicant is often required to show a contract before a loan will be 
granted. The contract is more than an indication that the farmer has 
hedged his risks and is thus fairly secure; the contract provides 
collateral for the loan. If necessary, the bank can instruct the 
processor that all payments for the contracted crop should be made 
directly to the bank, bypassing the grower. 
Contract growers are also eligible for credit from McCain. The firm 
does not give cash loans but its subsidiaries (e.g. those selling 
fertilizer or farm equipment) will accept contracted potatoes as 
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payment. (At one point, the contract stated: `The Company reserves 
the right to withold payment for potatoes delivered by the Grower up 
to the amount said Grower is owing any of the McCain Group of 
Companies.' This clause was discontinued after 1977.) This source of 
credit is a last resort for the farmer, for several reasons. First the 
firm's interest rate is very high: in 1980, it was 24% vs 15% from 
private banks. Second, the farmer cannot choose the source of his 
purchases; for example, he cannot get credit from McCain to buy a 
Lockwood harvester. Finally, inputs purchased on credit are sold at 
full `list' price rather than the normal price charged for cash sales. A 
1977 study reported the list price for one ton of fertilizer as $131 plus 
interest; the cash price was $120 (Martens, 1977, p. 17). 
A credit-related problem of greater potential importance is the 
possibility that a farmer may become `locked into' growing for 
McCain. It is unlikely that a $50,000 harvester could be paid off in a 
single season; the farmer would have to contract potatoes to the firm 
for several years. (Although contracts run for only one season, it is 
possible to come to a verbal agreement with the company to supply it 
for several years.) It may be that the first year's price is good and that 
the decision to contract is undertaken freely; once in debt, however, 
the farmer must take whatever price is offered, even one below the 
costs of production. 
The possibility of being `locked' into growing for McCain results 
from three conditions: debt, monopsony, and the specialized nature 
of potato equipment. Where these three elements exist, a grower can 
find himself locked into selling to McCain even when he borrows 
from a bank. Even a bank loan for a harvester must, in effect, be paid 
for with potatoes from that harvester. Assuming that a farmer signs a 
contract with McCain in order to get a bank loan, he must then invest 
in equipment suitable, not just for potato cultivation, but for process 
potato cultivation. The trucks used for delivery to the plant are 
different from those used for delivery to table or seed shippers. Table 
or seed potatoes must also be graded on the farm - this requires 
conveyor-type equipment worth about $10,000. Furthermore, the 
harvesters produced by McCain are designed for high volume at the 
expense of quality; potatoes handled by these machines are difficult 
to sell in the table or seed markets. A farmer who grows process 
potatoes has one buyer (McCain) and a farmer wanting to switch to 
an alternative market must make a substantial investment in new 
equipment. Again, it is the least prosperous farmers or those with the 
least access to credit who can be trapped. 
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To conclude this discussion of credit, two other sources should be 
mentioned - the federal and provincial governments. Both provide 
loans, but these are mainly intended to finance permanent improve- 
ments to the land and are not available for purchases of machinery or 
inputs. While they are useful to farmers contemplating long-term 
investments in their property, these programmes do not address the 
needs of growers who have trouble making ends meet from year to 
year. For these people, McCain and private banks are the only 
alternatives. 
McCain has also been accused of 'locking-in' farmers through its 
pricing policies, which are said to encourage poor quality potatoes for 
which there is no alternative market. McCain's price is said to be so 
low that farmers must grow large volumes and cut corners in their 
cultivation and storage practices in order to break even. Their 
potatoes are then of such low quality that they cannot be used for 
anything but processing. 
This seems to be changing, however. McCain had for many years 
encouraged quantity, rather than quality, among its growers. This 
was necessary to elicit sufficient production of Netted Gems, a variety 
not well suited to New Brunswick's growing season. This policy has 
changed in recent years; having raised production to sufficient levels, 
McCain is now aiming for higher quality. Whether or not all farmers 
will be able to adapt to this change remains to be seen. It is common 
knowledge that many farmers have done well on McCain contracts 
only by passing off rejects from potato acreage intended for other 
markets; if stricter inspection is the rule, this practice may no longer 
be possible. It is possible that a new type of contract farmer will 
become the norm if quality can be encouraged without affecting total 
production in the valley. 
Other criticisms have been made of McCain, most of which are 
narrower in scope. The most basic is that the contract is one-sided; it 
offers protection to the firm, but not to the grower. One controversial 
clause in the potato contract allows the company to make up a 
grower's shortfall by purchasing potatoes on the market and billing 
the grower for them. This clause does not apply if the expected 
shortfall is reported to the company before November 1. Its purpose, 
according to the firm, is not to penalize growers whose yields were 
lower than anticipated; rather it is a sanction applied to farmers who 
renege on their contracts by selling contracted potatoes on the open 
market when the market price is higher. 
Farmers with genuine shortfalls due to poor harvests are protected 
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by the November 1 provision; those whose shortfalls are the result 
of deterioration in storage after November 1 are not so protected. 
McCain says that a farmer in this situation would never be pros- 
ecuted; in fact, the company goes out of its way to take immediate 
delivery if a breakdown in storage occurs. Many farmers and other 
informants confirm this. One farmer did dispute the company's claim, 
however. He reported that one year a number of breakdowns occurred 
in the St. Andre area; the firm offered to accept the deteriorating 
potatoes only if the farmers agreed to sell all their non-contracted 
potatoes as well. (At that time, the market price was low but 
expected to rise.) McCain's response was as follows: when the firm 
offers to accept distressed potatoes, there is a tendency for farmers to 
try to sell all distressed stock (both contracted and non-contracted) 
and hold on to all their good stock. McCain requires farmers to sell 
proportional amounts i.e. if distressed non-contracted stock is offered 
for sale, then good non-contracted stock must also be sold. 
McCain's general position regarding its contracts is that they are 
indeed tough contracts; their purpose is to provide clear protection 
against dishonest growers who try to take advantage of the firm. 
Honest growers need not fear, however; it is in their interest to allow 
the company a certain amount of discretionary power, since this 
power would never be used against them, but will often be used to 
assist. A more 'two-sided' contract might look better on the surface 
but would actually be harder on the growers. 
Does the firm need the amount of discretionary power the contract 
gives it in order to protect its interests? It seems unlikely. Food 
processors interviewed in western Canada rarely resorted to legal 
action when a grower reneged on his contract; this was said to be 
expensive, uncertain, and generally damaging to goodwill. Instead, 
these firms simply refused to deal with that grower again and advised 
other firms to do the same. All firms interviewed were satisfied that 
blacklisting was an extremely effective sanction. (This is in an area 
where alternative crops and markets are numerous. For McCain, 
refusal to deal with a farmer would be an even stronger deterrent 
than it is in Saskatchewan.) The contention that the contract's 
toughness is purely a defensive measure necessary to protect 
the firm against unscrupulous growers must be eyed with some 
suspicion. 
There are other ways in which the firm can exercise discretion in 
administering the contract. Variability of quality inspection is fre- 
quently encountered and can occur for several reasons. The firm may 
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be operating at capacity or be able to purchase supplies cheaply on 
the market; if so it may `grade hard' to reject as much contracted 
produce as possible. In McCain's case, where the firm calls up 
contracted supplies through the year as required, this practice is 
presumably unnecessary; allegations that it occurred were not fre- 
quent. Second, an inspector might give poor grades unless offered a 
bribe. This practice was so widely alleged that there is little doubt of 
its common occurrence. It is an accusation which must be directed at 
the employee in question, however, and one would not expect the 
practice to be company policy. (It is not in the company's interest to 
accept substandard potatoes so that the inspector can get a free 
bottle of liquor.) The third and most serious possibility is that a 
`troublemaker' (e.g. a politically active farmer) might have his 
loads unfairly graded. It is impossible to prove that such discrimina- 
tion has actually occurred; the point to be made here is that it could 
happen. 
This possibility results from two circumstances. First, grading is 
done by a McCain employee, not a government official, and it is done 
by eye. McCain resists the use of a standardized grading device known 
as a `colorimeter' in its New Brunswick plants. Second, farmers are 
generally unwilling to call in government inspectors. While the 
farmer's right to do this is guaranteed in the contract, few growers 
make use of it. To call in a federal inspector is to risk the `revenge' of 
the McCain inspector on the next load; soon the grower would have 
to request arbitration on every load, irritating the inspector as well as 
the McCain employee. While the contract's provision for federal 
inspection is a step in the right direction, the firm's (or its employees') 
discretionary power in this area will persist as long as grading is done 
by the company itself and not by independent inspectors. 
Delivery dates are also a source of controversy. Growers store 
their potatoes on farm until they are `called up' by McCain between 
September and June. The contract price rises 3.5% each month to 
reflect the cost of storage, which includes the following: 
Direct costs of storage: heat, electricity, ventilation and insurance 
for a storage building. 
Opportunity cost of capital. 
Shrinkage of potatoes through moisture loss. (Shrinkage is 7% in 
the first three weeks and continues at a slower rate throughout the 
winter.) 
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Risk of deterioration. (This risk is not predictable but depends 
heavily on the condition of potatoes at harvest time.) 
While most farmers say that the price differential for storage is 
adequate, their behaviour indicates otherwise. Farmers invariably 
prefer to sell their potatoes as quickly as possible, especially in a year 
when harvest conditions are poor. Again, the possibility exists that 
farmers, favoured by the firm for various reasons, will be given 
preferential treatment. This possibility arises most commonly when 
McCain experiences a sudden shortfall in input for the plant. It may 
then phone a grower and tell him to deliver a large load, perhaps his 
whole crop, in order to fill the gap. In such a case, the firm wants 
potatoes of assured quality and it wants them immediately. It will 
therefore call a farmer it has dealt with for years, one known for 
growing a consistently good product and who can deliver large volumes 
quickly. It will not seek out a number of small growers of unknown 
rep, itation and try to coordinate their deliveries. This leads to accusa- 
tions of favouritism towards big farmers, those who are friends of the 
management, those who are not troublemakers, and so on. 
The issue of favouritism brings into sharp focus the controversy 
over McCain's role in shaping the valley's potato industry. McCain's 
critics allege that the firm favours big farmers and is trying to drive 
out small ones, in order to take over their land and concentrate 
production in the hands of a few large, politically passive `business 
farmers'. The firm contends that productive efficiency must be the 
sole justification for anyone to stay in farming; the firm's policies 
favour those who can produce high quality potatoes at low cost. Any 
farmer that can do so can do well with McCain; those who cannot and 
drop out of farming, use McCain as an excuse to hide their own 
failure. It is very difficult for an outside observer to evaluate this 
argument - certainly no farmer is going to admit his own incompe- 
tence. Furthermore, if large farmers are efficient and politically 
passive, the company has two motives for favouring them and the 
explanations of McCain and of its critics are consistent. 
A third allegation regarding McCain's potato contracts is that they 
sometimes have strings attached. For instance, it has been said that a 
farmer must agree to sign a potato contract in order to get a pea 
contract. Alternatively, he may be required to buy McCain equip- 
ment or fertilizer. (One farmer said that the company presented him 
with an order for fertilizer along with a contract and asked him to sign 
both.) The firm denies that this has ever taken place; contracting and 
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fertilizer sales are entirely separate activities, conducted by different 
subsidiaries. Most farmers also deny having been pressured in this 
way. This may be another area in which the farmer's bargaining 
power is a factor: a grower who badly needs a contract could be a 
more likely object of pressure than one who has other alternatives. It 
is also alleged that in years when fertilizer is scarce, McCain contract 
growers will get the first chance at McCain fertilizer, a practice which 
is less objectionable than those referred to above. Access to scarce 
fertilizer would be an added advantage of contracting, not a dis- 
advantage, as forced purchases are. 
A final source of dissatisfaction among growers is company produc- 
tion. Some farmers feel that the land used by McCain to grow 
potatoes is an unfair bargaining device, a way of saying `You can be 
replaced' to a farmer who is dissatisfied with the contract price. 
McCain has about 7,000 acres of cultivated land (Senopi, 1980, p. 
43). Some is used to grow vegetables for processing; the firm grows 
20% of its pea supplies and all of its beans and broccoli (McCain, 
1976, p. 2). Some land is also devoted to potatoes, both for export 
and for processing. The exact percentage of processed potatoes 
grown on company land is not public information; a firm's spokesman 
set it as well below 5%. 
According to public statements by the firm, this potato production 
is used to fill in shortfalls when contracted or open market supplies 
are short. However, an interview with the company's fieldman 
provided an explanation more consistent with farmers' accounts and 
with what is known about McCain's procurement practices. Several 
farmers said that McCain's own potatoes are taken directly to the 
plant in the autumn bypassing storage; since they are not stored, a 
procedure called 'top-killing' is unnecessary. (Top-killing makes 
harvesting easier and leaves the potatoes in a better condition for 
long storage.) The result is said to be a saving, on storage and top- 
kill, of about $2 a barrel. The firm can then cite its low production 
costs when questioned about low contract prices. 
The company's description of this practice is consistent with the 
farmers' version, but not identical. The purpose of internal produc- 
tion, says the fieldman, is to start up the plant as early as possible. 
The company's potatoes are harvested early in September, before 
they are fully mature, and when they are still below average size. 
Some top-kill is applied to facilitate harvesting, though less than is 
normal. The poor yield more than offsets the saving on storage and 
top-kill, so that the net effect for the company is a loss, not an 
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advantage. The company's own production is processed before its 
suppliers have finished harvesting; it cannot, therefore be used as a 
means of price manipulation. 
If McCain's internal production is as small as it says, it would 
indeed seem to be of little value as a threat against reluctant contract 
growers. On the other hand, the company's version has not been well 
disseminated. Most growers and observers of the potato industry are 
under the impression that McCain produces a substantial proportion 
of its potato requirements. It is this belief, accurate or not, which 
influences their behaviour. Dispelling these erroneous impressions 
might improve the firm's relations with local farmers, but it might 
also weaken its bargaining power. Allowing the misunderstanding to 
persist is perhaps the most efficient strategy of all - the firm can 
maintain production, and the expense associated with it, at a low 
level, while enjoying the bargaining advantages of a higher volume. 
GROWER ORGANIZATION 
The farmers of the St. John valley have not accepted their predica- 
ment passively - some of them have made efforts to organize and 
promote their collective interests. For the most part, their efforts 
have not met with great success. The purpose of this section is to 
examine some of the factors which have impeded or facilitated the 
process of organization and to explain the pattern of organization 
that has occurred. 
During the 1950s and 60s, a number of efforts were made to 
establish marketing boards and agencies that would represent New 
Brunswick potato growers. These bodies were set up in accordance 
with the provincial enabling legislation, which allows producers to 
coordinate the marketing of agricultural products. From the farmer's 
point of view, these agencies suffered from two severe problems. 
First, they were not strictly producer organizations, since they also 
included shippers, grower/shippers, processors, and so on. Second, 
they had a history of poor management and corruption and each was 
voted out within a few years of its inception. The failure of these early 
efforts left farmers suspicious of the motives of subsequent organizers 
and sceptical about the value of their proposals. 
In 1969, the National Farmers Union (NFU) began to operate in 
New Brunswick, finding the bulk of its members among potato 
growers. This group is a nation-wide association of farmers which 
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favours fundamental change in Canadian agriculture. The NFU has 
a distinct ideology with long range goals; it tries to involve non- 
producers by working with consumer and church groups; and it uses 
press conferences, demonstrations, pamphlets and other popular 
media to state its case. Its leaders feel that the problems of Canadian 
agriculture are extensive and that ad hoc measures addressed at 
specific problems will not be effective. 
In each province, the NFU has campaigned strongly against the 
provincial marketing boards. These boards handle the marketing of 
most agricultural products, the major exception being beef. Some 
boards have the power to set prices and production quotas, but most 
do not. The great majority of these bodies belong to the Federation 
of Agriculture in each province. 
The NFU believes that provincial marketing boards are not an 
effective means of raising or stabilizing producers' incomes. They are 
said to be under the control of the provincial governments, giving 
producers only an illusion of power, and their authority is too limited. 
The Federation, on the other hand, says that it works within the 
limits of the enabling legislation. According to the Federation, 
Parliament allows marketing boards certain powers but does not wish 
to encourage inefficiency or contribute to high food prices. It will not, 
therefore, give farmers monopolistic powers denied to other seg- 
ments of society. The NFU, says the Federation, wishes to exceed 
these limits at the expense of the consumer. 
In general, the Federation regards the Union as a left-wing fringe 
group seeking to bring back a form of farming incompatible with 
efficient use of resources. The Federation views farming as a busi- 
ness, in which managerial skill is as important as farming skill, 
and in which romantic notions about the family farm cannot justify 
inefficiency. The NFU regards the Federation as a reformist trap, a 
means by which producers are divided, bought off and controlled 
by provincial governments. According to the NFU, the `business 
farming' philosophy may produce cheap food in the short run but will 
result in environmental degradation and corporate control in the long 
run. 
Having established the basic character of the two types of organiza- 
tions, let us examine the roles they played in organizing farmers 
during the 1970s. The first thing to be pointed out is that the initiative 
behind the formation of the current New Brunswick Potato Agency 
(NBPA) did not come from among the farmers themselves. Govern- 
ment initiatives have been very important. In 1969, the provincial 
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government tried to encourage an agency that would include non- 
producers, but without success. In the mid-seventies, the Federal 
Minister of Agriculture made it clear that New Brunswick potato 
farmers could not expect federal stabilization payments to continue 
unless a provincial marketing agency of some sort was formed. 
The organizing drive which resulted in the NBPA's formation 
seems to have been largely the work of one man - James Patterson. 
Patterson was a potato producer at the time, though he subsequently 
left farming, selling his land to McCain. He was also an employee of 
McCain Foods for several years in the marketing department. He 
says that frustration with rising input prices and static contract prices 
led him to take action. Initially many growers were wary of reprisals 
by McCain but when it became apparent that the company was not 
going to interfere, farmers began to sign up. Most of the initial 
support came from contract growers, particularly those in Carleton 
county. (This is the southern half of the valley, where McCain's first 
plant was started and where Jim Patterson lives.) 
In 1976, the provincial government held a referendum among New 
Brunswick potato growers to find out how much support existed for 
a marketing agency. About 60% voted `no' and the proposal was 
defeated. A breakdown of voting revealed that support for the 
agency was not evenly distributed; much of the opposition had come 
from the northern part of the St. John valley. Subsequently, a number of 
local referenda were held, in the following areas: 
(1) Carleton county 
(2) Victoria/Madawaska (Francophone) St. John valley 
(3) Victoria (Anglophone) 
(4) `rest of New Brunswick' (peripheral potato areas) 
The first local vote was held in Carleton county and resulted in a 
strong `yes' vote. A local marketing agency was then set up for 
Carleton county growers. The next vote was taken among the few 
potato growers not in the St. John valley and had similar results. The 
two local agencies were then combined to form the Western New 
Brunswick Potato Agency. Next, a proposal was made to provide the 
Francophone growers with a separate agency; this was also imple- 
mented following a vote. This left only the remainder of Victoria 
county without an agency. A referendum was held there and de- 
feated; about 70% voted `no'. 
On May 23, 1980, the provincial government decided to override 
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the opposition of Victoria growers. It disbanded the local agencies 
and established a province-wide agency by fiat; membership is 
compulsory for all potato growers. Out of, roughly, 800 New Brunswick 
potato growers, about 100 have refused to register, in spite of the 
threat of fines and/or jail sentences. The legislation also requires 
McCain to bargain with the agency over contract prices and terms 
and allows the agency to set minimum prices to shippers on an ad hoc 
basis. 
The most interesting aspect of this issue is the different voting 
behaviour of Victoria and Carleton counties. It is puzzling that 
Carleton county farmers supported the NBPA, while Victoria opposed 
it, in spite of the basic similarity of the two areas in economic terms. 
The explanation seems to lie in the different `political cultures' of the 
two counties. 
Carleton county is the home of the McCain family and the site of its 
first french fry plant. This is where the firm's social influence is 
strongest. It is also the home ground of the provincial Premier and 
there may be a feeling that he will take care of his constituents as 
long as they work within the system. Ethnic/cultural factors are also 
frequently mentioned by local farmers. The people of Carleton 
county are largely of English descent and many of their ancestors 
were United Empire Loyalists. (The Loyalist connection is said to 
show a tradition of deference to authority.) The residents of Victoria 
are largely French Canadians and people of Danish or Scots extrac- 
tion; they are said to be more excitable, less impressed by authority, 
and generally ̀ fighters'. Carleton folk, it was said time and again, are 
more respectful of authority and dislike disruptions; they prefer to 
go through proper channels in an orderly way, rather than `make 
trouble'. They also tend to be very religious and morally conservative. 
While some of these characterizations may simply be local stereo- 
types, many of these traits do surface in conversations with local 
farmers. It is very common for a Carleton farmer to say that he had at 
one time sympathized with the NFU but became disillusioned with 
their disruptive tactics. An NFU demonstration that blocked the 
Trans-Canada Highway for several days and the NFU takeover of an 
NBPA meeting were cited as examples. 
One should not infer that all farmers are strong supporters of one 
organization or another; a great many want no part of any farmers' 
group. Some are quite satisfied with their dealings with McCain and 
prefer to maintain a direct relationship with the firm. They feel that 
their skill and reputation as growers, their seniority, or their personal 
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relationships with the McCains will serve them better than member- 
ship in a collective bargaining unit. Although they are very pessimistic 
about the future of the fresh market, the problems of this sector are 
seen as intractable. Many farmers resent the provincial government's 
imposition of the agency; some regard it as simply a tax for which no 
benefits are received. (The NBPA takes a levy of five cents on each 
barrel marketed; for a medium-large grower this could amount to 
$1,000 a year.) Some are wary of corruption in a marketing agency, 
expecting history to repeat itself. Others are afraid that it will start to 
`tell farmers what to do', controlling what and how much they grow. 
(Supply management has never actually been discussed as a possibil- 
ity, either by the NBPA or the NFU.) 
The competitive nature of the fresh market also undermines 
support for a potato marketing agency. Although their numbers have 
declined, there have always been a great many small grower/shippers 
who sell their own crop plus those of other farmers. Their superior 
market information often puts them in a position of conflict with their 
suppliers. (If the market price is expected to rise in a month, the 
shipper may try to mislead growers and persuade them to sell to him 
now.) The presence of this mixed category has been a considerable 
problem for those who have tried to organize producers. Finally, 
individual growers have also been cut-throat competitors, undercut- 
ting their neighbour's price to make a sale. A great deal of enmity 
and suspicion has been generated in this way and many growers are 
sceptical of the very idea that farmers could ever cooperate. 
The competitive and volatile nature of the potato industry also 
contributes to individualistic attitudes. Many fortunes have been 
made in the industry over the years and many growers hope to make 
one of their own. They are waiting for the `perfect year', when high 
prices and high yields will produce a jackpot. Regulation of the 
industry might provide more stability and adequate incomes but it 
might also eliminate the jackpots. 
Another factor which has impeded organization is the recent influx 
of Dutch immigrant farmers, most of whom are hostile towards any 
efforts to mobilize farmers. For one thing, they are prosperous 
enough that they can treat farming almost as a hobby. They can sell 
their land in Holland for perhaps a million dollars (land prices being 
far higher than in Canada), buy a place in New Brunswick for much 
less, and have a sizeable sum left over. They are not in the same 
financial straits as most of their neighbours and see little reason to 
protest. Furthermore, they come from a country where agriculture is 
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highly regulated. Dissatisfaction with this system was what led many 
of them to leave Holland in the first place and they oppose any 
changes that would move the New Brunswick potato industry in the 
same direction. 
McCain's role in the development of the NBPA is also worthy of 
note. The firm has long resisted collective bargaining and many 
farmers expected interference from the firm when they began to 
campaign for a marketing agency. This interference was not forth- 
coming and McCain is presently on record as supporting the NBPA. 
The most plausible explanation for the firm's attitude is that it does 
not regard the NBPA as a serious threat. First, although the firm 
must negotiate the terms and prices of each year's contract with the 
agency, it still retains considerable autonomy. The firm's contracted/ 
spot market mix is not affected, nor is the choice of whom to contract 
with, or how much, or how the contract is administered. Second, 
compulsory arbitration is imposed if the firm and the agency cannot 
come to an agreement. It is likely that the arbitrator would examine 
current North American potato contracts to establish a guideline, 
and would not grant an increase which greatly exceeds the North 
American average. 
On the other hand, the agency provides some public relations and 
management advantages. McCain has been embarassed by several 
journalistic `exposes', each of which focused on the weak bargaining 
position of the New Brunswick farmer (The Fifth Estate, 1976; 
Stewart, 1975; Macleans). The firm may feel that an agency like the 
NBPA would improve public relations and undermine the more 
radical efforts of the NFU, without seriously affecting business. 
Furthermore, the NBPA has some value to the firm in coordinating 
farmers and providing a convenient liaison. (For instance, the NBPA 
and the firm have collaborated in disinfection programmes.) 
CONCLUSIONS 
The past twenty-five years have seen important changes in the New 
Brunswick potato industry. Traditional markets have all but dis- 
appeared and growers have adapted their farming practices to the 
needs of the processing industry. McCain Foods has played a major 
role in promoting these changes and today there are few aspects 
of life in the St. John valley which the company's policies do not 
impinge on. 
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Of the issues raised in the introduction to this book, there are 
several which the McCain case sheds light on. First, unlike most 
of the cases surveyed, this agribusiness has clearly encouraged 
specialization. Farmers have devoted larger percentages of their land 
to potatoes in order to meet the firm's demand for high volumes of 
production. Concurrently, farm machinery has become more special- 
ized to harvest potatoes for processing. Farms have become fewer, 
more specialized and more highly mechanized. 
Second, the case illustrates the ways in which mechanization and 
specialization can lead to debt and the narrowing of the farmers' 
options. Debt need not be contracted with the agribusiness; in a 
situation of monopsony, even loans from banks can effectively lock 
the farmer into growing for the processor. 
Third, social differentiation has occurred among contract growers, 
with those best able to meet the company's requirements expanding 
their acreages and incomes. To date, the incentives have been for 
large volumes of production. As average farm size increases and 
McCain's preferred potato variety (Netted Gems) becomes widely 
accepted, a shift in emphasis from quantity to quality is likely. How 
farmers respond to these new demands remains to be seen. 
Finally, the firm has been accused of manipulative practices. 
These, along with the broader changes in farming practices induced 
by the processing industry, have led a number of growers to protest 
and to organize politically. The organizational efforts and the firm's 
efforts to control them have led to the same outcome that occurs in 
most of the cases examined in this book: the establishment of an 
organization which acts as an intermediary between the firm and its 
growers. The NBPA represents farmers' interests on matters of 
short-term and relatively limited importance; it also serves to en- 
hance the coordination and communication function which firms find 
important when dealing with a multitude of growers. 
An assessment of the broad rural development effects of McCain 
is at once facilitated and made difficult by the long time-span over 
which they occurred. The difference between the St. John valley 
twenty-five years ago and the valley today is striking. The changes 
occurred gradually, however, and as noted previously, the direction 
of change is consistent with that taken by Canadian agriculture. 
One way to assess the broad impact of McCain would be to argue 
the counterfactual: what would the St. John valley look like today if 
McCain had not set up a processing plant in Florenceville? It is most 
likely that the region would be much less prosperous. Most long time 
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observers of the Maritime industry argue that New Brunswick was 
beginning to lose its edge in the table potato market before McCain 
appeared. Changes in labour markets would have led to mechaniza- 
tion eventually and without the old `diggers', New Brunswick's rocky 
soil would have become an increasingly serious impediment in trying 
to produce table potatoes. Without a processing firm, potato farming 
would likely not be viable in New Brunswick today and employment 
in the plant and ancillary industries would be foregone. 
The likely effect of McCain's entry was to accelerate and modify 
the process of agrarian change in the St. John valley. Without 
McCain, fewer changes would probably have occurred in the 1950s 
and 60s but at the expense of a crisis in later years. Agribusiness 
appears to have this capacity to induce rapid structural adjustment to 
changing economic conditions more effectively than spontaneous 
responses in an uncoordinated market. 

5 Mumias and KTDA, 
Kenya: Public Sector 
Participation 
Two large-scale schemes in Kenya, financed and managed by a 
combination of public and private entities, have attracted consider- 
able attention. The Mumias Sugar Company and the Kenya Tea 
Development Authority process and market the output of a total of 
nearly 200,000 small farmers. Both have been in continuous operation 
for more than fifteen years and during that period have considerably 
expanded the number of smallholders they serve. Because of their 
apparent success, Mumias and KTDA have often been cited as 
`models' for smallholder agricultural schemes in Africa. As govern- 
ments, particularly those in Africa, re-examine the role of the public 
and private sectors in agricultural marketing as part of their `policy 
dialogue' with aid donors, the lessons of KTDA and Mumias are 
becoming increasingly relevant. 
THE MUMIAS SUGAR SCHEME 
The Mumias Sugar Company in western Kenya is a multipartite 
arrangement principally involving Booker Agriculture International 
(BAI), the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and 
the Government of Kenya. The World Bank has also contributed to 
the financing, particularly in the early stages. Mumias began with an 
19,750 acre nucleus estate in 1972 (now 8,400 acres); it now processes 
cane from 33,000 outgrowers, who provide about 90% of the plant's 
throughput. The company employs 5,000 full-time and 9,000 part- 
time workers, including field and factory operations (Williams and 
Karen, 1985, pp. 36-7). 
Located in a relatively remote and undeveloped region of Kenya, 
the scheme has had a significant impact on the area. In fact, it has 
been widely cited as an agribusiness success story, one which is both 
profitable and beneficial to small farmers. Numerous studies have 
assessed the project's impact; they vary in depth, timing and point of 
view but together provide one of the most complete pictures we have 
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of a well established agribusiness project. This chapter draws on those 
studies to assess the local impact, growers' response, and policy 
implications of Mumias. 
BACKGROUND 
Kenya straddles the Equator in East Africa, encompassing a range of 
altitudes from sea level to 5,199 metres. Most of the country is and to 
semi-arid, but some parts of the highlands receive abundant rainfall. 
Western Kenya, where Mumias is located, has the ecological condi- 
tions suitable for sugar cane, including 1200-1500 mm. of evenly 
distributed rainfall per year, temperatures that do not drop below 20 
degrees Centigrade, and relatively flat land suitable for mechaniza- 
tion (Buck-Hansen, 1980b, pp. 21-3). In this region, a single planting 
of sugar cane will produce three crops: a `plant' crop which takes 
about 24 months to mature and two `ratoon' crops of 18 months each. 
Prior to 1972, the Mumias district was one of the least developed 
in Kenya. Most households grew millet, corn and sorghum for 
subsistence and the poor soils were unsuitable for most cash crops. 
Agriculture was generally insufficient to sustain a family and non- 
farm employment was an important source of income. A limited 
amount of sugar cane was grown to supply some small traditional- 
technology mills. Agrarian social structure could be described, with- 
out too much oversimplification, as predominantly peasant. Most 
households owned or had traditional tenure to small plots of land; 
landlord-tenant relationships, plantations, cooperatives or modern 
farm entrepreneurs were relatively unknown compared to some of 
the other cases examined in this book. 
THE MUMIAS SUGAR COMPANY 
The Mumias Sugar Company (MSC) was established in 1972 on the 
initiative of the government of Kenya. The government was moti- 
vated by two factors: first, a desire to reduce Kenya's dependence 
on imported refined sugar, given the item's importance in the food- 
basket of most households; and second, a desire to promote develop- 
ment in one of the country's most disadvantaged regions. The latter 
motivation was tempered by the realization that suitable ecological 
and economic conditions were necessary for a successful scheme. 
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Sugar projects that lacked these characteristics had failed in other 
parts of Kenya. The government and the Commonwealth Develop- 
ment Corporation (CDC) therefore encouraged Booker Agriculture 
International (BAI) to undertake a feasibility study of the proposed 
project. BAI had considerable experience of sugar production in 
other countries and was increasingly interested in moving out of the 
risky and politically sensitive area of crop production and into the 
sale of management and technical services. 
The feasibility study proposed the purchase (from local peasants) 
of about 8,000 acres for the nucleus estate. This would be supple- 
mented by a gradually increasing quantity of cane purchases from 
outgrowers. Three aspects of the feasibility study and start-up phase 
were notable for their subsequent repercussions. First, the price paid 
by MSC for land, which was supposed to permit the sellers to 
purchase new property elsewhere, was set at the market rate; no 
provision was made for the predictable increase in land prices as 
approximately 1,000 new buyers entered the market. Assessments of 
the value of crops and buildings also tended to be subjective and/or 
susceptible to manipulation, and widespread chicanery led to the 
introduction of new assessment criteria midway through the process. 
Second, those displaced were given cash but no assistance in relocat- 
ing or adjusting to their new circumstances. This was symptomatic of 
a third and more general feature of this phase: although MSC was 
supposed to serve as a `pole of development' for a poor region, the 
feasibility study paid no attention to how these developments might 
be achieved. 
The basic structure and operating practices of MSC are largely 
unchanged today from 1971. BAI holds 5% of the company's shares 
(at government's insistence) and manages the factory, the nucleus 
estate and the outgrower operation. In return it receives dividends; a 
commission on sales of sugar (the percentage is set on a sliding scale 
to encourage higher output), and a fixed fee for expatriate salaries 
and related overheads (Goldberg and McGinty, 1979, p. 551). This 
remuneration structure is designed to encourage both output and 
efficiency. 
The government is involved in a number of ways. It holds 69% 
of MSC's shares; supplies credit through the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC); sets prices on inputs and outputs through the 
Kenya Sugar Authority (KSA); and controls the distribution of sugar 
within the country through the Kenya National Trading Corporation 
(Manundu, 1985). Pricing policy has been crucial in maintaining the 
98 Small Farmers, Big Business 
scheme's profitability. As part of a strategy to make Kenya self- 
sufficient in sugar, the government has encouraged local production 
by providing tariff protection, and setting prices well above world 
market levels. This amounts to a subsidy to the domestic sugar 
industry, paid by Kenyan consumers, without which much Kenyan 
sugar production would be unprofitable (Sharpley, 1984). 
CDC's contribution to the project seems to be largely financial, 
though it does own 12% of MSC shares and sits on the Board of 
Directors of the Mumias Outgrowers Company (MOCO). The over- 
all equity structure of MSC is as follows (Holtham and Hazelwood, 
1976): 
Government of Kenya 69% 
Commonwealth Development Corporation 12% 
Bank Agriculture International 5% 
Kenyan Commercial Bank 9% 
East Africa Development Bank 5% 
The nucleus estate currently supplies about 10% of the factory's 
throughput; the remainder comes from 33,000 outgrowers under 
contract. The average cane area per outgrower has been estimated at 
between one acre (Barclay, 1977, p. 236) and four acres (Holtham 
and Hazelwood, 1976). Barclay's study employed the most extensive 
survey of all those cited in this chapter; he found the following 
average land use pattern for outgrower farms (Barclay, 1977, p. 236): 
average area in cane: 1.1 acres 
average area in all other crops: 1.84 acres 
total farm area: 13.16 acres. 
The eligibility requirements for admittance to the outgrower pro- 
gramme complete this sketch of grower characteristics (Barclay, 
1977, pp. 218-9). To enter the programme, a farmer must: 
(a) cultivate land within 8 miles of the factory 
(b) be a registered owner of the land 
(c) have suitable soil for cane 
(d) have land accessible to tractors 
(e) grow a minimum of 3 acres of cane and 2.5 acres of food crops 
and/or pasture 
(f) form part of a contiguous plot of cane land at least 15 acres in 
area (i.e. several neighbours must also grow cane). 
Mumias and KTDA, Kenya 99 
Some of these criteria are more easily enforced than others and 
non-compliance with (b) and (e) is common. 
MANAGEMENT-GROWER INTERACTION 
The MSC contracts are among the most extensive described in this 
book. They specify most important aspects of the production process 
and, furthermore, assign responsibility for a high proportion of 
activities to the company. The contract stipulates the producer price 
(which is set by the Kenya Sugar Authority) and obligates the 
company to buy all production from the contracted area. Payment 
takes place at harvest time and growers can choose to receive cash or 
a cheque. Mumias sells fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, extension 
and farm machinery services, the cost of which is deducted from crop 
payments. The company cuts and harvests the cane; growers do the 
weeding. Many growers also prepare their land and plant their cane, 
though some prefer to have the company do it for a fee. Family 
members supply much of the labour for weeding, but many outgrowers 
hire workers to do it. Management has the right to inspect the fields 
and to undertake tasks it believes are not being performed adequately, 
charging the growers for this service. The application of chemicals is 
tightly specified in the contracts, though it is difficult for the company 
to control. The `illicit' resale or use of fertilizer on other crops is 
widespread. Because outgrowers' plots are in blocks of 15 acres; 
because their housing is often separate from the sugar fields; and 
because so many production tasks are performed by the company or 
hired labour, the casual observer gets the impression of a plantation, 
rather than a project involving independent farmers. 
IMPACT 
As in most agribusiness projects, the impact of Mumias has 
been mixed. Some groups have gained, others lost; most households 
have experienced both beneficial and harmful effects; and different 
analysts have interpreted or given different emphasis to the same set 
of observations. As with McCain in New Brunswick, the Mumias 
project's long history and extensive coverage have produced a series 
of effects which extend beyond the distribution of profits between 
grower and processor to affect community and regional development. 
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Income 
By the narrowest indicator, Mumias has had a positive impact. Every 
study has shown positive income effects and most estimate the 
income levels of outgrowers to be two or three times the average 
agricultural wage in the area (Barclay, 1977; Holtham and Hazel- 
wood, 1976; Buch-Hansen, 1980b). 
Investment 
Most observers have been disappointed in the degree to which 
income has been productively invested. The feasibility study saw 
Mumias as a pole for development. The first manifestation of this was 
to be increased food production to meet the demand of workers hired 
to man the factory and nucleus estate, and to harvest outgrowers' 
cane. In general, this expansion has not occurred and local food 
production does not meet demand. The reasons are not entirely clear 
but one cause seems to be the extremely poor soil which makes 
increased crop production uneconomic at current prices and with 
current technology (Holtham and Hazelwood, 1976, p. 155). 
Labour shortages also seem to be a contributing factor. With 
labour productivity and wages generally so low in African agri- 
culture, it is common for rural-urban migration and off-farm employ- 
ment to compete heavily with on-farm labour. In Mumias, female 
labour is heavily occupied with household duties and wage labour for 
outgrowers; children are in school, as evidenced by the investments 
in schooling noted below; and men prefer off-farm employment. 
Barclay's survey found the most common expenditures by out- 
growers to be food, clothing and school fees with little investment in 
land or farm improvements. A more recent study of a very similar 
scheme in the South Nyanza area of Kenya produced similar findings. 
Kennedy and Cogill (1987) found income from sugar to be spent 
principally on four items: housing, school fees, cattle, and debt 
repayment. In the Kenyan sugar schemes, growers receive large lump 
sum payments at harvest time; it had been thought that these `lumpy' 
payments would facilitate investment, though this was not the main 
reason for the choice of payment system. Barclay found that this 
effect did not occur. Most outgrowers spent their receipts almost 
immediately and few even kept bank accounts. To a large extent, 
informal financial markets simply adapted to the introduction of 
sugar contracts. Households, tended to increase consumption and 
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finance expenditures through loans from relatives and merchants; the 
lenders demand repayment at harvest time, leaving little cash for 
investment purposes. 
If household investment has not been significant, neither has 
collective investment. Cooperative community ventures such as 
school construction, clinics and cattle-dips have not been successful. 
While some projects had been started before Barclay's study, none 
were completed and payments were in arrears. Barclay attributes this 
to a long history of ethnic friction and a lack of interest in cooperative 
activity. Holtham and Hazelwood (1976, p. 155) similarly note that 
Abaluhya social structure is not conducive to certain kinds of co- 
operative effort. 
Entrepreneurs have not been much more active as investors than 
outgrowers or communities. While some merchants have set up small 
shops, foodstands and the like, the scope for such activities is limited 
by the enclave nature of the Mumias scheme. The project provides so 
many of its own inputs and services that there is little scope for local 
suppliers. Barclay mentions some of the project's ancillary activities 
(1977, pp. 380-2): 
- gasoline station 
- repairs to vehicles 
- importation of all spare parts of machinery 
- retail shop for employees 
- recycling of waste products for fuel and fertilizer. 
Other services are supplied by firms based outside the district: 
- engineering 
- transport 
- purchase and delivery of food for managerial staff. 
As a result, local investment has been steered away from agriculture- 
related activities and into less visible areas. School fees do not 
provide such immediate or visible pay-offs as machine shops but 
may in the long run provide farm households with opportunities for 
income diversification in the long run. Importing and selling consumer 
goods to satisfy increasing local demand is often done by very 
informal, nearly invisible family enterprises. It is entirely possible 
that many of these businesses are simply not visible to the casual 
observer and have been underestimated in descriptions of the spin-off 
102 Small Farmers, Big Business 
effects of Mumias. The scheme has not become the `pole' of develop- 
ment' that its designers hoped for, but some development effects 
have occurred. 
Displacement 
The establishment of the nucleus estate displaced about 1,000 house- 
holds. At the time of Barclay's study (1975), this was by far the most 
obvious welfare effect of the scheme. As with the provision of 
investment opportunities (or lack thereof), the compensation and 
adjustment process for the displaced families was carried out in a 
relatively unplanned fashion. No resettlement scheme was estab- 
lished and there were no plans to give the displaced households 
preferential access to jobs on the nucleus estate or sugar contracts. 
In spite of the lack of planning or assistance, over 90% of the 
displaced families surveyed by Barclay were quite successful in 
purchasing land with their cash payment. Some bought other goods 
as well, most commonly bicycles, radios and livestock (Barclay, 1977, 
p. 208). Most significantly, however, few became sugar outgrowers. 
In order to receive a contract, a grower must hold legal title to his 
land. Most of the ex-Mumias residents found it difficult to work their 
way through the legal procedures needed to get title, or to bypass the 
requirement, as many of the more knowledgeable growers were able 
to do. The non-title group was effectively excluded from Mumias; 
some profited from their land sales and the rest seemed to have done 
reasonably well, but the positive impact was purely financial and was 
partially offset by the disruption of relocation. Other potential 
impacts - learning effects, changes in family roles, and so on - were 
not significant for this group. 
Technology Transfer 
Assessments of Mumias' learning effects vary. Holtham and Hazel- 
wood (1976, p. 154) cite the illicit use of fertilizer by outgrowers on 
other crops as evidence of technology transfer: farmers have learned 
the value of fertilizer and are making their own assessments about 
where they will get the highest marginal return from its application. 
However, more recent observations suggest that cane fertilizer is now 
bartered for food grown elsewhere in Kenya and used outside the 
scheme. Beyond Holtham and Hazelwood's early observation, which 
is itself open to interpretation, there are few indications that tech- 
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nology transfer has been an important feature of the project. The 
contract is so tightly specified and, more important, so many func- 
tions are performed by the project authority, that there is little 
opportunity for growers to learn or apply new techniques. 
Nutrition 
The only data available on nutrition comes not from studies of 
Mumias but from the report from Kennedy and Cogill (1987) on a 
similar scheme in South Nyanza. Since sugar produces higher returns 
to labour and is less risky than maize, the area's principal food crop, 
the establishment of a sugar scheme has led growers to shift a 
significant proportion of their land from the food crop to the cash 
crop. This has also resulted in significant income increases, but a 
relatively small percentage of income increment spent on food 
purchases. The net effect has been only a slight increase in the caloric 
intake of outgrower households. In addition, a high proportion of the 
income earned by women as wage labourers on sugar farms is spent 
on food (Kennedy and Cogill, 1987). Unfortunately, the nutritional 
status of the most vulnerable group within the household - pre-school 
children - has not increased significantly in South Nyanza. 
Both Barclay and Kennedy and Cogill highlight the importance of 
the payment system. Infrequent `lumpy' payments appear to lead to 
less expenditure on food than small and frequent payments, though 
the availability of informal credit to buy food may reduce this effect. 
Finally, nutritional benefits are reduced when sugar payments go to 
men, since women generally bear the responsibility for food purchases. 
It also appears that receipts by women are more likely to be spent on 
food for pre-school children (Kennedy and Cogill, 1987). 
Changes in Household Roles 
Mumias' principal impact on household roles was alluded to in the 
previous section: while MSC hires gangs of male labourers, the 
workers who respond to opportunities for employment by outgrowers 
in weeding work, tend to be female, perhaps because the male 
outgrowers fear a loss of prestige by working for other outgrowers. 
This has considerably increased female access to employment and 
income; the new source of income has, in turn, affected welfare 
within the household, particularly nutrition. The impact has been 
limited by Mumias' policy of making sugar payments to the house- 
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hold head, normally a man. In female-headed households, household 
expenditure and nutrition patterns differ noticeably from those in 
male-headed households. Were company policy in this matter to 
change by allowing payments to female farmers in male-headed 
households, the social impact of the project would be magnified. 
Social Differentiation 
With outgrower incomes of two to three times the average agriculture 
wage-level in the region, it is clear that differentiation between 
outgrowers and non-outgrowers has occurred. The process of differ- 
entiation within the population of outgrowers seems to be much less 
marked. According to Barclay (1977), such a process was underway 
before the establishment of Mumias, as traditional land use rights 
gave way to individual land tenure. Polarization of landholdings 
was limited by ecology and markets, however; with such poor soil 
conditions, additional land could not be made to produce profitable 
crops. 
The establishment of Mumias changed this situation. For one 
thing, as Barclay hypothesized, access to sugar income could allow 
poor households to hold on to their land. Previously, land sales 
occurred most commonly when subsistence crop production and off- 
farm employment were insufficient for survival. Mumias appears to 
have stabilized the lower strata of peasant farmers and allowed them 
to persist. It can also be argued that the company takes responsibility 
for so many production tasks that little scope remains for more skilled 
growers to profit from their skills. 
GROWER ORGANIZATION 
In Mumias, spontaneous collective action by growers has been 
conspicuous by its absence. Apart from a few incidents noted below, 
there have been few organized protests and the organization which 
represents farmers, the Mumias Outgrowers Company (MOCO) was 
formed at the initiative of Mumias management, not the growers. 
This lack of collective action has been explained by both Barclay and 
Holtham and Hazelwood as stemming from the local political culture. 
The management of Mumias, like that of many agribusiness firms, 
saw advantages in the formation of an organization to mediate 
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between management and outgrowers. In 1975, it established the 
Mumias Outgrowers Company to carry out the following functions 
(Goldberg and McGinty, 1979, pp. 557-8): 
to promote and represent the growers of sugar cane supplied 
to MSC who become members 
to negotiate on their behalf 
to provide financial credits for the production of cane 
to provide or procure advice and services and to enter into 
agreements with MSC 
to purchase supplies 
to borrow, lend, and give guarantees for money in connection 
with cane growing 
to remunerate for services and to pay out funds for expenses 
to establish provident funds and associations to benefit 
members 
While MSC continues to control the cane-cultivation and cane 
transport operations, MOCO concerns itself with farmers' accounts 
and credits; the investigation of farmers' complaints; negotiations 
between farmers and MSC if required; and publicity aimed at 
improving outgrower performance. 
MOCO's Board consists of: 
- four grower directors, elected bi-annually from the four regions 
of the outgrowers' area 
- three government directors 
- one CDC director 
- one MSC director. 
Only a few incidents of organized conflict between growers and 
management have been recorded, and these do not seem to have 
involved MOCO. In 1979, outgrowers, led by a group of prosperous 
farmers, protested against increases in transport charges and threat- 
ened to stop deliveries (Mulaa, 1981, p. 94). Shortly after, growers 
accused Mumias of accepting non-contracted cane from outside the 
area, delaying the harvest of contracted cane in so doing (Mulaa, 
1981, p. 94). Accounts of the latter differ, however; Graham and 
Floering report that the firm was under pressure from outgrowers to 
accept cane for which they did not have contracts (Graham and 
Floering, 1984, p. 126-7). The Kenyan government intervened, 
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compelling Mumias to accept the additional cane, and creating 
confusion as to whether the delayed harvests for some growers 
were the results of the company's actions or the government's 
response. 
SUMMARY 
Mumias brings into question the criteria by which agribusiness 
schemes should be evaluated. By the simplest criterion - income 
effects - the project has clearly been a success. One wonders if the 
full potential of the project has been tapped, however, or if less 
cumbersome ways to provide the same income could have been 
provided. The production system is so highly centralized that there is 
little advantage to the outgrower system. Smallholder production has 
not provided technical economies in production; nor has it provided 
many opportunities for spin-off effects and broader rural develop- 
ment. 
KENYA TEA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (KTDA) 
The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) is an autonomous 
corporation responsible for crucial aspects of the production and 
marketing of tea, Kenya's second largest export. Financed by ex- 
ternal lending agencies and the Kenyan government, KTDA has 
dealt with small tea growers for over twenty years; like Mumias, it 
has been cited as a successful scheme combining profitability with 
benefits to smallholders. Though less extensively studied than 
Mumias, enough information is available to permit an assessment of 
the scheme's impact and the factors that have influenced it (Buch- 
Hansen, 1980a; Lamb and Muller, 1982; Swainson, 1986; Stern, 
1972; Lele, 1975). Of these, Lamb and Muller's account is the most 
complete and forms the basis of much of this section. 
KTDA had its origin in the Swynnerton Plan of the former colonial 
government, which designated tea as an export crop for smallholder 
production and established the Special Crops Development Authority 
to promote tea and other crops (Swainson, 1986, p. 41). In 1964, a 
month after independence, the SCDA became the KTDA. It is an 
autonomous commercial enterprise financed essentially through non- 
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government sources. Its first and largest source of capital was CDC, 
though the World Bank, the West German government and other 
agencies have also provided loans. Loans from the government of 
Kenya have amounted to less than 20% of the total (Lamb and 
Muller, 1982). The agency's operating costs are covered by a levy or 
`cess' deducted from tea payments to growers. As a condition of the 
first CDC loan, there is no export tax on tea. 
KTDA purchases tea from Kenya's 150,000 tea growers. It also 
provides extension (technical crop advice), distributes planting 
material, and operates thirty-nine tea processing factories. Its Board 
of Directors includes members of KTDA management, the govern- 
ment of Kenya, external lending agencies and tea growers' organiza- 
tions. Tea growers also own shares in KTDA factories; about 10% of 
KTDA growers have purchased shares. 
Tea is grown in the west of Kenya around Kericho and Kisii, and 
in the districts around Mt. Kenya - Nyeri, Kirinyaga and Embu. 
Kericho is the major production zone. These areas lie at a higher 
altitude than Mumias and have colder temperatures and heavier and 
more constant rainfall. Conditions are ideal for tea growing and 
Kenya enjoys a reputation for being a high-quality producer. The 
Kericho area has a relatively high population density (232 persons/ 
square mile in 1979: FAO, 1984) and is characterized by a combina- 
tion of smallholdings and tea estates. Rain-fed maize is the principal 
staple crop of the region but beans, millet, wheat, barley and live- 
stock are also produced. While tea is the most profitable cash crop, it 
has not displaced the food crops: a 1979 survey of the Kericho district 
found 18,000 acres planted to maize vs. 3,120 acres to tea (FAO, 
1984, p. 48). Nor have all smallholders entered tea production; the 
same survey found non-tea smallholders outnumbering tea growers 
two to one. 
MANAGEMENT-GROWER INTERACTION 
KTDA is designed to provide tight control over all important aspects 
of tea production and marketing, even those it does not carry out 
itself. In practice, control over production has been exercised most 
effectively through pricing policy; efforts to directly supervise pro- 
duction practices have not been given heavy emphasis nor achieved 
great success when tried. The result has been tea of consistently 
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high quality which fetches premium prices in international markets. 
Growers receive planting material from KTDA nurseries and tech- 
nical assistance from extensionists seconded to KTDA from the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Production tasks are the responsibility of the 
grower and are carried out by family or hired labour; unlike Mumias, 
KTDA does not perform such tasks as harvesting. This largely 
reflects the greater suitability of tea for smallholders; harvesting, for 
example, is carried out throughout the year and requires skilled 
pluckers to remove only the top two leaves and a bud. 
Plucked tea is delivered by growers to inspection stations, where 
the leaf is publicly weighed and assessed for quality. Growers receive 
two payments: a monthly payment based on the quantity delivered 
the previous month and an annual payment that reflects the price 
received by KTDA for the year's sales in world markets. The latter 
depends largely on quality. However, since quality is affected by 
processing as well as production and the quality `bonus' is paid to all 
growers, there is an obvious danger that the payment system will not 
provide adequate incentives to farmers. Two factors offset this: 
public leaf inspection and the attendant peer pressure to deliver good 
tea, and grower representation and shareholding in KTDA and its 
factories. 
Some features of KTDA's relationship to its growers have changed 
with time. Originally, tea plots were limited to 0.44 acres; this was 
later raised to one acre in order to permit economically viable plots. 
Farmers had not found it worthwhile to harvest and transport such 
small quantities and, in fact, a great many evade the one acre limit. 
Smallholder tea production in Kenya increased dramatically, from 
1,200 to 30,000 tonnes between 1965 and 1980; the proportion 
produced by smallholders and marketed by KTDA increased from 
6% to 32% (Lamb and Muller, 1982, p. 21). 
Acreage limits are no longer, strictly enforced; seedlings are more 
widely available than before (through resale or illicitly from exten- 
sionists) and the scheme no longer finds it feasible to strictly control 
planting. In spite of this, there has not been a noticeable tendency 
for successful growers to accumulate large holdings. In this densely 
populated area, there is little unused land for sale; custom discourages 
commercial transactions in land; and the monthly tea income allows 
small growers to avoid `distress' sales. The result has been relatively 
little differentiation. 
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IMPACT 
Income 
Every study of KTDA has found positive effects on smallholders' 
income, with average net receipts well above the average for the 
region. There is also obvious physical evidence of prosperity, for 
example in housing standards. Buch-Hansen found the distribution of 
income among tea growers to be somewhat unequal (p. 33). He sees 
the possibility of further differentiation in the expenditure patterns of 
outgrowers. The most common expenditures were school fees and 
`matatus' (low cost transport that can be used for taxi hire). Among 
the growers with higher incomes, however, there was a greater 
tendency to invest in land, to buy shops and matatus and to hire 
agricultural labour. Buch-Hansen refers to this group as an `incipient 
capitalist class'. The hiring of labour has had a significant employ- 
ment effect since, on average, each outgrower hires three pluckers; 
given the continuous nature of the harvest, this employment is not 
seasonal (FAO, 1984). 
Nutrition 
Outgrowers generally grow significant amounts of food crops. Buch- 
Hansen found outgrowers in the Buret area to be essentially self- 
sufficient in food and to use little of their cash income for food 
purchases. FAO found the nutritional status of children in the 
Kericho area (as measured by height-for-age and weight-for-height 
ratios) to be somewhat better than the average for Kenya but did not 
detect a significant difference in this respect between Kericho small- 
holders who grew tea and those who did not (FAO, 1984, p. 54). Nor 
was there a relationship between income and nutrition. 
The lack of significant nutritional differences between growers and 
non-growers of tea, in spite of the growers' higher income, is con- 
sistent with Buch-Hansen's finding that little tea income is spent on 
food. FAO concludes that it is not lack of income or availability of food 
that determined these nutritional outcomes, but lack of information. 
The report recommends increased nutritional education (FAO,1984). 
Organizational Viability 
The most thorough study of KTDA (Lamb and Muller, 1982) takes 
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the project's positive income effects as its starting point and focuses 
its analysis on the factors determining the organization's success. 
KTDA's autonomy results largely from its financial independence 
from the Kenyan government. External finance and the cess provide 
most of the organization's revenues and, as long as it does not make 
excessive profits or losses, the government has little incentive or 
justification to intervene. The early exemption of tea from export 
taxes has also been important in this respect. Control over the 
important aspects of tea production and processing has ensured a 
steady supply of high quality material. KTDA has achieved this by 
retaining authority for the most crucial stages of the operation 
(initially, the distribution of planting material and, later, inspection 
and payment). 
Accountability to growers as shareholders and Board members has 
prevented KTDA from exercising its autonomy and control at the 
growers' expense. Finally, the system provides a series of perform- 
ance incentives for each of the participants. The payment system 
provides growers with a combination of security and rewards for 
quality. KTDA field staff are seconded from the Ministry of Agri- 
culture and can be returned there; slightly better KTDA salaries and 
perquisites (e.g. better housing and transportation) give them a reason 
to try to stay with KTDA. Finally, as noted above, KTDA manage- 
ment has an incentive to avoid both losses and the accumulation of 
large reserves, since either would invite government intervention. 
A cost-benefit study carried out for the OECD (Stern, 1972) found 
the KTDA's extremely tight organization to be of major importance, 
confirming, in more general terms, Lamb and Muller's findings. Lele, 
however, points to the intensity of the relationship between KTDA 
and its growers through the heavy use of `trained manpower and 
financial resources' (Lele, 1975, p. 14). The ratio of extension agents 
to farmers in KTDA, for example was 1:120, while for Kenya on 
average it was 1:500. Furthermore, total operating expenses per 
beneficiary were about 50% higher than the government's per capita 
expenditure on agriculture. For these reasons, Lele was somewhat 
sceptical about the degree to which the KTDA constituted a feasible 
model for national programmes. 
GROWER ORGANIZATION 
In KTDA, grower organization has been an important influence on 
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the scheme's operations; rather than a response to KTDA practices, 
however, political organization has been a prior conditioning factor. 
The central highlands of Kenya are an area of high population density 
and had a tradition of resistance to the British during colonial times 
(Swainson, 1986). These factors would have made it politically 
impossible to set up plantations here in the 1960s, as was done in the 
Mumias nucleus estate: a smallholder scheme was the only choice. 
Since then, KTDA has had to be responsive to growers' needs. The 
middle peasants who supply much of the scheme's tea form part of 
the government's social base of support. Furthermore they have 
direct as well as indirect means to pressure KTDA management, the 
former including the farmers' tea committees through which they are 
represented on KTDA's Board. 
SUMMARY 
The unique organizational style and structure of KTDA have per- 
mitted it to achieve an unusual degree of success, harnessing the 
productive potential of smallholders in a rational and efficient 
manner. The challenges facing the organization are problems associ- 
ated with success. First, it must avoid complacency and maintain and 
improve its performance in order to sustain Kenya's competitive 
position internationally. There are signs that this will require a 
conscious effort. The organization seems to be passing up some 
opportunities (for example, better use of its data on yields, more 
flexible extension systems based on demonstrations at delivery 
stations) which a `lean and hungry' enterprise might exploit. Second, 
it must find a way to maintain its own morale and prestige without 
diminishing that of the rest of the public extension service. There is 
still a danger that non-KTDA extensionists working in unpublicized 
programmes with basic food crops will see themselves as second class 
civil servants and perform as such. 
CONCLUSIONS: MUMIAS - KTDA COMPARISONS 
The settings and structures of Mumias and KTDA differ in several 
respects, though the results have not been as dissimilar as one might 
expect. The sugar scheme set up a nucleus estate in a financially and 
ecologically poor region of Kenya, displacing large numbers of 
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farmers. The production system involves very heavy central control 
and the crop has a long gestation period and infrequent harvests, 
resulting in large but infrequent payments. Technology transfer has 
not been a conspicuous feature of the scheme. 
KTDA, by contrast, did not set up a nucleus estate, but set up 
factories to buy from local farmers in a relatively prosperous and 
ecologically favoured region. Outgrowers bear more responsibility 
for production and their farming practices are influenced more by 
price incentives and extension than direct supervision. As a result, 
technology transfer has been significant. The nature of the climate 
and the crop leads to a fairly continuous harvest and frequent 
payments which are more conducive to careful financial manage- 
ment and expenditures on basic needs. 
Both schemes have been qualified successes, producing significant 
income increases for outgrowers. There are indications that there is 
untapped potential in both, because of a lack of regional develop- 
ment planning in Mumias and a tendency for KTDA to `rest on its 
laurels'. Income increases have not gone into major capital invest- 
ments, but have largely been used for consumption and, particularly, 
for education. In both schemes, there has been little differentiation 
among growers. Instead, major income gaps have appeared between 
outgrowers and farmers not involved in the scheme. (The lack of 
differentiation among outgrowers, at least in the Mumias case, could 
be a basis for criticism rather than praise: farmers are so tightly 
controlled that they have little opportunity to advance themselves by 
developing skills or exercising initiative). Acreage limits or farmers' 
preferences have also prevented specialization. As in most cases in 
this book, farmers have not abandoned food crops. 
The cases also underscore the importance of pricing policy in 
determining the success of a scheme. In KTDA, the lack of an export 
tax has allowed growers to capture a large share of the world market 
unlike many other African farmers. In Mumias, protection has 
allowed the producer price to rise well above that which an open 
market would permit, with sugar growers benefitting at the expense 
of the Kenyan consumer. 
6 Commodity Sketches: 
Mini-cases from Latin 
America 
As shown in the in-depth studies of the previous chapters, contract 
farming can have far reaching effects on households and communities. 
Other ventures have had more limited impact or highlight specific 
issues that can be appreciated without an extensive knowledge of 
their context. This chapter consists of a number of 'mini-cases' from 
the authors' fieldwork which provide more specific lessons for agri- 
business planners. 
TOMATOES FOR PROCESSING 
Tomatoes are a classic contract farming commodity. Processing 
plants which produce ketchup, tomato sauce and juices have large 
fixed costs and need an assured volume of throughput at predictable 
prices to run economically. Tomatoes are also highly perishable, 
particularly in tropical conditions, and growers often prefer relatively 
low but stable prices in a contract rather than take the risks of selling 
in the open market. Certain features of tomato production and 
marketing, while favourable to the use of contracts, also present 
serious problems for small growers, as the following cases from 
Honduras, Ecuador and Panama illustrate. 
In Honduras, a processor known as Mejores Alimentos Ltda. 
produced a large volume of tomatoes on its own land and, in part 
because of government policy, purchased an additional amount from 
ten to twenty large farmers. Complaints from farmers about the 
contracting relationship were common and included allegations of 
long waits to rent company-owned harvesters, highly variable reject 
rates, and low prices. The latter (at $140 a ton in 1980-81) were at the 
low end of the market price range. 
With prices and other contract conditions so poor, one wonders 
why the farmers grew for the company at all. The answer seems to lie 
in two severe problems in the fresh market for tomatoes. 
First, these large growers use a great deal of hired labour, 
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especially at harvest time, and cash to pay the workers is hard to 
come by. Workers expect to be paid daily, i.e. before the crop is sold 
and, in the case of early-season tasks, before it is harvested. The 
company is by far the easiest source of credit, although its interest 
rate is no better than that available from private banks. Growers say 
that a contract is of some help in obtaining bank credit, but not a 
great deal. Government loans carry lower interest rates, but are even 
harder to get, requiring a great deal of paperwork, waiting and many 
guarantees. Each of the growers interviewed said that access to credit 
was their principal motive for contracting. 
The certainty of selling all production at a fixed price is the second 
important advantage of a contract. Prices in the open market fluc- 
tuate considerably, since the tomato market is very `thin'; the amount 
of fruit sold is quite small and minor changes in volume traded can 
have a drastic effect on prices. The thinness of this market has two 
implications for large growers. First, the delivery of even one day's 
harvest can lower the market price significantly. Price sensitivity 
analysis (Johnston, 1977, p. 22; Glover, 1983, p. 221) shows that a 
delivery of a six-acre harvest will lower the price to half of its original 
level. Spacing deliveries over a longer period would mitigate the 
problem, but is not practical. The tomatoes can keep for only a 
couple of days in the tropical sun before they start to spoil, and 
weight loss from evaporation begins even sooner. Refrigerated 
storage facilities would be very expensive. The second implication of 
this is, of course, that permanent entry by a large grower would lower 
producer prices permanently. 
The thinness of tomato markets and the market power of large 
growers effectively eliminate this market as an alternative to con- 
tracting for large growers. Permanent entry by these producers would 
depress the market price to the contract level in any case, but without 
a contract there is no guarantee that deliveries, either to the plant or 
to wholesalers, will be accepted. Onions, peppers and other vegetables 
present the same credit and price sensitivity problems as tomatoes. 
Corn, rice and other basic food crops can be mechanically harvested, 
eliminating much of the wage bill, and markets are deep enough that 
no one producer can affect prices. Unfortunately, prices, though 
more stable, are lower and will not compensate for the expense of dry 
season irrigation. The result is that large growers have no real 
alternative to tomato contracting, except to leave their land idle four 
months of the year. 
Small growers are currently prevented from contracting by com- 
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pany policy; even if they were not, it is unlikely that the firm would 
attract a great many of these producers at current prices. For a small 
grower, the relative advantages of open-market and contract sales are 
quite different. Small growers are, to a much greater extent, price 
takers and the fixed-price aspect of a contract is less important. 
Access to credit is also less of an advantage, since these peasant 
producers rely principally on family labour. The alternative to 
vegetable cultivation is, again, to leave the land idle, which many 
farmers do. 
During the tomato season, many peasants work for the tomato 
producers and the demand for labour is such that wages greatly 
exceed the legal minimum. While agricultural workers in the area 
normally earn about $2.25 a day, the average daily wage of tomato 
pickers, who are paid at piece-rates, is $5 and many earn more. The 
harvest season coincides with the school holidays and often whole 
families work in the fields at this time. The resulting situation is one 
in which large producers contract with the processing firm while small 
producers supply the more lucrative fresh market. 
What is perhaps most interesting about this case is that it is 
imperfections in factor and output markets (for credit and tomatoes), 
not any dis-economies of scale in production, that make contract 
farming in tomatoes unsuitable for small farmers. 
Contract farming in tomatoes has created serious problems for 
small growers in Ecuador and Panama. Repeated cultivation of 
tomatoes without adequate rotation and/or chemical controls can 
lead to a variety of soil infestations, most commonly nematodes. In 
both countries, small farmers grew tomatoes without adequate pre- 
cautions; many experienced infestations so severe that within a few 
years their land was unsuitable for cultivation of any crops. In 
Ecuador, it was severe enough to cause significant numbers of 
growers to sell their land and leave the area. The company, Desarrollo 
Agropecuario Ltda., responded principally by shifting its supply 
sources to other regions where soils were not yet infested. 
Two factors could be to blame here: lack of information and 
inappropriate prices. On the first point, the companies were clearly at 
fault if they failed to inform their growers about proper crop rotation. 
The second point is more complicated. Local observers often com- 
mented that the company's low product prices were to blame, since 
they provided the grower with insufficient income to afford rotation. 
If prices were higher, they said, growers could afford to plant a lower 
value crop in alternate years and still maintain an adequate income. 
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Without observing the response of farmers to significant price 
changes, it is difficult to evaluate this argument. It is possible that 
growers would reduce production as the price increased, but only if 
they were well informed about the consequences of mono-cropping. 
If they were not, a normal upward-sloping supply curve could be 
expected and higher prices would only exacerbate the problem. 
The last problem discussed in this section occurred in Panama. 
Farmers delivering tomatoes to a processing plant often found 
themselves waiting at the gate for up to a day and a half. During the 
delay, the tomatoes would lose weight due to evaporation and the 
company would then receive a more concentrated product for the 
same price per pound. Longer delays resulted in spoilage and a higher 
reject rate. The company insisted fairly persuasively that this was 
a coordination problem which occurred because of weather and 
because growers had not followed their assigned planting dates. A 
government investigation of the point was inconclusive and many 
growers continued to suspect that the delays were staged in order to 
manipulate the effective product price. 
BANANAS 
Most of this book deals with the relationship between agribusiness 
and small farmers. Agribusiness firms do contract with large farmers, 
however. In fact, the commodity for which contracting is quantita- 
tively most important - bananas - is grown for export almost 
exclusively on plantations and cooperatives. Because of its quantita- 
tive importance and because it raises important issues different from 
those highlighted in the other cases, the banana industry deserves 
specific attention. 
Latin America produces about two-thirds of the bananas traded 
internationally and three transnational corporations - United 
Brands, Castle & Cook and Del Monte - market about 70% of those 
exports. These firms own their plantations and also purchase bananas 
from local producers under contract. The percentage purchased in 
this way varies from firm to firm and country to country but averages 
about 30%. 
Contracts generally run for renewable terms of five or ten years. 
The contract growers, or `associate producers' (APs) as they are 
known in this industry, generally cultivate at least 300 acres of 
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bananas. Economies of scale are very important in banana produc- 
tion, mainly because of the need for frequent aerial spraying to 
control diseases. The transnationals generally provide the bulk of the 
services and many of the inputs needed for production, deducting the 
cost from product payments. In some cases, such as the large 
production cooperatives in Honduras, loans are also provided (by 
multilateral development banks) for infrastructure or rehabilitation. 
Supervision by the TNCs and coordination of farming practices, 
particularly harvesting, is very tight and responds very quickly to 
changes in world market conditions. Labourers perform highly 
specialized tasks and the plantation exhibits many features of 
assembly-line production in a factory. 
Several features of the associate producer system are worthy of 
note. First, there are significant differences in the wage paid by TNCs 
on their own plantations and those paid by associate producers. The 
earnings of cooperative members also differ from those of TNC 
plantation workers. Estimated daily earnings for Honduras in 1981 
were: 
TNC plantation worker: $6 
Cooperative member: $4.25 
AP plantation worker: $2.55. 
The relatively high wages of TNC workers (high relative to other 
banana workers and to agricultural wages in general) seem to be a 
function of the high degree of worker organization. In most Central 
American countries, TNC plantations are fully unionized and in some 
they are politically quite effective. Associate producers' plantations 
are rarely if ever unionized. On cooperatives and worker-managed 
enterprises in Honduras, unionization is actually illegal. 
The plantations of associate producers and cooperatives are also 
subject to greater instability of sales than TNCs. The transnationals 
tend to market all of their own production, while using APs as 
reserve suppliers during periods of peak demand. This is done 
by varying the quality standards applied to the AP's fruit in order 
to evade contractual obligations to purchase all acceptable fruit 
delivered. 
The following table shows the exports by one transnational and its 
associate producer over a one year period in Honduras (Cohbana, 
1979): 
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One of the issues raised in the literature is the degree to which 
associate producers are effective lobbyists for the TNCs, increasing 
the latter's political influence in the host country. The degree to 
which APs have been effective lobbyists depends on the degree to 
which their interests coincide with those of the TNCs and the degree 
to which the APs are politically influential. 
On the first point, it is apparent that the interests of contract 
growers are ambiguous. When it comes to keeping costs of produc- 
tion down, for example by legislating against trade unions or by 
granting duty-free status to agricultural inputs, local growers and 
TNCs are of one mind. Any successful lobbying the AN do on these 
issues will benefit the transnational. On the issue of the price paid for 
contracted bananas they are clearly opposed. On the broader issue of 
the presence of TNCs in their country, contract growers are generally 
supportive. The growers interviewed also wanted the companies to 
maintain plantations in the country, since this allowed them access to 
the companies' research facilities. 
On the second point, the evidence is that associate producers have 
not been particularly influential politically. In most countries, these 
growers are ex-company foremen without a great deal of money, 
education or influence. An exception is in Costa Rica, where the 
TNCs set up their associate producer programme through expansion 
rather than by transferring land. Here the companies have contracted 
with large and often diversified businessmen. Many of these are quite 
influential politically and a couple have held cabinet posts. 
Finally, it should be noted that the expectations of local govern- 
Commodity Sketches 119 
ments about the reduced `enclave' effects of subcontracting have 
not been realized. The `spinoff' and employment effects of banana 
production have been equally slight for TNCs and associate pro- 
ducers. In both cases, nearly all of the inputs used are supplied by the 
TNCs, which either import them (duty free in the case of chemicals) 
or produce them in TNC-owned factories. 
Given the technological imperatives of export banana production 
and its unsuitability for smallholder production, the associate pro- 
ducer system has, for the most part, succeeded only in shifting some 
landownership and profit earning to local plantation owners. This has 
not been sufficient to increase the industry's potential to promote 
economic development; nor has it resulted in increased earnings for 
labour. 
SUGAR 
In Honduras, eight sugar mills process cane, largely for the domestic 
market. With the exception of one state-owned firm, each company 
cultivates substantial amounts of cane, purchasing the remainder 
under contract. Contract purchases are a response to Article 39 of the 
1975 Agrarian Reform law, which limits the amount of land an agro- 
industry may own. This area is generally less than that needed to 
keep the processing plant operating near full capacity, so outside 
purchases are necessary. 
The sugar mills generally contract with many types of growers, 
including large business farmers, absentee landlords, peasants and 
cooperatives. The last two types have expressed dissatisfaction with 
the treatment they have received from the firms and government 
inquiries have been held to investigate their complaints (e.g. INA/ 
IICA 1980b). Fieldwork in the Choluteca area of southern Honduras 
confirmed that neither firms nor small growers were satisfied with the 
contract arrangements and complaints by farmers, about late pay- 
ments, excessive charges for technical assistance, and long waits at 
delivery time, were common. 
Government policy is largely responsible for the use of contracting 
in sugar; without the Agrarian Reform law, the mills would almost 
certainly grow all their own cane. Policy also determines the most 
crucial variable in the contract: the producer price. While the govern- 
ment does not set the cane price, it does set the wholesale and retail 
prices at very low levels. Processors therefore have little room to 
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manoeuvre in negotiating prices for cane and are under considerable 
pressure to keep them as low as possible. 
Many of the problems that have arisen between the firm and its 
smaller growers stem from the fact that sugar is not particularly suited 
to contract production by smallholders in southern Honduras. For 
several months of the year, the climate is dry and irrigation is 
required. Most of the cooperatives and smallholders do not have 
irrigation facilities or any advantage to offset this shortcoming. The 
closer supervision and availability of family labour which are impor- 
tant for delicate, labour-intensive crops, are of little value in cane 
production. Often their land is not especially good for sugar cane, 
unlike company land, which was selected specifically for this purpose. 
Small farmers are also unable to afford a costly and specialized piece 
of equipment called an `encargadora' which is used to load the cane 
onto trucks for delivery to the plant. The need to rely on the firm for 
rental of this equipment puts smallholders in a dependent position. 
Smallholders also create administrative problems for the firms, 
.which must send out their harvesting and loading equipment to a few 
acres of land here and there. They would prefer to own large blocks 
of land which could be economically irrigated and harvested in a 
factory style operation. Since the Agrarian Reform law limits their 
ownership of land, the second best strategy is to contract with large 
growers, who receive most of the technical assistance and better 
treatment at harvest time. 
Under these conditions, the only motive for peasant farmers to 
grow for the company is a lack of alternatives for a certain type of 
grower. Of the three cash crops grown in Choluteca (sugar, cotton 
and melons), sugar is by far the easiest to grow and the least sensitive 
to poor weather. Cotton requires expensive inputs and melons 
require technical expertise, close supervision and the willingness to 
accept high risks in the export market. Farmers who are relatively 
unskilled or risk-averse may prefer the low but fairly secure income 
provided by a sugar contract, sometimes in combination with other 
crops. 
The bargaining power of small farmers in the Choluteca case is 
limited by the heterogeneity of the firms' suppliers and, in particular, 
the presence of one type referred to as `prestanombres' or `name 
lenders'. Large, often absentee, landowners with little interest in 
farming have signed contracts with the sugar mills, which assume de 
facto control of the farming operations. The landowners receive an 
assured if not lucrative income, without any of the headaches or risks 
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of managing the farm. Prestanombres are likely to accept a lower 
price than business-oriented farmers who expect compensation for 
their managerial skills, not just a fee for use of their land. Not all 
large landowners are prestanombres; some do manage their own 
operations. Even these growers, however, will be more inclined to 
discuss their grievances with the company individually than to join a 
bargaining organization of peasants with whom they have little in 
common. As a result, efforts by discontented growers to better their 
situation have taken the form of sporadic and ineffective complaints 
rather than organization. 
FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPORTS 
The expansion of smallholder contract farming has been particularly 
noticeable in fruit and vegetables for export to developed countries. 
Crops such as melons, berries, cucumbers and peppers are particularly 
suitable for peasant farmers since they require considerable labour 
and attention and can produce high incomes per acre. At the same 
time, vertical coordination is extremely important to match production 
and quality to seasonal fluctuations and consumer preferences in the 
final market. 
Two export schemes in Honduras, each involving joint ventures 
between transnational corporations and the Honduran government, 
have produced significant benefits for small farmers. There is some 
doubt about the profitability and long term viability of the schemes, 
however. 
In Choluteca, a firm known as PATSA (Productos Acuaticos y 
Terrestres, S.A.) purchases cantaloupes and honeydew melons for 
export to the U.S. during the winter months, after U.S. production 
has stopped and before Mexican production begins. PATSA is a 
subsidiary of United Brands, a transnational conglomerate that has 
grown bananas in Honduras for over a century. The project began in 
1975 and involves three government agencies in addition to the 
company: the agrarian reform agency (INA), the National Develop- 
ment Bank (BNF) and the Ministry of National Resources (MRN). 
INA owns the packing shed and the land it is situated on; BNF 
provides loans to producers; MRN is ostensibly responsible for 
technical assistance to growers. PATSA pays a fixed price for 
acceptable melons and handles transportation, marketing and much 
of the technical assistance. 
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Melons are grown for only a few months each year and require 
constant supervision. When cantaloupes are ripening, for example, 
the fields must be harvested three times a day in order to get the fruit 
at exactly the right stage. Melons are a luxury product, purchased by 
affluent U.S. consumers who expect a cosmetically perfect product 
for the high prices they pay. Quality standards at the packing plant 
are correspondingly high, with the reject rate averaging 50%. Pro- 
duction is all done by fairly small growers and the company does not 
grow any melons itself. No specific equipment is needed and trans- 
portation to the packing house is by small pickup truck, a vehicle 
commonly used in the area and easily rented. Prices are considered 
very good by most growers, reflecting the luxury export market to 
which they are geared, although many farmers are frustrated by the 
high reject rate. 
Earnings, grower satisfaction and the transfer of technology are all 
high. Production, however, is not up to expectations and PATSA is 
dissatisfied. The packing shed operates well below capacity and fixed 
administrative costs on the operation are high for the small volume of 
produce exported. 
Additional production could be obtained in a number of ways, 
none of them fully satisfactory. One would be for the firm to grow 
some melons itself; the firm says this would be feasible economically 
but not politically; it believes a low-profile image is safer. Another 
possibility would be to deal with larger growers, but this would likely 
result in lower quality. A third would be to try to attract more small 
growers; the question is how? Higher prices might produce more 
quantity but probably not of sufficient quality. A more aggressive 
recruiting and extension program would tax the firm's administrative 
capacity. Instead, the firm is relying on the growers' cooperative to 
implement an outreach programme. 
A similar scheme at Fruta del Sol for exporting cucumbers, operates 
in the Comayagua area of Honduras. It involves Standard Fruit (the 
second major banana transnational operating in Honduras), USAID 
and the BNF. Pricing policies differ between the two schemes. 
PATSA provides a fixed price to growers regardless of the final price 
received: at Fruta del Sol producers receive the sales price commis- 
sion about six weeks after delivery. In Fruta del Sol's first year, 
project managers tried to `shelter' producers from price fluctuations 
and did not inform them of U.S. buyers' acceptance of the fruit 
delivered. This practice was found to have negative effects on 
production quality and was discontinued. Informing producers about 
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buyer acceptance of each delivery has produced a better under- 
standing of the importance of specific quality features and improved 
farming practices. 
The same producer benefits that occured in PATSA are apparent 
in Fruta del Sol. So is the development of business-like practices by 
growers and the strengthening and diversification of the producers' 
cooperative. In the long run, these may be more important benefits 
than the earnings or farming skills associated with specific crops. The 
life span of a non-traditional export can be very short. Disease and 
pest problems can spring up overnight with a new crop in tropical 
conditions. Competition from other countries is fierce, technological 
innovation rapid, and protectionism in developed countries is an 
increasingly serious constraint. 
Honduras has had to deal with all of these problems. Standard 
Fruit had tried growing tomatoes in N.W. Honduras before Fruta del 
Sol but abandoned them because of pests. Fruta del Sol is shackled by 
a U.S. customs regulation which prohibits the importation of cucum- 
bers through Miami, a regulation which substantially increases 
transportation costs. While its ostensible purpose is to avoid the 
spread of fruit flies, its real purpose is probably to bolster the com- 
petitive position of Florida growers. PATSA has faced serious 
competition from producers in Puerto Rico, who developed a pro- 
duction technique that could have put PATSA out of business in one 
season. 
These problems raise doubts about the long term viability of any 
particular operation and questions about the motives of the firms in 
promoting them. They may well be simple public relations exercises. 
The amount of profit or loss that United Brands or Standard Fruit make 
on these operations is tiny compared to their global earnings or even 
those they make from their Honduran banana operations. PATSA 
and Fruta del Sol are, to some extent, a way of staying in the govern- 
ment's good graces and maintaining the status quo on the banana 
front. It is probably realistic to regard these projects, not as long term 
activities in themselves, but as vehicles to strengthen producers' 
organizations and to transfer technology and managerial skills. 
MILK IN HONDURAS 
Leche Leyde is the only private sector dairy operating in Honduras. 
Its plant is located in La Ceiba, the headquarters of Standard Fruit, 
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the international banana and pineapple company. Small and 
medium-sized farmers in the area traditionally kept a few head of 
dairy cattle; their milk was used to make fresh cheese for local market 
sales. This market was not very lucrative, but was the only outlet 
possible in the absence of refrigeration or dairy processing plants. 
The Leche Leyde plant was built by a local storekeeper and 
medium-sized farmer, the son of an immigrant who worked as a 
foreman for Standard Fruit. Selling milk at first only in the northern 
coastal cities, it soon expanded to cities nationwide. It competed 
successfully with the two government-owned dairies by delivering 
fresher milk to stores and by selling small containers of flavoured 
milk (chocolate, strawberry, egg-nog) to poorer urban consumers, 
who lacked refrigeration and had not traditionally bought milk. 
Advertised as a healthy alternative to soft drinks in radio commer- 
cials, the flavoured milk drinks proved popular and expanded the 
national market for milk. 
The dairy was as innovative in its milk purchasing organization as it 
was in its marketing. Through efficient operation of truck routes and 
meticulous attention to sanitation, it avoided the problems common 
to tropical dairy operations that lack on-farm electricity or refrigera- 
tion. Twice daily, ice trucks picked up milk containers from every 
farm and dropped off sanitized containers for the next collection. 
Routes were relatively short, since the area's cheese-making tradition 
meant that almost every farmer in the zone had dairy cattle. All sold 
to the dairy because their incomes were so much higher. Profits on 
local sales of cheese were barely adequate to pay for the costs of the 
cow; profits on fresh milk sales were sufficient to become the largest 
source of income in the household. 
Leche Leyde's impact on small farmers was as wholly positive as 
in any case in this book. Why? Most basic was the efficiency and 
honesty with which it was run. It kept fair books, paid promptly, and 
never missed a milk collection. It was able to make large profits, for 
expansion and reinvestment, selling milk at government-set prices 
that required public subsidies to the government dairies. 
Second was its ability to constantly expand its markets. In five 
years, as production doubled and redoubled, it always stood ready to 
take as much milk as a farmer could produce. To the individual 
farmer, it was an unlimited, fixed-price market. It even planned to 
make ice cream, as soon as its raw material volume permitted, to 
keep up the expansion. 
Third was its context. The dairy was an expanding alternative 
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agribusiness in an area that for sixty years had been dominated by a 
banana company whose operations were no longer expanding. Most 
of the dairy farmers had family members who worked for Standard, 
either in the recent past or the present. The income from the milk 
sales could equal a wage, yet the work could be carried out by school 
children or by women whose other tasks took up most of the day. 
Fourth, little technical assistance and no farm credit was needed or 
given. These farmers had the cows and the know-how; all that was 
needed was a market. The company filled in the infrastructure gaps 
(ice, trucks, urban distributors) to connect these farms to the national 
market for their milk. 
CANNED FRUITS AND JUICES IN GUATEMALA 
Two companies in Guatemala specialized in canned fruits and juices 
for the Central American market - Conservas and Del Lago. Their 
most popular products were six-ounce cans of sweetened juices 
(`juguitos'), marketed under their own brand names and sold in every 
corner store in the region. Conservas was locally owned; Del Lago is 
the Guatemalan subsidiary of a small Costa Rican canning company. 
Both companies had purchased used equipment and received tech- 
nical assistance from U.S. agribusinesses. Their basic markets - 
juguitos - were not expanding, and the Central American Common 
Market had introduced serious competition among the six producers 
in the region. The juices could be made either from fresh local fruits 
or from imported concentrate. Both companies used concentrate, 
partly because local supplies were unreliable, in the absence of a 
field-staff to keep up contacts with farmers. To expand, they would 
have to switch their emphasis from sweetened juices to canned fruits, 
which had export potential. This meant buying local fruit. 
Conservas chose to do this through spot purchases from truck- 
owning intermediaries who bought fruit from local growers on 
speculation and brought it to Guatemala City. If the fruit's quality 
was too low, or if it had deteriorated too much for sale on the fresh 
market, the truckers would come to offer their fruits at the Conservas 
gate. The advantage of this system was its low cost. No field staff was 
required, and the raw materials purchased were the lowest-priced 
available. The disadvantage was the uncertainty of supply, both in 
type of fruit and in quantity. 
Del Lago hired two field-staff to make contact with fruit growers 
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and try to buy their fruits; one worked in the temperate orchard 
region (apples, pears, etc.), the other the coastal tropical zone 
(pineapple, guava, etc.). These buyers offered the farmers a large 
market but little else. Its prices were lower than those in the fresh 
market, and it gave no price or volume guarantees. Nevertheless, 
they were able to buy all the fruit that the plant needed. 
The Conservas system of no direct purchases from growers failed, 
for lack of supply. The company struggled on for two years, opening 
when it had fruit to can but more often closed, and finally it was sold 
to a rival operation. 
The Del Lago system evolved into a modified contract system and 
succeeded. The company discovered that it could get the type of fruit 
it needed, when needed, if it offered small amounts of production 
credit, a month or so before harvest, to relatively small growers. 
Those loans were used to purchase appropriate insecticides that 
would not leave residues in the canned fruit. To obtain these credits, 
a farmer would contract to deliver an agreed number of truckloads 
of minimum quality fruit, on agreed dates, at an agreed price. On 
delivery, the interest-free loan would be deducted from the payment. 
As long as the contracted truckloads were delivered, farms were free 
to sell as much of their best fruit to the fresh market as their yields 
permitted. 
The system allowed the company to plan production, purchase raw 
materials proportionate to its anticipated demand for the various 
canned fruits, and avoid problems of insecticide contamination. It 
allowed the farmers to get insecticide and to lock into a market 
for their lower quality product. Neither took much risk, since the 
contracts were made so close to harvest time that the size of the 
harvest and the likely fresh-market prices were relatively predictable. 
Del Lago succeeded in entering the U.S. market, canning fruit 
under different brands for various distributors. Eventually, it became 
the major exporter of canned fruits in Central America. Its success 
demonstrates that contract farming need not be elaborate or exten- 
sive; in the right circumstances, a system which provides a few key 
inputs can be just as effective and much less costly. 
7 Conclusions 
The case studies described in previous chapters demonstrate the 
diversity of experience associated with contract farming schemes, in 
the forms they take, the effects they have on local communities, and 
their long term viability. This chapter attempts to draw from this 
diversity some broad generalizations about the issues presented in 
Chapter 1. 
(a) What problems do firms and growers most frequently face in 
contract farming? 
Contracting provides many advantages to firms in reducing risks, 
improving raw material flows, and other aspects described in 
Chapter 1. It is not without problems for the firms involved, however. 
The most serious problem, though not the most frequent, is default- 
ing by contract growers. When the market price rises above the 
contract price there is great temptation for farmers to sell on the 
market. Firms have dealt with this problem in a variety of ways, 
including the use of court action and blacklists to punish the 
offenders. It is also possible to prevent the problem in the right 
circumstances. If the local market is thin and the company has some 
production, it may be able to manipulate the market; by selling a 
truckload when fruit is in short supply, it can flood the market and 
keep the market price down. 
More common than contract defaults are problems of insufficient 
or inconsistent quantity and quality. Inexperienced growers may find 
it particularly difficult to achieve the same yields and quality that the 
company obtains on test plots, and the latter yields are often used as 
the basis for setting prices. Companies also complain that growers do 
not follow their technical advice or suggested planting dates. Growers 
often try to economize by applying less than the recommended 
quantity of chemicals and they may plant when it is convenient, 
rather than on the date agreed. Ignoring planting dates creates 
problems at delivery time, causing deliveries to arrive in bunches, 
exceeding or falling short of plant capacity. 
As the case study material has shown, contract farming can also 
present a variety of problems for growers. Many of these arise from 
the difficulty of coordinating the production and deliveries of many 
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farmers so as to ensure an optimal flow of raw material. These 
coordination problems result from three sources: 
(a) the failure of growers to comply with company instructions 
(b) the company's lack of physical or managerial capacity 
(c) exogenous variables - principally weather. 
An example of a coordination problem is the competition for 
company-owned machinery at harvest time; growers must often wait 
until the firm has completed its own harvest before obtaining access 
to the equipment. 
Coordination problems are not the only ones faced by growers in 
dealing with agro-industries, however; companies may also attempt 
to manipulate or take advantage of their suppliers. This type of 
problem is probably the most interesting, but it is often difficult to tell 
whether manipulation or lack of coordination is occurring. The case 
of tomatoes in Panama is perhaps the best example, where it was 
unclear whether long waits at the factory gate for tomato deliveries 
were the result of poor coordination, or a deliberate effort to increase 
evaporation and reduce the effective product price. 
In cases where growers are in a weak bargaining position when 
signing a contract, or do not fully understand the contract's implica- 
tions, the company may be able to draw up an agreement which, 
strictly enforced, will allow it to manipulate its suppliers. More 
commonly, however, the contract is superficially equitable, but is 
circumvented by the company. Sometimes this involves breaking one 
of the provisions of the contract, though not always. Few contracts 
are `perfectly contingent' and a number of variables are usually left 
open. For example, some processors, such as McCain, reserve the 
right to `call up' deliveries from growers at dates chosen by the 
processor. While companies usually describe their orders to deliver as 
simple coordination decisions, it is also possible to use the best 
delivery dates as rewards for favoured growers. Some contracts and 
contracting situations allow more scope for favouritism than others, 
but this element is almost always present to some degree. 
Finally, one must distinguish between manipulation by the firm 
itself and manipulation in the self-interest of individual employees. 
Inspectors are notorious for demanding bribes, for example, even 
though this creates quality control problems for the company. 
Company fieldmen have also been known to take kickbacks on input 
sales and to recommend excessive applications in order to maximize 
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those kickbacks, as in the ALCOSA case. KTDA extensionists 
have to some extent undermined the agency's attempts to control 
plantings, by accepting payments for seedlings. While it is difficult 
to control such behaviour, it is not impossible, as the administra- 
tive reforms and subsequent improvements in ASAGRO demons- 
trate. 
Other examples of problems encountered by growers include the 
following: 
-Manipulation of inspection standards to control deliveries. (If 
production exceeds the firm's requirements, it may surreptitiously 
raise its quality standards in order to reject excess production, as 
in McCain, the banana industry and numerous other instances.) 
- Poor technical assistance. (Most contracts require growers to 
follow the company's advice, but absolve the firm of responsibility 
for the results. The tomato processing firms provide the most 
obvious examples.) 
-Tying one contract to another. (In cases where the company 
purchases more than one crop, growers may be pressed to sign a 
contract in crop A in order to get one in crop B. This occured in 
the McCain and ALCOSA cases.) 
- Cheating or insufficient specification in growers' accounts. (The 
company may charge growers for goods and services not actually 
delivered, or fail to specify quantities, dates, etc. as in ASAGRO 
in Peru and many examples from the literature: Odada, 1985; 
Rama, 1985; Scott, 1984.) 
- Late payments. (Delays of up to two years have been recorded, 
for example in the Honduran sugar industry, a problem of 
particular severity when inflation is high.) 
This listing is indicative of the kind of problems frequently encoun- 
tered. As noted in the analyses of ASAGRO and ALCOSA, farmers 
frequently draw attention to problems of a highly specific nature or 
are influenced by such examples in their overall assessment of an 
agribusiness. These cannot form the basis for an evaluation of a CF as 
a system, however, or even for the evaluation of a specific case. A 
comprehensive view requires attention to more fundamental effects; 
these will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
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(b) What role do credit and debt play in contract farming? 
In many cases (McCain, ALCOSA and others), access to credit 
proved to be an important motive for farmers in signing production 
contracts with agribusiness firms. In some cases, the contract itself 
makes provision for credit from the firm, with repayments often 
deducted from the product price. In others, the contract serves to 
assure banks of the farmer's credit-worthiness, thus facilitating access 
to private credit. 
Debt is most likely to be a problem with crops which have long lead 
times before the first harvest. For sugar, asparagus or tree crops, for 
example, growers may have to wait several years to earn any 
revenue. Loans are necessary to carry the farmer over this period and 
high levels of indebtedness can accumulate, as they did in the 
Peruvian case. If projected profits are not realized, because of 
changes in costs of production or market conditions, repayment 
problems will result. The longer the pre-harvest period, the more 
likely it is that projected and actual profit levels will differ. 
These problems are compounded in the economic and institutional 
environment of many LDCs. High and variable inflation rates make it 
difficult to determine appropriate interest rates. Ceilings on interest 
rates set by government policy (often negative in real terms) can 
prevent firms from setting appropriate rates, once determined. Small 
farmers with limited business experience often have difficulty keeping 
their own records and in distinguishing between real and nominal 
interest. Furthermore, loan disbursements are usually made on a 
weekly or monthly basis at rates equivalent to a minimum or sub- 
sistence wage; this can create the perception among farmers that they 
are receiving a wage for work performed prior to harvest, rather than 
a repayable loan. This was a major element in the ASAGRO case in 
Peru. The more distorted the price, the less experienced the farmer, 
and the longer the pre-harvest period, the more likely it is that prob- 
lems of perception will exacerbate and compound financial problems. 
(c) How does contract farming affect risk-bearing by growers? 
As noted in the Introduction, contract farming is fundamentally a 
way of allocating risk between the firm and its growers. The firm 
tends to assume marketing risks while the growers bear most of the 
production risks. Two general points should be emphasized. First, 
the precise distribution of risk will depend on the specific provisions 
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of the contract and the way they are implemented. Implementation 
is important since the reality of a contracting situation may differ 
markedly from the formal terms, as many of the case studies have 
shown. Second, there is in theory considerable interdependency in a 
contracting relationship and much implicit bargaining over risk 
allocation. One cannot assume, for example, that a firm can avoid all 
the consequences of droughts, floods, diseases and so forth by 
transferring responsibility for production to outgrowers. A rational 
grower with some room for choice will not accept a risk unless he is 
compensated for it in the product price. 
In practice, the distribution of risk will depend heavily on such 
factors as bargaining power, availability of alternatives and access to 
information. For small farmers entering their first relationship with 
an agribusiness firm, the contract is likely to be less risky than existing 
alternatives; with this comparison in mind, small growers may well 
accept a disproportionate share of risk within the boundaries of the 
contract. The firm may also be able to shift onto small growers the 
risks and costs associated with new crops or farming practices, simply 
because information about their medium- to long-term effects has not 
been disseminated. The tomato producers in southern Ecuador are a 
case in point, where a processing firm was able to avoid the effects of 
soil contamination for several years by continually shifting to unin- 
formed growers in new regions. 
Dynamic factors also come into play when small farmers enter new 
agribusiness ventures. Both have been alluded to earlier. New 
ventures in this field are often very risky and growers will be exposed 
if they rely on a `pioneer' firm for a large portion of their income. 
`Agri-business normalization' often shelters producers from risk for a 
year or two; by the second or third year, the firm may find it impossible 
to continue to sustain losses, at the same time that growers have 
incurred debts and committed more resources to the new crop. The 
typical outcome is for the firm to begin to squeeze the growers just at 
the time that farmers have become more dependent on the scheme. 
An alternative, though less common scenario, is that the farmers will 
have invested the revenue earned during the `honeymoon' to diver- 
sify their economic base in such a way that they are now less, rather 
than more dependent on a single crop or buyer. Some of the Guate- 
malan vegetable growers were particularly active in this respect in 
seeking out alternative markets. In any event, it is clear that risk must 
be assessed over a longer time scale; one cannot assume that the 
initial distribution of risk will persist. 
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(d) What changes in income does contract farming produce? 
Contract farming holds far less possibility for coercion than traditional 
agricultural relations between smallholders and the rural elite. Land- 
lords and money lenders can coerce the rural poor into quite exploit- 
ative relationships because the elite control access to land and inputs 
that the rural poor need for their survival. Agribusiness processors 
control access to new markets. What they offer farmers in a contract 
is not the right to continue living through the next agricultural season 
on the same terms as always; it is the chance to enter a new market. 
That being the case, the firm must induce and not coerce the 
smallholder to sign the contract, generally by offering better prices. 
In these cases, outgrower income was, in fact, increased as a result of 
the contracts. As agribusiness normalization proceeds, outgrower 
incomes may be reduced from their initial levels. However, this 
reduction cannot go too far or the small farmer may return to his pre- 
contract markets, assuming these still exist and that the grower is not 
locked into the new crop by debt, specialized machinery or other 
factors. There is also the possibility of increasing quality and yields 
from innovative farming practices to offset any reductions in price or 
quality terms. 
In virtually every case reported in this book, growers did achieve 
significant income increases. Nor did we encounter cases in which 
growers were locked into schemes that lowered their incomes. How- 
ever, we have not devoted much attention to the many ventures 
which have failed after one or two seasons because of insufficient 
profits for the firm or its growers. There is an inevitable bias in our 
study in this respect, since it is more difficult and probably less 
revealing to examine cases that have failed and no longer exist. Our 
sample shows that contract farming can produce significant income 
increases, sometimes double previous levels. The issue is, not 
whether such increases can be achieved, but whether they can be 
sustained and replicated in other ventures, a point we shall return to 
in the last chapter. 
(e) Does contract farming in LDCs exclude small farmers? 
There are both ideological and practical reasons why agribusiness 
might prefer not to work with small farmers. Agribusiness managers 
often share, with other educated town dwellers, the stereotype of 
small farmers as backward and unreceptive to innovation. They 
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sometimes prefer to work with more educated `medium sized' 
commercial farmers, who are often urban professionals and business- 
men with farming sidelines. Nor can it be disputed that, for the same 
volume of raw materials, a large number of small outgrowers requires 
larger, more complex and more costly field operations to contract, 
advise, monitor, finance, receive, inspect, transport and pay for the 
outgrowers' products. Such expenses can nearly equal the farm direct 
production gate costs of the raw materials themselves, as they did for 
such small-farmer dominated outgrower systems as ALCOSA's 
broccoli in Guatemala and ASAGRO's asparagus in Peru. 
For these reasons, agribusiness critics argue that agribusiness 
growth will squeeze out small farmers as large commercial farmers 
expand their operations. Yet this has not happened in any of the 
cases studied, nor does it seem likely in the foreseeable future. 
Agribusinesses do contract with small farmers and small farmers do 
share in the resulting economic growth and transfer of technology. 
Why? 
One reason is political. The same political motivations that lead 
agribusiness managers into outgrower programmes in the first place - 
the desire to avoid owning large areas of land and to avoid the direct 
hiring of a unionized labour force - lead them to want to include 
smaller and poorer farmers as beneficiaries of their programmes. 
Some of the cases reviewed, like Standard and United's profitless 
melon and cucumber projects in Honduras, appear to be maintained 
by the agribusinesses at least in part as public-relations exercises 
necessary to keep their profitable traditional agribusiness operations 
going. Others, like the Mumias and the Honduras sugar projects, are 
largely political creations, involving crops for which small outgrowers 
are not particularly well suited. 
This essentially political motivation is increased when the inclusion 
of small outgrowers permits access to credit at concessional rates 
from financial institutions founded by international development 
agencies. Virtually all of the cases studied used such credits when 
available. In Peru and Guatemala, funds originating in USAID were 
`on-lent' to small growers through the firms. In Honduras, funds from 
the Inter-American Development Bank were channelled through the 
national development bank to banana growers' cooperatives, which 
sold their fruit to TNCs. 
Another reason is the economic rationality of the potential out- 
growers. Larger, more commercialized farmers have, on the one 
hand, more options than small farmers (more access to credit, inputs, 
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markets, more capacity to absorb risk) and on the other hand more 
cash expenses, since less of the managerial or production labour is 
performed by unpaid family help. Agribusinesses have often found, 
as ALCOSA did, that after agribusiness normalization has occurred, 
small farmers remain highly motivated to continue as outgrowers 
while larger farmers prefer competing non-contract markets. These 
may require farmers to provide their own financing and inputs and to 
take more risks, but they may also provide more potential for profit. 
A third reason agribusinesses may prefer smaller farmers is that 
they have less power or influence, and less ability to involve trouble- 
some government officials, agencies and lawyers in the event of a 
contractual dispute. In a plant capacity crisis, ALCOSA was able to 
stop the purchasing of contracted cauliflower from small indigenous 
farmers, but had a harder time stopping purchases of okra from large 
commercial operators. 
Finally, agribusinesses producing luxury goods for demanding 
export markets (fresh fruits and vegetables, some frozen goods, 
canned asparagus) must have extremely high quality raw materials. 
They have often found that small farmers and their families, with 
their personal involvement in their operations, are more likely to 
produce high quality products than larger farmers who must super- 
vise hired labour forces. Though this point should not be overgeneral- 
ized, small farm size can provide a significant advantage in producing 
high-quality, labour-intensive crops if growers have access to tech- 
nical assistance and other needed services. This condition is more 
likely to obtain under contract farming than under any other arrange- 
ment. 
M What is the social status of contract farmers? 
The largest farmers in less developed areas rarely participate in 
contract farming. They tend instead to grow traditional cash crops 
such as coffee or cotton, to control or have bargaining strength in 
dealing with their processing and marketing organizations, and to 
reserve their diversification efforts primarily for nonagricultural 
activities. Middle sized farmers - differentiated from small farmers 
by their ability to transport a day's harvest to buyers in an owned or 
rented vehicle - occasionally do choose to become outgrowers. They 
do so when initial promotional pricing makes an outgrower contract 
the most attractive market available; when the agribusiness supplies 
all technology, labour, and equipment, so that the purchases become 
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de facto land-rent for unused fields; or when the contract can provide 
an assured market for a product which thin local markets could not 
absorb (e.g. tomatoes in Honduras); or when the contract will balance 
the risks associated with the growers' principal crops and markets. 
The phenomenon of `prestanombres' or frontmen referred to by 
Feder (1977) was not encountered frequently, though it did appear in 
sugar in Honduras and potatoes in Canada. In such cases, the 
suitability of the crop for large-scale mechanized production, iegisla- 
tion affecting land use, and the sociological characteristics of growers 
were all important factors. 
The social status and characteristics of farmers are important to an 
understanding of the outcome of agribusiness-farmer interaction. 
Similar company practices can produce very different results depend- 
ing on the nature of the growers, as the ALCOSA case illustrates. 
The effects on women, on the growth of cooperatives and other 
aspects, varied considerably in the three study villages, and depended 
more on local culture, ecology and history than on the company. 
Contract farming is likely to be particularly attractive to small 
farmers. There are external reasons, already described, why limited 
options make relatively low contract prices more attractive to smaller 
farmers than to others. There are also more positive internal reasons 
why contract farming can fit particularly well into the economic 
development strategies of some small farmers (Kusterer, 1987). 
The first economic development goal of small farmers is normally 
to establish a minimally capitalized and reasonably secure economic 
base for subsistence farm- and household-work. Without this, they 
cannot survive as farmers or even as rural farm workers. Once this is 
secure, their search is for cash income to purchase basic necessities 
that cannot be made in the household. In this search for income, they 
seem naturally to prefer a diversified approach which will spread the 
risk and bring income directly into the hands of each individual male 
or female adult member of the household. The income-producing 
activities can include the sale of labour, farm products, or non-farm 
home-based goods and services. Most small farmers seek income 
from all three. 
For the smallest farmers, contract farming is by far the easiest way 
to enter more lucrative remote markets for high value crops. It offers 
much higher income potential than traditional local market crops, 
especially when the prices for these are government regulated, as 
they were in Honduras, Peru and Kenya. Because of farmers' risk 
aversion and diversification strategies, the activity they typically give 
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up to undertake contract farming is other cash crop production. They 
did not give up subsistence or women's income activities. They gave 
up off-farm wage labour only if it was traditionally subservient and 
low-paying (coffee-estate harvesting, cotton picking, daily farm 
labour, domestic service); never if it was non-agricultural, non- 
seasonal or higher paying. Because of these considerations, contract 
farmers were rarely the largest, and not necessarily the most pro- 
gressive farmers, but the ones with few enough other options that 
contract farming offered the best available combination of income 
enhancement and risk reduction. 
(g) What are the effects on women? 
Women are potentially affected by contract farming through two 
routes. As members of outgrower households, they are affected by 
the shifts (of labour allocation and income generation within the 
household) wrought by the new contract farming activities. As 
members or potential members of the wage labour force, they are 
affected by shifts in employment opportunities resulting from direct 
and indirect agribusiness hiring. 
In all cases, contract farming led to large increases in outgrowers' 
farm production. In a few cases - McCain potatoes, sugar every- 
where, - this increased production is largely handled through new 
access to specialized mechanized equipment, so that farm labour time 
is not greatly increased. It is more common, however, that increased 
production leads to large increases in the amount of family farm 
labour required. In these cases, one sees the familiar story that 
women's work increases greatly, while the increased income comes 
into the household through the male, with whom the agribusiness has 
its contract. Women's work increases because the labour intensity of 
the contract crop draws women into the work of farming the 
household's main cash crop, without lowering (at least initially) any 
of her obligations in the subsistence and petty-commodity sectors of 
the household economy. Men, on the other hand, work in contract 
crops instead of other cash crops or the off-farm work that they 
previously engaged in. Their work load also increases, but not as 
much as the women's and their incomes increase to compensate. 
In the cases where female outgrowers were interviewed separately 
by female researchers (Guatemala and Peru), the respondents ex- 
pressed no dissatisfaction with this aspect of contract farming. These 
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also happened to be two of the cases where these increases in 
women's work loads were most evident. In this a sign of traditional- 
ism or false consciousness? Not necessarily. In the long run, their 
own economic development as women, as well as that of others in 
their households, depends on shifting labour resources out of low- 
productivity subsistence tasks into higher productivity work. This can 
only happen by improving the productivity of subsistence work, since 
so many of these tasks that fill poor women's days are necessities for 
human survival. This requires increased income, to buy productivity- 
enhancing appliances (fuel efficient stoves are a classic example) and 
to purchase some inputs (milled grains, fuel) that had previously 
required the most time to produce at home. In both Guatemala and 
Peru, outgrower householders were making these purchases just as 
rapidly as women's influence over their increased incomes permitted 
(i.e. after men had bought farm equipment and a transistor radio to 
take out into the fields). Women used small loans and time payments 
(particularly in Guatemala) to speed up the process. This prospect is 
what made the outgrower women willing to make the sacrifice of an 
initially increased work load. Their interest in these purchases is a 
practical strategy for a long-term improvement in the quality of their 
lives. 
The most positive transformational effect of agribusiness on 
women's lives came not from contract farming but from processing- 
plant employment. Small-town and rural women who worked in the 
packing sheds, canning plants or freezing factories were nearly 
unanimous in reporting that the employment increased their self- 
esteem, self-confidence, and household influence. Paying legal mini- 
mum wages, not often available to women in informal employment, 
these jobs dramatically increased women's incomes. Female em- 
ployees became major, if not the major, earners of outside income in 
their households, and this empowered them in their relations with 
husbands and fathers. Even when dissatisfied with specific working 
conditions or wage levels, they were highly satisfied with their new 
roles as wage workers and intended to remain in the plant as much as 
possible throughout the life-cycles of marriage and motherhood that 
lay ahead. 
The hardships of `double shift' work in home and plant, and 
conflicts between wage work and household duties, were universal 
sources of difficulty. They were resolved by kin-based arrangements 
that shifted household work and childcare onto other women who 
were compensated in cash or kind out of the wage worker's increased 
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income. Only in rare instances did any of this work shift onto male 
household members, even if they were relatively underemployed, as 
many were in Peru. Nevertheless, the women interviewed considered 
these problems a relatively small price to pay for the improvements 
they felt employment had brought to their lives. 
These very positive changes were much less pronounced for 
women working for local subcontractors or larger outgrowers, since 
these provided more temporary and sporadic employment. In 
general, the impact of agribusiness on women through factory 
employment was much more significant than the impact through 
purchases of raw materials from outgrowers. 
(h) What are the effects on labour? 
One of the principal effects of agribusiness growth is increased 
employment, direct and indirect, in processing plants and in agri- 
culture. Although the evidence is that food processing is not particu- 
larly labour intensive and investment-to-job ratios can be quite high 
(Checchi & Co., 1977, 1978), it nevertheless offers more hope than 
most industries for bringing industrial employment opportunities into 
the rural areas where the poorest people live. In these case studies, 
agribusiness generated new employment in many different forms. 
Key variables affecting the developmental quality of the new 
employment were the following: (a) whether the crop or process was 
traditional (sugar, rice, bananas) or nontraditional (export fruits and 
vegetables, canning or freezing); (b) whether the employer was a 
transnational (ALCOSA, Standard, United), a large private national 
(McCain, ASAGRO), a mixed parastatal (Mumias), or a local 
private firm (subcontractors and large outgrowers in various cases); 
and (c) whether the employment was in processing or agriculture. 
Traditional crops and processors hired more men than women, and 
organized the work in less `modern' ways (with less technical division 
of labour, less bureaucracy and less standardized treament of em- 
ployees). Non-traditional processors hired women more than men 
and organized the work in more `modern' and thus locally innovative 
ways. Trans-national firms and public enterprises paid better wages 
and fringe benefits (even if they were only the legally required 
minimums) than large national firms, who in turn paid better than 
local employers. Processing plant jobs were better paid than all 
agricultural jobs except tractor drivers and equipment operators. 
Although this book deals principally with small farmers, agribusi- 
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ness firms occasionally contract with large farmers; the banana 
industry is the most obvious example. These cases raise interesting 
issues about the welfare of workers employed by the large contract 
farmers. 
In the Latin American banana industry, workers employed by the 
transnational firms have wage levels roughly double those of workers 
employed by contracted plantation owners. Social benefits and 
housing are also noticeably superior. This is probably a result of the 
unionization of TNC plantations, in contrast to locally-owned planta- 
tions where unions are rare. 
There are also indications that agricultural workers employed by 
the parent company enjoy greater stability of employment than the 
employees of contract farmers. Greater stability of sales by the 
parent firm means more stable demand for labour; this tendency is 
reinforced by pressure from unions. Contract growers are utilized to 
some extent as reserve suppliers, and fluctuating demand is reflected 
in fluctuating employment. This is apparent in both the banana and 
sugar industries in Honduras. 
Canning plants, freezing plants and most packing sheds followed 
international agribusiness practice - and thus differed from local 
practice in every case - by giving preferential hiring to women. These 
are also in the best categories in all other areas (processing rather 
than agriculture, nontraditional rather than traditional, nationally or 
transnationally rather than locally owned) with the result that they 
often offer better jobs than are locally available to non-skilled men. It 
is not surprising how enthusiastic women are about these jobs. 
Women like the bureaucratic, impersonal management style, the 
well-defined divisions of labour, the time clocks, and the chance to 
work with large numbers of other women. These features, usually 
perceived as alienating and anomic aspects of modern capitalism, 
represent improvements over the patriarchal and paternalist work 
conditions previously available to women as domestic servants or 
small business employees. Employment in these large plants also 
meant access to social security and health benefits, which in Peru 
conferred the right to medical care not otherwise available at any 
cost. 
General satisfaction in these large plants does not translate into 
docility. The women in Guatemala had gone on strike in the plant's 
early days of operation and in Peru they held a sit-down strike that 
lasted for weeks. Ironically, it is a testament to the self-confidence 
and personal empowerment brought about by these jobs that women 
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were able to act so strongly when they felt that specific grievances 
warranted action. 
Employment in smaller scale, traditionally organized, locally 
owned, and farm-based jobs did not confer any of these benefits 
except the significant one of increased income. They increased 
employment among populations whose access to land was limited and 
access to income chronically inadequate. Even when pay and working 
conditions were low by international and even local standards, these 
seasonal and temporary jobs still represented an important additional 
source of income in the domestic economies of the poorest local 
households. Though not `transformational' as employment in the 
larger processing plants was, these jobs made possible incremental 
improvements in living conditions. 
(i) Does contract farming promote socio-economic differentiation? 
It is a common idea in rural development studies that the growth of 
commercial agriculture leads to social differentiation of the peasantry. 
This hypothesis has its roots in Marx: that the growth of capitalism 
leads to competition among independent artisans and farmers, with 
the larger and more successful minority becoming bourgeois em- 
ployers while the majority are squeezed out to become wage labourers 
in the growing capitalist enterprises. Empirical support came from 
the experiences of the then presently developed capitalist countries 
and from the observation that the more developed a country, the 
smaller a proportion of its workforce is engaged in agriculture. 
While not necessarily invalidating the general proposition, the 
evidence from the case studies is that contract farming is at least as 
likely to prevent social differentiation as to enhance it. The mech- 
anisms that normally create social differentiation in commercial agri- 
cultural growth are; differential access to land, inputs, credit, new 
techniques and markets. Larger peasants normally have better access 
to these factors. If successful, they can soon afford to buy or rent 
more land, buy even more expensive inputs, and so continue in an 
expanding cycle of increasing agricultural productivity. Their demand 
for land drives up prices and rents; their demand for labour drives up 
agricultural wages; and slowly their smaller neighbours are both 
pushed and pulled into becoming farm workers rather than farm 
owners. 
Contract farming can act as a leveler, reducing risks and increasing 
access to inputs, credit, new technical knowledge and markets. Only 
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the original landholding differential remains as a factor, causing 
larger farmers' income to rise faster than that of smaller farmers. For 
labour intensive high value crops, even this factor can be reduced 
because family labour on small plots can produce higher quality, 
higher yields and greater income per acre than can larger farms. 
Thus, in most of our major case studies, contract farming reduced 
social differentiation among participants more than it increased it. 
The smallest outgrowers shifted their family labour allocations from 
off-farm labour to work on contracted crops, reversed their move- 
ment into the paid labour force, and enjoyed greater increases in 
income (in percentage terms, though not in absolute terms) than the 
larger outgrowers. In parts of ALCOSA's growing region in Guate- 
mala, peak-harvest labour scarcities, caused by small outgrowers' 
unwillingness to work off-farm during their own fields' peak labour 
period, forced larger outgrowers to cut back on their contracted 
acreage and shift to other non-contract crops, like cabbage, with 
earlier or later harvest peaks. 
Over the long run, social differentiation among outgrowers will 
probably still occur. Small outgrowers must use a larger proportion of 
their increases in income to provide themselves with a more adequate 
level of basic human needs - food, shelter, clothing and health care. 
Larger outgrowers, presumably, will have more of their increases in 
income available to reinvest in productivity-enhancing capital or, as 
they often prefer, to invest in secondary and post-secondary educa- 
tion for their sons and (less often) daughters. Eventually, if this 
continues over a period of years, the larger farmers will raise their 
incomes and living standards at a more rapid pace than the small 
farmers around them. Nevertheless, contract farming appears to be 
the most slowly differentiating route yet known for the transition 
from traditional local market agriculture to highly commercial 
capitalist agriculture. 
Only in the McCain case could one offer an interpretation in which 
contract farming accelerated differentiation. In this case, there are 
some indications that larger farmers are better able to prosper in 
the processed potato industry than small ones, and that McCain's 
purchasing practices exacerbate the tendency. The general tendency 
to fewer and larger farmers is found throughout Canada, however, 
and it is difficult to know how much of a role agribusiness played in 
accelerating this tendency in the St. John valley. 
These observations apply to differentiation among the outgrowers 
in a contract farming system. Differentiation between initially poor 
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participants and poor non-participants, on the other hand, did occur 
in all these cases, and can be quite rapid. In the state planned 
contract farming system, Mumias in Kenya, more people wanted to 
participate than there was land available to allocate, so some form of 
selection system, based on low level government contacts and in- 
fluence, was applied. Some were excluded against their will and the 
selection system was not entirely random. The fairness and efficiency 
of the selection system is a key issue in the large state-directed 
outgrower schemes in Africa and Asia. In the more purely private 
enterprise systems, however, selection was wholly voluntary. Field 
staff promoters signed up all those they could convince to participate 
and the farmers themselves chose to stay in or out. In these cases, the 
resulting differentiation was largely the result of personal choice. 
(j) What are the effects on farming and management skills? 
Agribusiness can produce dramatic changes in the farming and 
management skills of small farmers over relatively short periods of 
time. The case of ALCOSA in Guatemala is perhaps the most 
impressive, where farming systems and household dynamics changed 
markedly in a few years. The ASAGRO case in Peru was also 
dramatic, with the firm developing new technologies as well as 
disseminating established ones. Rapid technology transfer is most 
likely to occur when a new crop has been introduced and when 
quality standards are important, as in speciality crops for export. 
Some production techniques are highly crop-specific and are not 
transferable to other commodities. The management skills learned 
through participation in an agribusiness scheme are more widely 
applicable, however, and include accounting practices, negotiating 
skills, awareness of the importance of quality and characteristics of 
export markets and contract provisions. These management skills are 
most likely to be developed in schemes where producer prices closely 
reflect quality and final market prices; where farmers receive detailed 
accounts of the company's payments for crops and deductions for 
inputs; and where farmers are given substantial responsibility for 
managing their operations, rather than operating within a scheme 
where control is highly centralized. 
(k) What are the effects on the process of grower organization? 
In cases where individual growers are dissatisfied with their relation- 
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ship with the company, a very common response is to attempt to form 
a growers' organization. The contracting situation typically contains 
some elements which undermine those efforts and others which 
further them. 
One of the factors which impedes organization is the frequently 
heterogeneous composition of the contract growers. In Honduras, for 
example, firms have contracts with peasant farmers, large absentee 
landlords, and modern business farmers. The interests of these 
various types are quite diverse and this seriously impedes efforts to 
organize politically. Most significant is the presence of absentee 
landlords who often plant sugar simply to keep the land in production 
and thus immune to expropriation under the agrarian reform law. 
In a few cases, these absentee landlords are simply `front men' who 
turn over de facto control of their farms to the company. They are not 
particularly concerned about the product price and may even settle 
for a small loss on the contract as an alternative to losing their land. 
These growers have little in common with the profit-oriented growers 
and do not want to be bound by any collective agreement a bargain- 
ing group might negotiate. Generally, when agro-industrial firms 
concede higher prices in such agreements it is only in return for 
higher yields, higher quality standards, regular deliveries and so on. 
While the progressive farmers might benefit from such an agreement, 
traditional landowners would be sure to lose. In Honduras and in 
Canada the presence of non-profit maximizing growers among the 
firm's suppliers (large sugar growers and `front men' in Honduras, 
Dutch immigrants in New Brunswick) has been a major organiza- 
tional problem. It is possible that firms deliberately include such 
growers among their suppliers for this very reason. 
Another split which has undermined grower solidarity at the 
regional or national level, is that between simple producers and 
producer/shippers. This split was found in the McCain case and 
among Ecuadorian banana producers (Glover, 1983; Larrea et al., 
1986). In the potato industry in Eastern Canada and the banana 
industry of Ecuador, some producers also purchase produce from 
other growers and sell it to exporters. Exports provide an alternative 
outlet for growers who do not have contracts and for varieties not 
purchased under contract. In both countries, producers have attempted 
to form broad-based organizations involving all producers, regardless 
of their ultimate market outlet. However, producer/shippers have 
access to market information that simple producers do not and are 
therefore in a position to take advantage of the latter. Since they can 
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always sell their own produce, they have no interest in reforms 
designed to improve the market access of small growers; in fact, they 
oppose such reforms since they use simple producers as reserve 
suppliers. Nor do they favour measures that would stabilize the 
market, since fluctuating prices provide these shippers with the 
opportunity for speculation. The interests of simple producers and 
producer/shippers are quite divergent, yet it is politically very difficult 
to exclude the latter from national or regional growers' organizations. 
When they are included, they tend to dominate the association and 
subvert its goals as perceived by the simple producers. 
Just as the diversity of interests among farmers has presented 
difficulties, so have the ambiguous interests of individual farmers. 
While growers may perceive the long term benefits of organizing 
themselves, the contracting relationship also encourages individual 
interest promotion. As mentioned, no contract is perfectly contingent 
and each gives the firm room to provide some growers with better 
conditions than others. This encourages growers to cultivate friendly, 
even personalistic relations with the company and to refrain from 
antagonizing it by joining growers' organizations. In New Brunswick, 
leaders of the National Farmers Union (NFU) tried to form a broad- 
based potato growers' organization of the type described above. NFU 
leaders said that, initially, contract growers were the easiest to 
organize. These growers had a visible, concrete adversary to focus on 
(the firm) and specific complaints against it. Once it came time to 
take concrete action, however, these same growers were the first to 
back out. The processing firm provided a focus for resentment, but it 
was also the sole source of income for these growers. If we can 
generalize from this case, the vulnerable position of many contract 
growers appears to arouse resentment at the same time as it inhibits 
risk-taking. 
On the other hand, there are elements in the situation which 
promote grower organization, particularly when a fairly homo- 
geneous group of small growers is involved. In such cases, issuing 
instructions and inputs to growers and seeing that planting and 
harvesting dates are observed can be difficult when hundreds of 
dispersed growers are involved. Some kind of growers' organization 
is usually helpful and in some cases the companies involved have 
actually encouraged the formation of such groups. 
In Guatemala, for example, ALCOSA found that grower discipline 
in villages like Santiago, which dealt with the company through 
orszanized coops, was much better than in other villages. In Santiago, 
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there was a manageable process for growers to use to negotiate with the 
company, and one result was that individual farmers did not engage in a 
daily struggle to `negotiate' by slipping lesser quality product past the 
company inspectors. In Santiago, the coop weighed, inspected, and 
recorded individual deliveries, at great savings to the company, 
because they could be trusted to do what they had agreed to in earlier 
negotiations. In Patzicia and other villages, the company had to hire 
people to do all this, at greater expense and in the face of the passive 
opposition of the farmers, who had not negotiated quality standards 
but experienced them as being arbitrarily imposed by the firm. 
Likewise in Peru, ASAGRO was able to get growers to reduce the 
length of asparagus stalks - at great savings to the company and 
at great cost to the growers - by recognizing their new growers' 
association and negotiating a compensating price increase. Within a 
week, all asparagus deliveries were coming in with the new shorter 
length, a result that could never have been achieved if each grower 
had to be personally convinced to make the change by company field 
staff. In both these cases, the very independence of the associations 
from direct company control gave their decisions the legitimacy 
necessary to get voluntary grower cooperation. 
In both these cases as well, the felt need to have a body capable of 
representing farmer interests before the company gave an impetus to 
the organization of these individualistic small farmers that would 
otherwise have been difficult or impossible. The very successful 
Guatemalan coop was initially able to organize only because farmers 
had to join it to gain access to the ALCOSA market for their vege- 
tables. Coop organizers stated that this was the main reason that 
farmers joined. In Peru, the growers' association was the only organ- 
ization of any type in the area that these farmers joined, and the weekly 
meetings of its small local groups served many social purposes as well as 
providing a forum for sharing opinions about asparagus operations. 
Cooperatives formed by growers, with or without company encour- 
agement, have in some cases restricted themselves to their original 
function and, in others, taken on new tasks, such as the collective 
production or marketing of other crops. 
In Guatemala, the coop went on to develop other new agribusiness 
markets as a result of its experience with ALCOSA. Members now 
grow crops for five or six different buyers, using a cropping pattern 
that maximizes their individual income without inconvenience or 
complication, since all crops are delivered to the coop which sorts, 
weighs, and sells them for the farmer and pays him weekly with a 
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single cheque. On a similar but less developed scale, the asparagus 
growers' association in Peru has gone on to represent the growers 
with other agribusinesses who entered the market after the period of 
this research. 
With this type of organization, small farmers become an organized 
interest group in the economic and political life of their region. With 
interests to protect, they are consciously or unconsciously drawn into 
the informal and formal local arenas of everyday political interaction. 
Thus drawn into `the system', they almost inevitably come to express 
dissatisfactions in reform-oriented terms and to reject revolutionary 
solutions to overthrow the system altogether and begin anew. The 
ALCOSA buying zone in Guatemala has been the least radicalized 
highland indigenous area in the country during the guerilla struggles 
of the last eight years (a correlation that does not prove cause and 
effect but is hard to dismiss). Farmers there and in Peru have been 
involved in highly visible disputes to protect their interests; in both 
cases the political context is often a violent one, but their organiza- 
tions have consistently preferred to negotiate differences in places 
where that tradition has not been strong. 
(l) How does contract farming affect elite-small farmer 
relationships? 
The relations between the rural elite and the rural poor typically have 
a patron-client quality to them. In this traditional pattern of attempted 
mutual manipulation, subordinate clients profess loyalty to super- 
ordinate patrons in hopes of receiving personal economic benefits 
and favours. Patrons dispense these favours with arbitrary pater- 
nalism, effectively reinforcing client behaviour with such occasional 
rewards. The system is manipulative in the sense that there is never 
an open expression of conflicting interests. Patrons pretend to have 
nothing but the client's best interest at heart, and clients profess 
nothing but devoted gratitude for the patron's attentions. Neither 
party acknowledges the self-interested motivations behind their 
requests and expectations. 
A patron-client relationship is for these reasons a very poor 
context for the communication of honest information, especially 
information that acknowledges the conflicting interests in the rela- 
tionship. Processor-grower relations can be efficient and successful 
channels for providing technical assistance and for negotiating 
mutually acceptable quality standards only if they cease to be 
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traditional patron-client relations. In these case studies, the only 
successful example of contract farming which did not break down 
local patron-client norms was the McCain case in Canada. This 
experience appears to confirm our hypothesis, since it was also the 
only case in which' technical assistance was not an important part of 
the firm-grower relationship and one of the few in which high quality 
was not important. 
The introduction of contract relations, as new and non-paternalistic 
styles of elite-smallholder interaction, may be in the long run as 
important a benefit for the small outgrowers as the increase in their 
productivity and incomes. The new style raises the possibility of 
competing elite styles in the rural zone, giving small farmers new 
possibilities for playing the rural-elite off against each other and 
increasing their freedom to manoeuvre. The contract relation is also 
one of formal (though not substantive) equality between the two 
contracting parties, which allows the subordinate more respect, 
responsibility and self-esteem than more traditional patron-client 
forms. This being the case, contract relations permit a more honest 
acknowledgement of potential conflicts and a more open negotiation 
of their resolution. The result is that both parties are more likely to 
maximize their benefits from the relation, making it more efficient 
both in the passing of information and in the realization of both 
parties' objectives. 
(m) What are the effects on food production and nutrition? 
The impact of agribusiness growth on the food supply and the 
nutritional status of the rural poor has been much debated. Since 
contract farming schemes often produce export crops, it is argued, 
they do not contribute to food self-sufficiency and may in fact 
undermine it by diverting land from the production of food crops. 
The argument should, however, be qualified in a number of respects. 
(a) Some of the crops produced by TNCs, notably sugar and oil 
palm, are destined for import substitution in the local market,, 
although quantities may also be exported. 
(b) Local conditions are sometimes more suitable for export crops 
than food crops. In such cases, there can be a significant welfare 
gain from trade. For example, a cooperative of former banana 
workers was formed in Honduras in the early 1960s to farm land 
formerly planted to bananas. The coop experimented with 
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many food crops, but found that they did not grow well in these 
soil and drainage conditions. On reverting to bananas (the 
export crop) the cooperative's income increased to levels far 
above those of foodcrop producers. 
(c) The reject rate in fruit and vegetable export operations often 
reaches 50%. These rejects - often set aside merely for reasons 
of ripeness or size - can be sold in local markets for a fraction of 
the price paid by consumers in industrial countries. The produce 
has equal nutritional value and can complement the traditional 
starchy diet of low-income Third World consumers. In 
ALCOSA's growing zones, reject cauliflower and broccoli are 
so widely and cheaply available that they have become a highly 
nutritious staple of the very poorest people's daily pottage, and 
a feed supplement to any animal that will eat it. The leaves and 
stalks are also used, as animal feed and as an organic fertilizer 
for the non-contracted (mainly subsistence) crop fields. The 
same story could be told for the melon and tomato case studies. 
(d) The production of export crops and food crops can be 
complementary. Irrigation water in sugar schemes has been 
used to grow vegetables for local markets. Fertilizer applied for 
one year on an export crop can have residual effects the 
following year on a rotation food crop. 
(e) Export crops do provide income for local producers, many of 
whom are smallholders. Control of foreign trade by multi- 
nationals may depress prices below the level they would reach 
in a freer market, but apparently it still provides prices that are 
attractive to some producers. In many cases, the biggest 
margins are taken not by TNCs but by government marketing 
boards and state-managed corporations. 
(f) ,Finally, and related to the previous point, in specializing in 
export crops, TNCs are often responding rationally to the 
incentives embodied in government pricing policies. If producer 
prices for food crops are kept to a level that is not remunerative, 
neither TNCs nor local farmers will produce them. 
An important empirical question to answer in addressing the food 
production issue is, what was displaced to produce these export or 
urban products? With respect to land, several examples can be cited. 
The Mumias case was essentially a colonization project. Before the 
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sugar, the area was sparsely populated and the land only sporadically 
cultivated; the entire present population emigrated to the area to 
take part in the project. ASAGRO likewise is located in a former 
desert, where local farmers could not afford to level the land or build 
up the sands into soil to make use of the newly built irrigation system. 
Before asparagus was alfalfa, the only other colonization crop that 
grew at all in the irrigated sand. It too was a cash crop, though a much 
less lucrative one, sold to nearby large landowners to feed animals 
that local farmers could not afford to own. 
ALCOSA vegetables displaced some corn, wheat, and beans, but 
mostly other vegetables (cabbage, carrots) sold at volatile prices in 
nearby city markets too thin to support the level of production which 
farmers were capable of growing. Similarly, McCain potato growers 
formerly grew fresh-market potatoes for regional urban consumers. 
In these cases, as in the minicases in Honduras and elsewhere, the 
outgrowers either substituted new cash crops for old ones or colo- 
nized land previously unused for agriculture. Since few subsistence 
fields were taken out of production, there was no reduction in the 
local food supply. 
With respect to labour, it is clear that outgrowers substituted 
contract farming more for other income sector activities than for 
subsistence activities. (We consider `subsistence' labour as house- 
work and personal services as well as subsistence farming, and 
'income-producing' sectors as home-based micro-enterprises, off- 
farm labour, and cash crop farming.) If we further subdivide the 
income-producing sector into men's income and women's income, it 
is also clear that women's income activities (artisanry; market sales of 
`sideline' crops like flowers, eggs and poultry; trading; part-time 
herbalism or midwifery) are usually not diminished. Men's off-farm 
labour and men's cash crops (which may nevertheless have used 
much female labour) are the activities foregone for contract farming 
(which likewise may nevertheless use much female labour) and it is 
men who get this increased income. That being the case, it is arguable 
that the income increases are not increasing family nutrition as much 
as they might have if the income increases had been in the women's 
sector of the small farm economy. It can be argued, as Kennedy and 
Cogill (1987) have, that the widespread practice of paying men for 
women's contract crop work is not only inequitable, but leads to less 
household expenditure on food than would payments to women. 
Some positive effects in this respect might also result from smaller, 
more frequent payments. But it does not follow that these inequities 
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are new ones, or that the increased income to men leads to poorer 
nutrition for women and children. 
All of these cases involve a massive increase in the demand for 
farm labour, raising the wage levels in some cases and the number of 
work days available to farm labourers in all cases. This is a significant 
increase in the annual incomes of the poorest of the poor and 
probably has a tendency towards positive nutritional effects. 
Although no direct nutritional studies have been made in these 
cases, indirect evidence indicates that nutrition among outgrower 
families is more likely to have improved than deteriorated because: 
household income has increased; contract crops have primarily 
displaced land and labour previously used on other cash crops rather 
than on subsistence food crops; women's direct incomes have not 
been lowered as men's incomes have risen. Among the poorest of the 
poor (rural farm labourers), nutrition has possibly also improved as 
employment opportunities and annual incomes have risen, while 
their own subsistence household sectors have not been adversely 
affected. 
In summary, it appears that successful contract farming schemes 
create the possibility for improved nutrition and impose few if any 
conditions that would cause it to deteriorate. Without direct evi- 
dence, however, it is not possible to indicate what the actual 
nutritional effects are or what proportion of the potential nutritional 
improvements made possible by income increases are being real- 
ized. Our impression is that the proportion might be increased 
through changes in payment systems and perhaps by information 
programmes. 
(n) What changes in firm-grower relations typically occur over 
time? 
In order to secure a new source of raw materials, agribusiness 
processors must initially pursue promotional policies. High prices, 
low quality standards, more generous credit terms and other attrac- 
tions are used to seduce outgrowers away from their previous 
markets. In this start-up phase, it is more important to establish the 
new source of supply than it is to maximize short-term profits. The 
extra expense of such promotional policies is written off as start-up 
costs for the new operation. 
Once the new source of supply is assured and the processing plant 
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is operating at planned levels, the agribusiness objectives necessarily 
shift. Profit maximization requires continuing efforts to raise the 
quality and reduce the cost of the raw materials purchased. The 
company seeks to work with those outgrowers capable of providing 
the best product at the lowest price with the least amount of costly 
technical assistance. The company must still offer contract terms 
sufficiently attractive to motivate the most efficient and highest 
quality outgrowers, but it does not mind if lower prices and lesser 
technical assistance drive marginal producers out of the programme. 
This is the `agribusiness normalization' process, an inevitable dyna- 
mic of processor-outgrower relations. 
Initially, processors and growers need each other to make anything 
happen at all in this new market. This interdependence, which never 
truly dissipates, will soon be submerged. For the daily reality is one of 
conflicting short-run interests, and this short-run tension can hide the 
long-run mutual interest in continued cooperation. Once normal- 
ized, the relations between outgrowers and processors are full of 
continual low-level conflict, as each side seeks to maximize its 
own benefits to the point just short of severing the relationship 
altogether. 
The impact of this daily conflict on the small outgrower is not 
necessarily negative. Distrusting the company, he learns to keep his 
own accounts. Having learned what inputs are needed, he is constantly 
on the lookout for lower cost alternatives to company supplies. He 
learns from bitter experience about contracts, legal agreements, 
credit laws. Ultimately, he seeks competing contract buyers, his best 
defence against the possibility of exploitation. 
If the contract farming arrangement is even partially successful, 
competing contract buyers will arrive on the scene. With raw 
materials already available from outgrowers needing less technical 
assistance, later-arriving processors can often afford to compete by 
offering higher prices, since their start-up costs can be so much 
less than those of the processing pioneers. In both Guatemala and 
Peru, smaller competing buyers are already operating in growing 
zones pioneered by the original export processors. This does not 
always happen. In New Brunswick, McCain is still unchallenged 
after thirty years of potato freezing operations. But if competition 
does develop and the original processor loses its monopsony 
advantage, the situation may again shift slightly in favour of the 
outgrowers. 
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(o) What are the broader rural development effects of contract 
farming? 
Local governments often favour contract farming in the belief that it 
will produce greater spillover or linkage effects with the local eco- 
nomy than would plantation production. Our study found significant 
variations in this respect. For the labour-intensive fruit and vegetable 
crops, a multiplier is clearly present in the great expansion of daily 
farm labour employment made necessary by the new contracted 
crops. There are also, in all cases, very significant new employment 
opportunities in the transport and processing activities located just 
upstream, nearest to the farm sources of raw material supplies. 
For traditional crops, and in cases where a highly mechanized and 
centralized production system is transferred to large outgrowers, the 
situation is different. Here the nominal transfer of legal responsibilities 
via a contract does little to change the economic imperatives of the 
production system. 
In the banana industry, for example, the linkage effects of local 
production are not much greater than TNC production provides; 
nearly all of the inputs used by associate producers are provided by 
exporting companies, which either import them duty-free (in the case 
of chemicals) or produce them in Honduras (e.g. boxes and plastic 
bags). Moreover, as Ellis (1977) shows, the linkage effects of any 
form of banana production are very slight. Nor is there any reason to 
believe that associate producers would be less likely to evade taxes 
than TNCs; while the latter have more sophisticated accounting tools 
at their disposal, local producers are generally too small and numerous 
to make careful audits by the tax authorities worthwhile. The issue is 
less contract farming vs. its alternatives than the management- and 
capital-intensity of the production system. 
Apart from employment, is there a spillover for the outgrowers 
themselves into other areas of rural development, or is all their 
increased income spent on increased consumption? Do outgrowers 
make productive investments in areas outside of the contracted farm 
activity itself? There is evidence of such investment, in some cases 
more than in others, but the amounts involved, and the kinds of 
activities invested in, often make these changes almost invisible to the 
outside observer. 
In the two systems involving recently colonized land, Mumias and 
ASAGRO, subsistence farming systems did not fully utilize the 
acreage available where physical and organizational farm-to-market 
Conclusions 153 
infrastructures were only incipient, and where farm families have 
been accustomed to men's off-farm and out-of-area work as a main 
source of income. Women concentrated their efforts - stretched thin 
by daily subsistence work requirements and the labour required on 
the contract crops - on building the productive capacity of the house- 
hold's subsistence economy sector. Expansion and diversification of 
the household's commercial farming activity - very important in 
Guatemala - did not occur at all. This choice was probably the result 
of both the lack of perceived opportunities and the need to bring the 
subsistence sector up to culturally expected levels of production. 
Investments and production increases in the subsistence farming 
sectors of these farms were particularly impressive in Peru, limited 
only by the lack of family labour. The cases in western Kenya, 
and especially Peru, performed well in terms of opening up under- 
developed areas of the country. Roads, rural infrastructure and, in 
the Santa valley, the creation of arable land itself, have been direct 
results of the establishment of agribusinesses. 
In the three LDC cases, an important area of family investment 
was in the increased education of dependants. As soon as financially 
able, families were willing to make the financial sacrifice of foregoing 
children's subsistence labour to keep them in primary school more 
days and more years. Additionally, families able to do so sent boys 
out of their areas to attend secondary schools to earn credentials 
qualifying them for steady non-farm employment. This seems to 
reflect a judgement that the family's economic future would be better 
served by human capital investments which get members out of 
agriculture, rather than by farm investments. There was no obvious 
difference in this strategy between farm families in Guatemala, 
whose adult men had returned from outside employment to contract 
crop farm work, and farm families in Peru and Kenya who hired 
outside labour so that adult men could continue their non-farm 
occupations. 
Another area of investment was in household capital that contri- 
buted both to the subsistence economy and to the women's income 
side of the cash economy. This included the small farmer's traditional 
`savings account' of domestic livestock, and some innovations, namely: 
the purchase of farm or household equipment that could be rented 
out or used at home; the purchase of inputs to increase the quantity 
or quality of artisan products; increased inventories of goods for re- 
sale in markets or home-based stores. Although these kinds of 
investments were very common, the levels involved were quite small 
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compared to the investments in contract farming activities and male 
children's advanced education. They were probably sufficient to 
raise women's incomes in absolute terms while they fell as a pro- 
portion of total household income. No cases were observed where the 
investment in this kind of production was sufficient to make a 
woman's micro-enterprise activity into a major `full-time' business. 
The economic and cultural context seems more likely to have 
favoured this type of economic development in Mumias but the 
primary literature does not report it. This may be because it was not 
seen, as is often the case with `invisible' women's work, or because it 
was prevented from happening by arrangements in which contract 
payments were made to absentee male `contract farmers' rather than 
to the women who actually lived on and managed the farms. 
Unlike some cases of plantation agribusiness, contract farming per 
se does not lead to enclave development. Through the diversification 
of small contract farmers, the increased income permeates their 
households and communities. Capitalization occurs, together with 
investment increases in subsistence agriculture, commercial farming, 
non-farm micro-enterprises and education. This economic develop- 
ment is more visible with larger farmers who can buy equipment such 
as tractors and pickup trucks, but it also occurs, less visibly but no less 
significantly, among the smaller outgrowers. 
8 Policy Implications 
This chapter explores some of the factors which policy makers must 
take into consideration in trying to promote or control contract 
farming schemes. The first part highlights some of the ambiguities 
and tradeoffs that can result, as different goals or internal dynamics 
come into conflict. The second discusses some areas in which positive 
sum solutions are possible, and where sustainable benefits to small 
farmers can be achieved through state intervention. The final section 
explores the degree to which successful contract farming experiences 
can be replicated in other contexts. 
TRADEOFFS FOR POLICY MAKERS 
If serious problems arise in an agribusiness venture and efforts by 
contract farmers to defend their interests are ineffective, intervention 
by government would seem to be indicated. This, of course, assumes 
a government responsive to the concerns of small farmers. Frequently 
this assumption does not hold. Agribusiness firms may exert greater 
political influence than growers, and even governments sympathetic 
to the latter may be forced to deal with problems more pressing than 
farmers' welfare. For example, pressure to squeeze the agricultural 
sector for foreign exchange earnings is overwhelming in debt-laden 
countries and may lead to a short term co-incidence of interests 
between governments and export-oriented firms. 
Furthermore, it is an oversimplification to speak of `the govern- 
ment'; one must distinguish among the often conflicting objectives of 
its various agencies. In the Honduran sugar case, private sugar mills 
purchased and processed the cane of local farmers. The National 
Development Bank provided credit to growers, a second public 
agency set prices for the firm's processed output, and the Ministry of 
Finance taxed its revenue. Each agency had a different objective with 
respect to producer prices. The Bank could be expected to favour a 
high producer price, since that would facilitate the repayment of its 
loans to growers. If producer prices were high enough to reduce 
the firm's profits, however, the Ministry's tax revenues would be 
reduced. Furthermore, the price control agency's interest would be in 
a low producer price, in order to keep the wholesale price of sugar 
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down to a politically acceptable level. In such situations, simple goals 
like `maximizing smallholder welfare' are soon subordinated to the 
more specific objectives of individual agencies. 
In spite of these caveats, there is evidence that some LDC 
governments have intervened on behalf of small contract farmers. 
Rama's (1985) survey of agribusiness in Latin America found many 
instances in which governments attempted to obtain better contract 
conditions for producers. This section assumes that such governments 
will continue to intervene and would benefit from more complete 
information about the effects of their interventions. The following 
paragraphs illustrate some of the difficulties that can arise in attempting 
to design effective policies. 
The availability of alternatives is one of the most important 
preconditions for a contract farming situation that benefits small 
farmers. If the policy context is a dynamic one - if government has 
the means to increase alternatives via licensing, pricing policy and the 
like - there is no tradeoff. If the context is taken as given, however, 
and the choice is where to introduce CF (in competitive or non- 
competitive environments), then a serious conflict does arise. 
Farmers who have many alternatives are generally the more pros- 
perous ones anyway - the ones who need help are peasants who 
can only grow a couple of basic crops or have only one middleman to 
sell to. If we say that agro-industries should only be set up in areas 
where there are already abundant alternatives, we exclude the target 
group. 
Another equally tricky precondition for beneficial CF is that the 
company have no farms of its own. Clearly, a group of farmers who 
control 100% of a firm's supplies will be in a strong bargaining 
position. On the other hand, company production has positive 
aspects. A firm with its own farms will often have specialized 
machinery that it can rent to growers, and better technical assistance 
than a company that is strictly a buyer. Only large growers could 
afford to buy specialized machinery and they are likely to be in less 
need of advice than small farmers. The policy recommendation that 
would maximize the growers' bargaining power would also result in 
the exclusion of the target group. 
This contradiction appears even on the apparently simple issue 
of price. A high contract price may not only drive the firm out of 
business, but also may attract inefficient growers who should prob- 
ably be producing a different crop. If the price is too low, on the 
other hand, only the most efficient producers will be attracted, and 
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peasants who might be good growers if they got some help and 
experience will be shut out. Furthermore, the contracting relation- 
ship is not a `zero sum game'; the distribution of benefits between 
the firm and its growers can affect the total magnitude of benefits 
available. For instance, an increase in the contract price will redistri- 
bute income from firm to growers, but it may allow the company to 
achieve economies of scale and thus greater long run profits. Invest- 
ments in technical assistance to growers, which result in better quality 
produce or more reliable deliveries, can similarly benefit the firm. 
The point is fairly obvious but deserves emphasis. The `non zero sum' 
character of the relationship makes it difficult, even in theory, to 
arrive at a distribution of profits that will maximize the long run 
benefits to growers. If the firm is `pushed back' to a profit level just 
adequate to keep it in business, it will not be able to expand or set up 
other plants. The benefits from contracting, such as they are, will go 
to existing growers and not to new entrants. 
Obviously, devising policies in this area is quite tricky. In addition 
to the types of conflicts just mentioned, there are serious difficulties 
involved in policing a contract. Many of the variables, such as who to 
contract with, are under the firm's control. It would be impractical to 
tell firms they cannot deal with absentee landlords, for example, 
especially when one of the goals of agricultural policy in many LDCs 
is to modernize these landlords and get them to produce commercial 
crops. Another problem is that most contracts involve too many 
variables to police effectively. Even if one can decide on a suitable 
price and fix it in the contract, as suggested by Scott (1984), there are 
many ways the company can get around it. It can manipulate quality 
standards, or raise the prices it charges for inputs, or delay payments 
and collect the interest in the meantime. If the firm really wants to 
sabotage the contract, there are a dozen ways to do it. There is 
probably not a great deal a government can do to police a contract 
and it should definitely not impose contracting on an unwilling firm or 
in an inappropriate situation. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A more promising approach than attempting to intervene in existing 
situations is to undertake more careful ex ante appraisals, drawing on 
lessons from successful and unsuccessful experiences. Research 
should attempt to define the conditions under which CF can operate 
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profitably to the benefit of small farmers and without intervention. 
For example, it is fairly clear that the preferred crops are those which 
do not require specialized machinery. Growers who have invested in 
such machinery can be effectively locked in to growing a particular 
crop, even if prices or relations with the company deteriorate. 
It is a truism, but one frequently ignored, to say that smallholders 
are most likely to benefit when producing crops suitable for small- 
holder production. Many schemes have attempted to involve small 
farmers in crops better suited to plantation production, with poor 
results. An extreme case occurred in Honduras, where the govern- 
ment in the mid-seventies required all agro-industries to purchase at 
least some of their raw materials from outgrowers. In cases where 
firms could have grown their own crops more cheaply, the result 
was ill-will and the mistreatment of contract growers. It is entirely 
possible that these companies were in fact, trying to sabotage their 
contract arrangements in the hope that the government would retract 
the legislation. 
Even in schemes which are well designed and contain the potential 
for benefit to both the firm and its growers, disagreements are likely 
to rise. The sheer number of transactions that take place and the 
subjectivity of judgements about produce quality lead to conflict. 
Governments should provide a mechanism to resolve such conflicts 
by requiring or providing a neutral arbitrator to whom growers or the 
firm can refer in cases of dispute. 
The two most critical ingredients for a successful agribusiness 
venture are undoubtedly the existence of an adequate market for the 
product and an appropriate government pricing policy. The key 
advantage which an agribusiness provides small farmers is access to a 
large remunerative market. These farmers are often unable to exploit 
their comparative advantage in labour- and skill-intensive products 
because foreign markets are inaccessible and domestic markets are 
too `thin': there are relatively few producers and consumers. Particu- 
larly for perishable crops, these markets are highly volatile and prices 
in them can drop by 50% or more following a single delivery from a 
large grower or cooperative. 
Pricing policy is crucial in determining the profitability of an agri- 
business enterprise, both for growers and processors. KTDA's 
success is in large part due to the scheme's exemption from export tax 
which allows the project and its growers to receive a large share of the 
world price. Sugar companies in Honduras, by contrast, sold their 
products in domestic markets at prices set well below market levels 
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by government. This in turn exerted downward pressure on the 
producer price. No other single factor is likely to exercise as much 
influence over the success and sustainability of a contract farming 
venture as pricing policy. 
In contract farming, the processing or exporting firm provides 
multiple services to the growers: credit, technical assistance, seed, 
inputs, and so on. The provision of such a package is useful, but, 
related to an earlier point, it is the firm's role as a buyer of produce 
that is crucial. If a market outlet is available, growers will probably be 
able to obtain other services, though quality and price may not be 
optimal. Credit probably ranks second in importance. Provision of 
inputs or extension, however, are likely to have little effect if there is 
no adequate market for the product. 
Growers should not depend on the scheme for more than a portion 
of their income; agribusiness should be seen as an additional, often 
seasonal, source of cash, rather than the farmer's principal liveli- 
hood. Ideally, the contract crop should be a second or third cash 
crop, rather than the only supplement to subsistence. Furthermore, 
agribusiness will be most beneficial when it `opens' rather than 
`closes' options: when the farming system is such that the new crop 
can be added to existing activities rather than requiring specialization. 
However, as noted elsewhere, this does introduce a bias away from 
the participation of the poorest farmers. 
Experience also provides some lessons about other aspects of price 
policy. Price stabilization can, under a particular combination of 
supply and demand elasticities, lead to income stabilization for 
producers. If price stabilization is introduced, however, care must be 
taken in distinguishing short term fluctuations from long term trends 
and in ensuring that administered prices do not mask signals about 
quality requirements. Price signals have proved to be highly effective 
in indicating to producers the importance of quality and the con- 
sequent need for appropriate agronomic practices. 
Size and frequency of payments is also significant. There are 
indicators, from Kenya for example, that small but frequent pay- 
ments may lead to more expenditures on food, especially if payments 
are made to women. Large infrequent payments could in theory lead 
to more expenditure on large investments. Evidence to support these 
contentions is not completely convincing, however, largely because 
the use of informal capital markets tends to moderate the effects of 
different payment systems. 
As KTDA and Mumias show, efforts by government to legislate 
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minimum acreages for food crops within CF schemes have been 
notably unsuccessful. Growers tend to have higher acreages and the 
relative prices of food- and cash-crops lead to higher incomes from 
specialization in the latter. The resources needed to legislate and 
enforce acreage requirements would be better spent in the analysis 
and management of effective price policies. 
The studies also support the contention that both incentive and 
expenditure effects are likely to be superior when contracts are 
signed with and payment made to women, in those frequent cases 
where women are responsible for crop production. By modifying 
agribusiness schemes to more explicitly recognize and reward 
women's participation, these schemes can make a very significant 
contribution to women's income. This contribution is potentially far 
greater than that of small projects specifically geared to women, such 
as handicraft production. 
Policy makers should also recognize that many of the benefits from 
contract farming will come via increased employment, either in the 
processing plant or by the medium and small contract growers who 
hire supplementary labour. Both the level and quality of this employ- 
ment (in terms of skill acquisition, conformity with labour standards, 
and so on) is frequently superior to that available in traditional 
agriculture. 
The benefits of agribusiness can also be increased by involving 
a growers' organization. Such organizations increase the farmers' 
bargaining power and improve coordination between firms and 
growers. In the short-run, these organizations can make it more 
feasible for firms to deal with a multitude of small growers, thus 
extending the benefits of the scheme. In the longer run, they can take 
over some functions performed by the firm, even including ownership 
of the enterprise. As discussed elsewhere, however, such associa- 
tions, especially ones which do more than coordinate, are often 
difficult to organize. 
As noted previously, agribusiness schemes are very risky, particu- 
larly those which introduce new crops and/or extend the agribusiness 
frontier into new countries or the least developed countries. The first 
company into a new field often fails. Only by learning from its 
mistakes and adapting the product to the market's requirements can 
subsequent firms succeed. Governments or aid agencies should find 
ways to reward risk-taking, perhaps along the lines suggested by 
Williams and Karen (1985). 
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REPLICABILITY 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, the attention directed towards 
contract farming has come from different directions. Much early 
research reflected an interest in the `new forms of investment' 
practised by transnational corporations; later research reflected the 
search for new kinds of rural development projects suitable for small 
farmers. In the late 1980s, there was much interest in new ways to 
organize agricultural production and marketing that involve less 
direct state involvement and increase the country's export earnings. 
Contract farming is becoming an element of the `policy dialogue' 
between developing country governments and the donor community. 
As yet, the number of farmers involved in contract farming is 
relatively small. What is of most interest about these schemes is not 
so much their actual effects but the potential for replicating their 
positive features in other schemes, spreading the benefits more 
widely. What are the limits to this replicability? 
Projects of two different types have been described in this book, 
each limited by different factors. For companies exporting non- 
traditional high value speciality crops, the `agribusiness infrastruc- 
ture' described in the business school literature is very important. 
Reliable storage, refrigeration and transport are essential and the 
costs of air or sea freight are very important. These factors tend to 
limit successful operations to countries not too distant from northern 
markets, and to areas which have already undergone some develop- 
ment, rather than the poorest and most isolated regions. This frontier 
is constantly being pushed back, however. As technological innova- 
tions make long distance transport less expensive and labour costs 
rise in established areas, entrepreneurs will move outward, often 
failing in their first attempt but making things easier for firms that 
follow. This progression has been most obvious in Central America, 
where rising agricultural labour costs in Mexico induced firms to set 
up operations in Guatemala and Honduras. For some products with 
very high value-to-weight ratios such as strawberries and cut flowers, 
the range has extended to below the Equator in Africa and South 
America. 
The second kind of scheme is state-directed, producing traditional 
tropical commodities such as sugar, oil palm, rubber or tea, either 
for import substitution or for export. Schemes involving these com- 
modities are widespread in Africa and Asia, and two - KTDA and 
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Mumias - were described in this book. Here the limiting factor tends 
to be the management intensity of the schemes. A large ratio of 
managers, technicians and extensionists is needed to run the highly 
centralized projects and few developing countries can afford this. For 
example, KTDA, generally regarded as highly successful, operates 
with a ratio of extensionists to farmers about four times the average 
for Kenya (Lele, 1975, p. 14). This also tends to limit the schemes to 
high value crops, since the margins on basic foodstuffs are usually too 
small to support this infrastructure. 
There are three ways that project managers might try to overcome 
these limitations. One is to expand the schemes to include larger 
areas and more farmers. However, processing plant capacity and the 
distances over which perishable goods can be handled will not leave 
much room for manoeuvre in most projects. 
A second option would be to incorporate other commodities, such 
as food crops, into the schemes, spreading management costs over a 
wider range of activities. The project could distribute agro-chemicals 
for other crops; extensionists could provide technical assistance, 
perhaps using demonstration plots at collection sites; the project 
authority or growers' organization might market the secondary 
crops. The schemes could also be useful testing grounds for intro- 
ducing new technologies for food crops under semi-controlled 
conditions, providing a necessary stage between the experiment 
station and dissemination through the market or nation-wide govern- 
ment programmes. This proposal does run the risk of overextending 
public or project resources and using cash crops to subsidize food 
crops. 
A third solution to the problem of management intensity would be 
to forego efforts at tight centralized control and instead to manage 
outgrowers through less direct methods. Price incentives are often 
neglected as a way to influence farmers' behaviour. Price differentials 
can be applied to produce delivered at key times of the season or to 
desired quality grades. Transmitting world prices directly or with only 
slight cushioning to producers is also a more effective method of 
providing signals about the importance of quality than exhortation. 
Providing appropriate price signals, controlling a few key stages or 
inputs such as processing or provision of certified seed, and giving the 
farmers a stake in the enterprise's success and a voice in its manage- 
ment through shareholding and a growers' organization - these are 
likely to achieve the desired coordination and quality control more 
efficiently than attempts at direct control over each aspect of pro- 
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duction, provided that adequate information and technical assistance 
are also provided. 
Clearly, the most successful cases in this book were ALCOSA in 
Guatemala and KTDA in Kenya. The fact that one is private and the 
other state-directed indicates that the public/private distinction is not 
decisive in determining the success of a scheme. Much more import- 
ant are the selection of a crop suitable for small farmers; a pricing 
policy that reflects market signals, neither taxing producers, subsidiz- 
ing them at the consumer's expense, nor sheltering them from market 
signals about quality; and a decentralized management style that 
leaves much initiative in the hands of growers. 
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